During the first fifty years of the twentieth century, several suppositions developed about the ideal civil procedure and its appropriate relationship to substantive law. This article questions those suppositions with respect to cases arising under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We begin Section II of the article with a brief overview of the purpose and legislative history of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Sections III and IV examine the structure of title VII and the claims brought under it, and discuss the prima facie case, burdens of proof, pleadings and discovery. Section V addresses the Supreme Court's redefinition of the parties to title VII litigation and the Court's analysis of class actions, indispensable parties and preclusion. Thereafter, we scrutinize the effect of the cases on legal practice, discussing attorney's fees and Rule 11 sanctions. We conclude with an epilogue that questions the compartmentalization of twentieth century legal thinking, and challenges Congress to recognize the significance of the interplay of procedure and substance in creating new rights.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Law
Baumann, Phyllis Tropper; Brown, Judith Olans; and Subrin, Stephen, "Substance in the shadow of procedure: the integration of substantive and procedural law in title VII cases" (1992). School of Law Faculty Publications. 99.