The State of State Competition for Incorporations

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by

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Abstract

The competition by states for incorporations has long been the subject of extensive scholarship. This article tries to deconstruct the state competition debates by showing that scholars are engaged in three separate debates that are only loosely connected to each other. The first, “directional” debate concerns whether firms, if given a choice, will choose corporate law rules that maximize shareholder value or managerial benefits. Resolution of this question is relevant regardless of whether states “compete.” All it takes to make this question important is for firms to have a meaningful choice among legal rules. The second, “competition” debate concerns whether, how, and which states compete for incorporations. Depending on what is meant by “competition”, competition can exist even in a regime where firms have no choice over where they incorporate and may not exist in a regime where firms have free choice. The third, “federalism” debate concerns the shape a mandatory corporate law would take if such a law were enacted. Separating these three conceptually distinct questions, and the evidence relevant to each, yields a better understanding of the arguments made by the partisans in the state competition debate and of the issues that remain unresolved.
Introduction

The competition by states for incorporations has long been the subject of extensive scholarship.\(^1\) Views of this competition differ radically. While some commentators regard it as “The Genius of American Corporate Law,”\(^2\) others believe it leads to a “Race to the Bottom”\(^3\) and yet others have taken the position that it barely exists.\(^4\) Despite this lack of consensus among corporate law scholars, scholars in other fields have treated state competition for incorporations as a paradigm case of regulatory competition.\(^5\)


\(^3\) Cary, supra note 1, at 666.


\(^5\) See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
In this article, I will try to deconstruct the state competition debates by showing that, in fact, scholars are engaged in three separate debates that are only loosely connected to each other. The first, “directional” debate concerns whether firms, if given a choice, will choose corporate law rules that maximize shareholder value, maximize managerial benefits, something in between,\(^6\) or something else entirely.\(^7\)

Resolution of this question is relevant regardless of whether states “compete.” All it takes to make this question important

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\(^7\) William W. Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 University of Toronto Law Journal 401 (1994).
is for firms to have a meaningful choice among legal rules.

In the U.S., a firm can incorporate in any state (or, for that matter, in a foreign country) regardless of where they are headquartered and have its “internal affairs” governed by the laws of its state of incorporation. An existing firm can also change their state of incorporation with the approval of the board and its shareholders without triggering major consequences other than the change in governing law.

As a result, even in the absence of state competition, firms have a choice among legal regimes as long as states offer different legal rules. For that matter, firms can have meaningful choices even if they have no choice of where to incorporate as long as the state’s legal regime offers firms flexibility in devising their governance rules.

The second, “competition” debate concerns whether, how, and which states compete for incorporations. Depending on what is meant by “competition”, competition can exist even in a regime where firms have no choice over where they incorporate\(^8\) and may not exist in a regime where firms have free choice.

The third, “federalism” debate concerns the desirability of federal corporate law as an alternative to the present regime,

where many corporate law rules are determined by the law of the firm’s state of incorporation. How such a law would stack up in absolute terms along various dimensions - pro-shareholder versus pro-manager, concern for other constituents such as creditors and employees, speed of adopting innovations, and so on - is a question that is entirely separate from the earlier two debates.

I. The Directional Debate: To the Bottom or to the Top?

The issue in the state competition debate that has been the subject of the fiercest controversy is whether the “race” that state competition supposedly engenders leads to the “bottom” - to laws favoring managers at the expense of shareholders⁹ - or to the “top” - to laws that maximize firm value.¹⁰ That this issue is the one most analyzed by commentators is, on one hand, not surprising: the direction of the “race” is clearly very important from a policy perspective.¹¹ On the other hand, however, the factors that determine whether the “race” is to the

⁹ See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 1 (arguing that state competition leads to rules biased towards managerial interests); Cary, supra note 1 (arguing that state competition results in a race to the bottom).
¹⁰ See, e.g., Winter, supra note 1 (arguing that state competition results in a race to the top); Fischel, supra note 1 (challenging Cary’s analysis); Romano, supra note 1 (adducing evidence that state competition results in a race to the top).
¹¹ Even if firms chose legal rules that maximize firm value, the result may not be optimal due to the presence of network and other types of externalities, see Klausner, supra note 1.
top or to the bottom have virtually nothing to do with state competition. Rather, these factors are internal to the firm.

Race to the bottom theorists, in effect, posit that, when given a choice between laws favoring managers that reduce overall value and laws disfavoring managers that increase overall value, firms will chose the former. Race to the top theorists posit that firms will chose the latter. Viewed from this perspective, the theoretical debate about direction is more closely connected to the debate about the need for mandatory rules than it is to state competition more generally.\(^{12}\)

As I will discuss here, the positions taken by the partisans, properly understood, are much closer to each other than the literature lets on. At the same time, the theoretical underpinnings make the question of firm choice significantly more complex that the "to the top" and "to the bottom" monikers suggest.

A. Extreme vs. Nuanced Versions in the Directional Debate

The extreme claim that state competition has resulted in a race to the bottom is clearly false and was probably never

seriously asserted. At the very bottom, managers have appropriated all shareholder wealth. The combined market capitalization of stock in U.S. publicly traded companies is (and the returns that investors have earned from stock ownership are) sufficiently high that it is safe to conclude that we have not arrived at the very bottom. Indeed, Lucian Bebchuk, the contemporary scholar most identified with the race to the bottom view, argues that firms will chose a law favoring managers which reduces firm value over a law favoring shareholders which increases firm value only if the reduction in firm value, relative to the benefit to the managers, is not excessive.\textsuperscript{13}

The extreme race to the top claim is also difficult to maintain. If firms, when given a choice, always chose the law that maximizes value, it must be either that managers have no power over that decision or that the interests of managers and shareholders regarding the choice coincide perfectly.

A more nuanced version of the race to the top claim would admit that firms may sometimes chose a law that reduces firm value and benefits managers. This more nuanced race to the top claim differs from Bebchuk’s more nuanced version of the race to the bottom claim only in degree (and perhaps not at all). For example, Easterbrook and Fischel, among the most prominent early

\textsuperscript{13} Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1461.
to-the-top scholars, share Bebchuk’s view\textsuperscript{14} that managers regularly chose rules that entrench them against hostile bids even though they lower firm value.\textsuperscript{15} So, possibly, the main difference between the two camps has less to do with their views on the directional debate and more to do with their (less well argued and articulated) views on the federalism debate: how good (or bad) would a federal corporate law be.

B. The Multiplicity of Settings for Choice

Firms chose their domicile, and thereby the legal rules that govern them, in a multiplicity of settings. Specifically, firms can make this choice prior to an IPO or mid-stream; they can make it explicitly (by reincorporating) or implicitly (by failing to reincorporate); and managers, at the time of the choice, can hold a small fraction (“outside managers”) or a significant fraction (“large shareholder managers”) of the firm’s voting power. But the direction of firm choice depends on the power and incentives of managers and of shareholders. Because these factors will vary systematically among the settings for choice, there is no a priori reason why the

\textsuperscript{14} See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 1.
directions of firm choices in different settings should be identical.

1. The Power to Effect Mid-Stream Incorporation Decisions

To change its state of incorporation, a firm typically merges with a wholly owned subsidiary incorporated in a different state, with the subsidiary surviving the merger. Mergers generally require a recommendation by the board of directors and the approval by at least a majority of the shares entitled to vote.\(^{16}\) According to Guhan Subramanian, 373 firms effected mid-stream reincorporations over the 1991 to 2001 period.\(^{17}\)

To effect a midstream reincorporation that benefits them at the expense of shareholder value, manager thus need to both dominate the board of director sufficiently to get the board to recommend the merger and either own sufficient shares to approve a merger or induce sufficient other shareholders to vote for the merger. To block a reincorporation that benefits shareholders at the expense of managers, managers merely need to dominate the board of director sufficiently to get the board not to recommend

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\(^{16}\) See, e.g. Delaware General Corporation Law, Section 251.
a reincorporation merger or have sufficient shares to block the merger. Obviously, large shareholder managers will have a greater power than outside managers to effect or block a reincorporation as they own a greater fraction of shares and as they are more likely to dominate the board.

i. Board Domination

Race to the bottom scholars have generally assumed that even outside managers have sufficient influence over board decision to block a reincorporation that runs counter to their interests and race to the top scholars have not directly challenged this assumption.18 While this assumption may be justified for many companies, the degree to which managers control boards is not uniform and has declined over the years.19 As Ed Rock and I have shown elsewhere, the percentage and the relative power of outside directors on corporate boards has increased substantially over the last 40 years.20 Thus, at least

18 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 1. An exception is Romano, who points that, when Pennsylvania enacted a disgorgement anti-takeover statute in 1990, the boards of almost 3/4 of all exchange traded Pennsylvania companies decided to opt out. Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 859 (1993).
19 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Texas Law Review 987 (2010).
20 Kahan & Rock, supra note 19; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How I
in some companies, managers may not have the power to block a reincorporation on the board level.

Whether outside managers in many companies have sufficient sway over their boards to get them to recommend a reincorporation that favors managerial interest at the expense of shareholder interest is questionable. The fact that there is no widespread shareholder opposition to reincorporation recommendations (unlike, say, to board decisions to adopt a poison pill and retain a staggered board) suggests that managerial power in this regard is limited.

ii. Shareholder Approval

That shareholders must vote in favor of a reincorporation would seem to indicate that reincorporations ought to benefit shareholders as long as managers do not control the shareholder vote. “To the bottom” theorists have countered that shareholders have imperfect information about the effect of a reincorporation on the value of firm and may vote in favor of reincorporations that run counter to their interest.  

Whatever the merits of this argument may have been in the


21 Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1470-76.

22 The argument that some shareholders are imperfectly informed
past, it has lost of its currency in light of the increased power of institutional investors. Institutional investors (such as mutual funds and pension funds) hold much larger stakes in specific firms than the individual investors of lore. They also hold shares in many more different companies. This generates economies of scope to the extent that they vote on recurring issues that have similar effects on companies (such as decisions to reincorporate). Moreover, institutional investors can pool their resources by hiring proxy advisory firms to give them voting advice. It is thus highly doubtful that institutional investors have significantly less information about the effect of a reincorporation than managers do and regularly approve of reincorporations that reduce company value.

A second argument put forth by “to the bottom” scholars is that firms will propose reincorporations that maximize managerial benefits, but subject to the constraint that they do is clearly valid. But it does not necessarily follow that they will tend to vote for value-reducing mergers. It may be more rational for rationally uninformed shareholders to abstain, split their votes, vote randomly, or even systematically vote against board proposals (if they believe that most proposals are adverse to shareholder interests). These strategies would be particularly effective if there are other, better informed, shareholders whose votes would become more likely to carry the day. Whether uninformed shareholders ever followed these more sophisticated strategies, however, is unclear.

23 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 19, at 996 (institutional shareholders have increased from 14% in 1965 to 50% in 2008).
24 Id. at 1005-7.
not reduce shareholder value.25 The result of such a process could be characterized as a “crawl upwards,” as firm value increases whenever a firm reincorporates (if only by a little). As discussed in greater detail below, the “crawl upwards” model has significant implication for the optimal competitive strategy of states trying to attract reincorporations.

2. Conflicts of Interest in Midstream Decisions

Midstream, various forces outside of legal rules (incentive compensation, the managerial labor market, the product market, etc.) align the interests of managers with those of shareholders.26 Some “race to the top” scholars have suggested that these forces are sufficient to induce managers to prefer rules than maximize firm value.27 But since these market forces do not work perfectly, residual conflicts of interest are likely to persist. Indeed, if outside market forces worked to align shareholder and managerial interests perfectly, there would not

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26 The extent to which legal rules, e.g. rules on hostile takeover defenses, align interests is not relevant here since these rules can, in principle, be changed through reincorporation. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 1, 1467 - 70.

27 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 1, at 256-266; Fischel, supra note 1, at 919.
be much need for corporate law.

Individual managers, however, will have incentives to seek pro-manager rules only to the extent that they themselves profit from these rules. The ability of outside managers to profit from pro-manager rules is a function of their expected tenure. The longer their expected tenure, the larger the benefits they derive, for example, from rules insulating managers from hostile takeovers.28

This has two significant implications. First, since expected managerial tenure is limited,29 incumbent managers will obtain only a fraction of the aggregate managerial benefit of a pro-management rule. Second, because managers differ in their expected remaining tenure, they will differ in their incentives to favor a pro-management rule. Indeed, the incentives of a CEO close to retirement to seek rules that maximize share value (and thereby the value of her stock and stock options) through reincorporations are likely to exceed the incentives to seek pro-management rules.

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28 With respect to other types of rules, for example those permitting blatant forms of self-dealing, even a manager with short tenure may be able to extract the bulk of the value from the company. However, such rules are not really at issue in the state competition debate. See Bebchuk, supra note 1; Bebchul & Ferrell, supra note 1.
Large shareholder managers, however, may reasonably expect to sell their shares as a block. If such blocks sell for a higher price as a result of pro-manager legal rules, large shareholder managers can appropriate to themselves the benefits generated by such rules beyond the duration of their managerial tenure.\textsuperscript{30} At the same time, large equity holdings by large shareholder managers reduce conflicts of interests.

3. The Power over Pre-IPO Incorporation Decisions

Pre-IPO firms generally have few shareholders. It is thus likely that pre-IPO boards will reflect the wishes of the pre-IPO shareholders. Pre-IPO, the power to change (and not to change) the state of incorporation therefore effectively rests with the pre-IPO owners of the firm.

The extent to which the pre-IPO owners are identical to the post-IPO managers of the firm varies from firm to firm. On one extreme, there may be a firm where the founding entrepreneur owns or controls most of the stock and plans to continue managing the firm post-IPO. On the other extreme, the pre-IPO owners may plan not be involved in the management at all. In between are firms where both the managers and other pre-IPO

\textsuperscript{30} Barzuza makes a similar argument in the context of cross-listings. See Michal Barzuza, Lemon Signaling in Cross-Listing Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2012-03.
investors (such as venture capitalists) own substantial shares and jointly exercise the power to make the pre-IPO incorporation decision.

4. Conflicts of Interest in Pre-IPO Incorporation Decision

In the IPO, the pre-IPO owners will sell a significant fraction of the equity in the firm. The pre-IPO owners -- including pre-IPO managers to the extent they are owners -- will thus have an incentive to make an incorporation decision that increases the price at which the firm shares can be sold at the IPO. To the extent that the market accurately values the effect of the incorporation state, this gives pre-IPO owners strong incentives to choose a domicile that maximizes firm value.

Race to the bottom theorists have made two retorts to this argument. First, they suggest that the market may not value the effect of the incorporation state correctly.\(^{31}\) Second, they argue that, whatever the incentives for pre-IPO incorporation decisions, it will be post-IPO decisions that will drive the direction of state competition.\(^{32}\) The second retort relates to the competition debate, rather than the directional debate, and will be taken up in the next Part.

\(^{31}\) Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1479.
\(^{32}\) Id. at 1481.
Whether incorporation decisions are accurately priced in the IPO is essentially a debate about stock market efficiency. Since the firm’s state of incorporation and its laws public information, believers in market efficiency would argue, its import is reflected in the stock price. “To the bottom” theorist, by contrast, would have to argue that the market systematically undervalues features of the incorporation law that protect shareholders against various forms of entrenchment and overreaching by managers.33

“To the bottom” theorists, however, have failed to present a cogent argument as to why the market would systematically mis-value companies in that fashion.34 Indeed, theoretically, the market should be likely to price standard terms like the incorporation regime reasonably well. While small pricing inaccuracies may persist, it is unlikely that prices would fail to reflect legal rules that had a significant effect on company value.

33 Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1478-1481.
34 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1478-1481 (noting generic believe of some commentators that markets may not price corporate law rules efficiently). Later on, Bebchuk argues that pro-shareholder rules are likely to be innovative and that innovative rules may not be accurately priced. Id. at 1482. But innovative rules (like rules permitting poison pills, anti-takeover laws, or the set of legal decisions originally attacked by Cary) may also often be pro-management.
5. Summary

Because of these systematic differences related to the multiplicity of settings, and because firms and managers will differ in less systematic ways (e.g., with respect to the degree of influence managers have over the board), it is unlikely that all firm choices follow the same paradigm. Rather, both across settings and, to a lesser extent, within settings, firms may choose different sets of rules.

C. Empirical Evidence on the Directional Debate

I now turn to some of the empirical evidence relevant to the directional debate. At the outset, it is important to note that this evidence is almost necessarily inconclusive. It is virtually impossible to distinguish the nuanced versions of the to-the-top and to-the-bottom positions empirically. Heterogeneity among settings and firms further complicates the empirical analysis.

The earliest empirical studies related to the directional debate are event studies that examine the effect of midstream decisions to reincorporate on firm value. There have been several such event studies and they generally find a slight (in
the range of 1%) statistically significant positive effect on the stock price upon the announcement of a reincorporation.\textsuperscript{35} “To the top” scholars point to these reincorporation studies as evidence for their hypothesis.\textsuperscript{36} Alas, these event studies at most show that midstream reincorporations tend to benefit shareholders. This result would be consistent with the view by race-to-the-bottom scholars that the requirement for shareholder approval constrains managers in this setting and would have no direct implications for pre-IPO incorporation decisions or midstream failures to reincorporate. Moreover, the event studies do not distinguish between companies with outside and large shareholder managers.

Another set of studies looks directly at the factors influencing incorporation decisions of firms. In separate studies, Guhan Subramanian\textsuperscript{37} and Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen\textsuperscript{38} present evidence that firms are more likely to be incorporated

\textsuperscript{35} The studies are summarized in Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 Jam. L. & Econ. Rev. 424 (2002). As the authors note, some of the studies find significant results only for certain subsamples.

\textsuperscript{36} See Romano, supra note 2, at 16-22.


in their home state than in Delaware if their home state has adopted anti-takeover statutes. If these statutes reduce firm value, this result would be consistent with the “to the bottom” view in the directional debate. However, most anti-takeover statutes are rendered redundant by poison pills, so it is unclear why these statutes should matter at all. Indeed, in a different study, I have shown that judicial quality and state law flexibility significantly affect IPO decisions and that, if one controls for these variables, anti-takeover provisions are insignificant.\(^3^9\)

Another set of studies looks at anti-takeover charter provisions (ATPs) of IPO firms. The selection of charter provisions and the selection of domicile represent similar decisions of firms choosing among legal rules (or sets of legal rules). The first of these studies, by Robert Daines and Michael Klausner,\(^4^0\) compares IPOs by firms that went public with venture


\(^{40}\) Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. Econ. & Org. 83 (2001). Other studies include John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1301 (2001) (arguing that variation in defenses can
capital backing, firms controlled by LBO specialists, and other firms. Daines and Klausner found that many IPO charters contained ATPs, with about 43% of the firm charters providing for staggered boards and 6% opting for dual-class voting stock. Dual-class stock was less common in firms with VC or LBO fund backing, but the incidence of staggered boards did not vary significantly between the three groups of companies.

The results found by Daines and Klausner pose questions for both camps. If staggered boards reduce firm value, as believed by several (though not all) “to the top” commentators, IPO charters should not provide for them and should instead (but do not) contain provisions limiting the board’s authority to adopt takeover defenses. But if ATPs reflect managerial self-interest, as “to the bottom” scholars tend to believe, why are they not more universal? In particular, the small percentage of firms with a dual-class share structure is consistent with strong entrenchment provisions being priced at the IPO and being avoided by most firms for that reason. However, that VC and LBO fund backed IPOs are as likely to adopt staggered boards as other firms (even though managers in these firms wield less

be explained by characteristics of law firms advising owner-managers) and Laura C. Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 Journal of Finance (2002).
power), as well as anecdotal evidence, suggest that these weaker provisions may not affect the IPO price, arguably because their effect on firm value is not clear cut.42

II. The Competition Debate: Who Competes and How?

The second debate concerns the actions of states: do they in fact compete for incorporations and, if they do, what is their competitive strategy? I refer to this prong as the competition debate.

Until recently, most state competition scholars have regarded the notion that many states compete for incorporations as a premise for their other arguments, without bothering to inquire much into whether this premise is correct.43 Starting with Bill Cary, state competition scholars have asserted that states stand to earn substantial franchise taxes by firms incorporate in them, which provide an incentive for many states

41 Daines and Klausner report that pre-IPO CEOs own on average 34% of the stock of “other” firms, compared to 15% and 8% respectively of the stock of VC and LBO fund backed firms. The pre-IPO holdings of VCs and LBO funds are, on average, 54% and 75%.
43 The most notable exceptions are Romano, supra note 1, and William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715 (1998).
(especially the smaller ones) to actively seek incorporations.\textsuperscript{44} Other scholars have noted that incorporations generate business for local lawyers, which enhances the incentives provided by the franchise tax.\textsuperscript{45}

Whether states in fact compete has only recently become a focus of the academic debate. In two articles from 2001 and 2002, Ehud Kamar and I have argued that only Delaware actively competes for incorporations.\textsuperscript{46} Since our articles, three different positions on whether states compete have emerged. Kamar and I attribute the failure of states other than Delaware to compete to political as well as economic factors. Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani basically agree that only Delaware competes for incorporations, but they attribute the failure of other states to do so to other states having realized that competition with Delaware would be futile.\textsuperscript{47} Romano maintains that several states are trying to attract incorporations.

\textsuperscript{44} See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 687, note 31 (citing literature).
\textsuperscript{45} See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987); Bebchuk supra note 1, at 1443; Romano, supra note 1, at 240-241.
\textsuperscript{46} See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4; see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell Law Review 1205 (2002).
\textsuperscript{47} Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Debate on State Competition over Corporate Charters, 112, Yale L. J. 553 (2002).
Notably, all camps in this debate agree that Delaware competes; the debate only concerns states other than Delaware.

A. Do States Compete?

The claim by Kamar and me that states other than Delaware do not actively compete for incorporations rests on two grounds: their lack of meaningful incentives to compete and their failure to take meaningful measures to compete. At the time of our article, most states either charged a low, flat franchise tax on in-state firms or a tax based on the amount of business conducted in the state that was also charged on firms incorporated in other states. Other than Delaware, no state stood to derive substantial revenues, even if it attracted a large portion of all public companies. Therefore, contrary to the claims in the earlier state competition literature, franchise tax revenues do not drive competition by other states.48

Kamar and I further show that the benefits states stand to gain from attracting (or retaining) legal business through incorporations are modest.49 These modest benefits may account for the fact that states periodically revise their corporation

48 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 687-694.
49 Id. At 694-699.
law or take other low-cost measures.\textsuperscript{50} States, however, have not taken any more substantial - and possibly more effective - measures to compete, such as replicating Delaware’s highly regarded Chancery Court which specializes in resolving corporate disputes.\textsuperscript{51} Given the at best modest economic incentives to compete and the at best half-hearted measures to compete, Kamar and I conclude that only Delaware makes significant efforts to attract incorporations.

Consistent with our argument, Rob Daines has shown that most firms incorporate either in Delaware or in their headquarter state.\textsuperscript{52} If states competed, Daines’s findings would imply that states other than Delaware either do not try, or do not succeed, in attracting firms headquartered elsewhere. It is, however, unclear what competitive strategy other states would follow to produce such a result. It is more likely, as Daines argues, that the pre-existing relationships between managers and (locally based) lawyers account for the “Delaware or headquarter state” incorporation pattern.

More recently, Michal Barzuza has presented evidence that Nevada competes for, and attracts, some firms who seek extremely

\textsuperscript{50} See also Carney, supra note 43, at 722-728, 737-741 (discussing role of lawyers in corporate law production).
\textsuperscript{51} Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 708-715.
\textsuperscript{52} Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (2002)
lax laws.\textsuperscript{53} Nevada, which had raised its maximum franchise tax from $85 to $11,100 in 2003, accounts for about 6-7\% of incorporations by firms not incorporated in their home state and could be seen as a niche competitor.\textsuperscript{54} Barzuza’s argument supports our notion, discussed in the next section, that competition (and the lack thereof) is politically contingent, rather than futile, and hence may emerge.

B. Why Don’t States Compete?

The prevailing franchise tax structure, which accounts for the fact that only Delaware (and perhaps Nevada) stand to gain substantial revenues from attracting incorporations, is endogenous. States can revise their franchise tax structure, as Nevada did, to give them greater incentives to compete. Why have states not done so?

Bebchuk and Hamdani argue that unerodable economic entry barriers account for the lack of competition. Drawing on Michael Klausner’s prior work,\textsuperscript{55} they argue that Delaware has competitive advantages over any other state attributable principally to “network benefits” (more on that later) derived from the fact


\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 949.

\textsuperscript{55} See Klausner, supra note 1.
that a large percentage of public companies are incorporated in the state. No competing states could compensate for these advantages because Delaware would quickly copy any “improvement” in the law offered by that state. Other states, understanding this dynamic, have realized that competition would be futile.\textsuperscript{56}

For Bebchuk and Hamdani’s argument to work, the entry barriers generated by network benefits must be steep. Delaware earns profit margins from the incorporation business that are, in economic terms, of a stupendous magnitude.\textsuperscript{57}

As Michael Klausner, on his own and with me, has argued, legal rules in general (and Delaware corporate law in particular) generate possible network benefits since the market is more familiar with Delaware law (making the law easier to price); lawyers are more familiar with Delaware law (and it is therefore easier to obtain legal advice); and there are more judicial precedents (clarifying Delaware law). Importantly, because Delaware is expected to continue to have a large market share, network benefits derive from the expectation that market familiarity and lawyer familiarity will continue in the future and that additional judicial precedents will be generated.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 47, at __.
\textsuperscript{57} Kahan & Kamar, supra note 46, at 1211 (estimating that Delaware’s margin is several thousand percent).
\textsuperscript{58} Klausner, supra note 1; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Given their somewhat intangible nature, it is difficult to estimate the magnitude of these benefits with precision. But it seems a stretch to suggest that the entry barriers generated by these benefits are so high to make competition futile.  

Moreover, Bebchuk and Hamdani’s argument that competition is futile because Delaware would copy any innovation is premised on the notion that all firms are attracted to the same legal regime. But as discussed before, due to the multiplicity of settings and the heterogeneity of firms, different firms may be attracted to differing regimes. Furthermore, outside managers and large shareholder managers will differ in the kind of legal rules that bestow benefits on them. Outside managers will be interested in rules that entrench them vis-a-vis shareholders.

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59 There is further reason to doubt that it is network benefits that immunize Delaware from attack. To maximize its profits, Delaware should set its franchise taxes at a level where demand for Delaware incorporations is elastic, i.e. where a change in price will induce a change in the number of firms that decide to incorporate in Delaware. That about half of all public corporations incorporate outside Delaware, and that franchise tax savings are a frequently stated reason for why they do so, is consistent with such a pricing regime. So is the fact that Delaware charges higher franchise taxes to large public firms (which are likely to attribute a greater dollar value to a Delaware incorporation) than to small public firms, but still has a larger market share among large corporations. But if demand for Delaware incorporations is elastic, it follows that a state could attract incorporations by improving its products.
(such a rules on takeover defenses), while large shareholder managers will be interested in rules that makes it difficult to sue them for breaches of fiduciary duties (e.g. if they engage in self-dealing transactions). Even if Delaware enjoys substantial network benefits, it would thus seem feasible for states to offer a differentiated product attractive to a subset of public corporations, as Nevada does according to Barzuza and as Maryland does for regulated investment companies.\textsuperscript{60}

Rather than purely economic factors, Kamar and I argue that political ones account for the lack of more significant competition. For one, states are not firms. Entry is limited (one cannot form a new state) and the notion that existing states will generally try to maximize their profits in designing their corporate law is unsupported. Indeed both Romano and Bebchuk and Hamdani acknowledge that economic benefits from attracting incorporations are unlikely to induce larger states to compete. But even most smaller states have probably never given serious thought to competing for incorporations or taken actions like hiring a consultant to explore whether competition would be profitable.

Moreover, seriously competing for incorporations entails substantial political costs. For example, in most states,\textsuperscript{60} Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 721-722.
establishing a court modeled after Delaware’s Chancery Court would require a constitutional amendment and attract political opposition, e.g. from the plaintiffs’ bar worried about undermining the right to a jury trial. If established, the most qualified potential judges would probably not be residents of the state. Small firm lawyers, who would stand to gain little from attracting public incorporations, may oppose a wholesale change in the state’s corporate law. And so on.\(^6\)

While more costly reform is difficult, states still revise their law. But as Bill Carney has argued, in some states these revisions are driven by the influence of political interest groups – lawyers and management – rather than by a desire to attract incorporations, while other states try to reduce the cost of lawmaking by adopting the Model Business Corporation Act.\(^6\)

Whether it is just economic and also political factors that explain the present state of (non)-competition bears on the stability of that state. For Bebchuk and Hamdani, it would take a significant economic upheaval to permit states to compete effectively. For Kamar and me, competition may emerge spontaneously, more states may start pursuing niche strategies, "

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\(^6\) Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4
\(^6\) See Carney, supra note 43.
and some niche players may start aiming at a greater market share, as the political dynamics in a state change.

C. Competitive Strategy

Though the directional debate and the competition debate are in many ways separate, they are linked with respect to one issue: what competitive strategy should Delaware (and other competing states) adopt?

The discussion of the competitive strategies for Delaware in this section will be somewhat stylized. In reality, it is of course difficult for anyone — and surely for amorphous political entities like states — to devise and implement a strategy. One important aspect of this difficulty is that a significant portion of Delaware corporate law is judge-made. And while the judiciary may not be oblivious to a state’s goals in attracting incorporations, it is also not the stooge of the state budget and economic development office. Moreover, the interests of lawyers, an important interest group even in Delaware,⁶³ may lead to deviations from the profit-maximizing strategy. Thus, whatever a state’s maximizing strategy is in theory, in practice it will be implemented imperfectly.

A starting point to the analysis of Delaware’s optimal

⁶³ See Cary, supra note 1; Macey & Miller, supra note 45.
strategy is to determine the forces that shape the law of other states. One possibility is that states will neglect their corporate laws. This is indeed what several very large and very small states seem to be doing. The laws of states like New York, California, Alaska, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia contain, or did until recently, antiquated provisions requiring, for example, a supermajority to approve a merger or cumulative voting for directors. One can speculate that, in these states, corporate laws are not regularly updated either because the corporate bar takes no interest (because it is small or because it is dominated by firms specializing in Delaware law) or because the state legislature has bigger fish to fry.

Another possibility is that managers of in-state public firms will lobby for pro-managerial laws. Bill Carney, among others, has argued that such lobbying accounts for the adoption of anti-takeover laws. In addition, labor groups may sometimes affect corporate law provisions, as is the case with the notorious section in New York’s law imposing personal liability on the 10 largest shareholders for unpaid wages.

Third, the local corporate bar may induce states to adopt a relatively decent, relatively up-to-date, statutory law, either by adopting the Model Business Corporation Act (and updating it

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64 See Carney, supra note 43, at 750.
regularly) or by devising and updating their own code. Members of the local bar may do so for a variety of reasons, such as benefitting closely-help companies incorporated in the state or enhancing their reputation. Such updating could also reflect a low-cost attempt to retain and attract incorporations by public firms.

Finally, some states may pursue a niche competition strategy. Such strategy would not be designed to replicate Delaware’s high-quality judiciary and would not significantly erode Delaware’s network benefits, but may attract a significant share of firms in a certain market segment.

The resulting laws of states other than Delaware can be mapped along two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the degree to which the law contains pro-management or pro-shareholder rules. The second dimension concerns the overall quality (including the content of rules where shareholder and manager interest do not conflict, judicial quality and network benefits). The laws of states other than Delaware will differ along both dimensions, because states will differ in their susceptibility to managerial lobbying, in the degree of attention the corporate bar devotes to updating the law, in the

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65 Id.
66 See Barzuza, supra note 53.
influence of the local bar on the political process, in the niche strategy they may pursue, etc.67

Delaware’s problem then becomes one of positioning its product optimally relative to both the demand by firms and to the products offered by its competitors. If all firms preferred the same position on the pro-management/pro-shareholder dimension, as posited by the more extreme race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom positions, Delaware’s strategy would be simple. But if, as argued above, firm choices are heterogeneous, Delaware’s positioning choice becomes more complex. To position its law optimally, Delaware would have to take account of the effect on whether existing Delaware corporation migrate out of the state, whether non-Delaware corporations move to Delaware, where companies incorporate at the IPO stage, and how high a franchise tax it could charge.68 Moreover, to the extent it does not reduce network benefits, Delaware would want to provide firms with a choice of rules along the pro-management/pro-shareholder dimension.

Return now to the argument that firms will try to maximize shareholder value at the IPO-stage (to the extent that the rules

67 See Barzuza et al., supra note 25, for a formal model making similar points.  
68 See also Michal Barzuza, Price Considerations in the market for Corporate Law, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 127 (2004) (highlighting interaction of positioning and maximum franchise tax).
of the state of incorporation are priced). “To the bottom” theorists have argued in response that, since the stock of already existing companies is larger than the flow of IPOs, a state trying to compete for incorporations will focus on the latter rather than the former segment of the market. 69 But if Delaware caters to existing companies (that prefer relatively pro-management rules), why does Delaware attract a high percentage of companies at the IPO stage (that prefer rules that maximize company value)? 70 The answer presumably is that Delaware is superior from the company value perspective, despite its hypothesized pro-management rules.

But such a conclusion raises questions for race-to-the-bottom theorists. If states compete, at least some of them should have adopted a niche strategy of catering to IPO firm demand for pro-shareholder rules. And if states do not compete, it must be that, however distorted Delaware law allegedly is by the dynamics of state competition, the product of non-competing states is even worse for shareholders.

Rather, it is more plausible that Delaware positions its

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69 Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1459. In particular, Bebchuk argues, both states that already have a large stock of companies incorporated in them (like Delaware) and states with presently few domiciled corporations that become successful in attracting IPO firms will (the latter ultimately) focus on reincorporation decisions.

70 See Daines, supra note 52.
law to appeal to both IPO firms and existing companies by pursuing a middle ground on the pro-manager/pro-shareholder dimension and otherwise focusing on maximizing quality (by having an up-to-date law, a good court system, quickly correcting court decisions that reduce firm value, etc.). Since no other state offers a product that is superior for both shareholders and managers, few firms would migrate out of Delaware (and firms from some other states may migrate in). And because the combination of balanced rules and high general quality results in relatively high firm value (possibly higher, or at least not significantly lower, than the rules of any other state), many IPO firms will choose Delaware law.

D. Refinements

The preceding discussion of Delaware’s competitive strategy can be refined in several ways. First, whether or not other states are actively competing with Delaware, Delaware has market power. The presence of such market power is suggested by Delaware’s substantial market share and confirmed by the supra-competitive profits Delaware earns from its chartering business.71

71 A high market share is not necessarily indicative of market power as the market may be “contestable.” However, a
Commentators have examined several ways in which market power may affect Delaware’s strategy. Most notably, Ehud Kamar has suggested that Delaware’s use of fact-intensive standards serves to protect its competitive advantages. A competing state can easily copy Delaware’s law. But without an expert judiciary to interpret that law, a law based on fact-intensive standards is less valuable. By using standards, in conjunction with an expert court, it becomes harder for other states to replicate Delaware.\textsuperscript{72}

A relationship between federal lawmaking and Delaware corporate law has given rise to other refinements to the competition debate. Congress has the power, and to some extent has exercised the power, to adopt corporate law rules. Thus, federal law governs issues like insider trading, the right to contestable market does not offer more than a normal rate of profit. William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 1982 Am. Econ. Rev. 1.

\textsuperscript{72} Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908 (1998). Although Kamar, when writing the article, assumed that other states competed with Delaware, his argument requires only that Delaware is concerned about potential competition emerging in the future.

In another article, Kamar and I have argued that Delaware engages in price discrimination. In particular, Delaware’s franchise tax effectively discriminates between publicly traded firms (who attribute a greater value to a Delaware incorporation) and closely-held firms (who attribute a lower value), as well as, among publicly traded firms, between larger and smaller firms. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 46.
have shareholder proposals included in the company’s proxy statement, and whether a company can make loans to officers. In theory, federal law could completely supplant the present regime of state-based corporate law. Such a move would be harmful to Delaware, which derives substantial revenues from the franchising business.\(^{73}\)

Commentators have taken different positions on how the threat of federal intervention affects Delaware law. On one extreme, Mark Roe has argued in a 2003 article that Delaware either mimics the rules favored by federal lawmakers or gets preempted by federal law.\(^{74}\) In Roe’s world, Delaware is basically a federal implementation agent that enjoys little autonomy. Put in our earlier terms, the threat of federal intervention forces Delaware to place its law at a certain position along the pro-management/pro-shareholder dimension. On the other extreme, Roberta Romano has argued that states compete largely unimpeded by federal threats because states correlatively exercise power over Congress. As evidence, Romano points out that the key components of state corporate law—fiduciary duties and the allocation of authority between

\(^{73}\) See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 46, at 1251 (revenues of $425 million in 1999).

managers and shareholders - are largely governed by state law.\textsuperscript{75}

Ed Rock and I have taken an intermediate position.\textsuperscript{76} We argue that the possibility of federal preemption constitutes a threat to Delaware, but that this threat is significant only in times when systemic change can generate a significant populist payoff. At other times, as long as the interest groups representing managers and investors are reasonably satisfied, the built-in inertia of federal legislation makes federal intervention unlikely.\textsuperscript{77}

To minimize its exposure to a populist attack, Rock and I argue, Delaware has adopted a classical or 19\textsuperscript{th} century common law model of lawmaking that makes Delaware law less overtly political. Specifically, most important and controversial legal rules are the product of judge-made law. Delaware’s judiciary has technocratic expertise on corporate law and is appointed on a non-partisan basis. Its opinions are filled with quasi-deterministic reasoning. Statutory amendments to the corporation

\textsuperscript{76} Another intermediate position, taken by Cary, supra note 1, and Bratton, supra note 7, 418-425, is that Delaware, in some instances but not always, adjusts its law to ward off federal intervention.
law are initially drafted by a bar committee, are adopted without debate or change by the legislature, and address largely technical matters.\textsuperscript{78}

E. Empirical Evidence

There is relatively little statistical evidence whether states compete. In an early, seminal article on state competition, Roberta Romano has found that there is a statistically significant correlation between the percentage of a state’s total tax collections derived from franchise taxes and the speed at which the state enacts corporate law innovations.\textsuperscript{79} However, since most states do not stand to gain material franchise tax revenues from attracting incorporations, this

\textsuperscript{78} Id. at 1590-1615. In a subsequent 2005 article, Roe seems to depart from his earlier claim that the threat of federal intervention is highly constraining and adopts an intermediate position similar to the one taken by Rock and myself. Roe observes that the set of groups that are influential in Delaware (managers, shareholders, lawyers) is narrower than those that wield power in Washington. As a result, the major state-level players want to minimize federal intervention, at least as long as Delaware does not adopt a lopsided law. This creates space where Delaware has room to maneuver in fashioning its law. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2493 (2005).

\textsuperscript{79} Romano, supra note 1. Romano, supra note 75, at 218, argues that the S-shaped pattern of adoption of innovations and the movement of firms from non-responsive states to responsive states are additional evidence that states compete. An S-shaped adoption pattern, however, does not show that diffusion is due to competition (see Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 715-716) and the action of firms relate to the directional debate, not to whether states compete.
correlation does not provide evidence that states adopt innovations to increase revenue.

Another approach in the competition debate is to examine the law of Delaware, the state that is clearly most successful in attracting incorporations. Indeed, several commentators have also tried to resolve the directional debate based on Delaware’s actions. For example, Bill Cary, who wrote the first significant modern article on state competition in corporate law, examined several then recent decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court, found that they were unduly pro-management, and concluded that the race must be heading “to the bottom.”

The most significant statistical analysis in this vain is a study by Robert Daines. Daines shows that firms incorporated in Delaware have a higher value (as measured by Tobin’s q) than similar firms incorporated elsewhere and argues that this Delaware premium is due to Delaware’s relatively takeover-friendly corporate law. In a follow-up study employing a different methodology, Guhan Subramanian confirms the results reported by Daines, but finds no statistically significant Delaware premium after 1996.

80 Cary, supra note 1.
23 Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J. L. 42
That Delaware firms have higher value is consistent with the notion that Delaware is competing for incorporations. That Delaware is trying to attract incorporations is, of course, undisputed. So the noteworthy result in Daines is that he was able to show that Delaware law contributes sufficient value to be reflected in a statistically significant difference in Tobin’s q.

Daines’s results have also become enmeshed in the directional debate. While “to the top” scholars have embraced Daines’s findings as confirmation of their view,82 “to the bottom” scholars have pointed to the disappearance of a significant Delaware premium after 1996.83 This controversy illustrates once again the conceptual confusion engendered by the failure to separate the various strands within the state competition debate. About half of all firms are not incorporated in Delaware. Thus, it is hard to see how a Delaware premium can be proof that firms chose a legal regime

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that maximizes firm value.

Rather, the results by Daines suggest that other states either do not try to compete (or do not compete effectively). In the presence of effective competition, neither the “to-the-top” nor the “to-the-bottom” theories would predict a sizeable Delaware premium. If states raced “to-the-top,” it would be hard to see how Delaware could have earned such a significant lead. And if states raced “to-the-bottom”, then Delaware would, at most, have to be as good as or slightly better on the shareholder value front than other states. But if other states do not compete and thus offer an inferior product, Delaware becomes able to design its law to appeal to both managers and shareholders.

III. The Federalism Debate: What Would Federal Law Look Like?

Although the arguments are least well worked out, the federalism debate lurks in the background of many disagreements among state competition scholars. If we had a mandatory federal corporate law that replaced the current regime that gives corporations a choice among different bodies of state law, what would it look like and how would it compare to state corporate law?
For adherents to the more extreme positions in the directional debate, it is not necessary to devote much energy to this issue. However, for proponents of the more nuanced versions, the quality they expect federal corporate law to take may be a key determinant of their normative views of the present regime.

But even though one can make some sensible predictions on how federal law would differ from state law, it is hard to arrive at firm conclusions on whether a mandatory federal law, on the whole, would be better or worse than the current regime. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that, in the current regime, only about half of the public companies are incorporated in Delaware, and governed by Delaware law, while the other half are incorporated in other states with a hodge-podge of different laws.

A. The Pro-Management/Pro-Shareholder Dimension

As several commentators have noted, federal law would be influenced by political factors, rather than by the desire to attract incorporations.84 Race-to-the-bottom theorists have

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84 See, e.g., Roe, supra note 78; Kahan & Rock, supra note 77; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) (arguing that the federal government would be
acknowledged that federal law may have a pro-management bias as a result of lobbying of managerial interest groups. But they argue that at least such lobbying would be made against a neutral baseline. By contrast, the argument goes, in a state competition regime, pro-management lobbying may also take place, but would occur against a baseline that is already excessively pro-management as a result of states’ interests in attracting incorporations. Therefore, they claim, federal law would be less pro-management than current state law.

This argument is problematic in two respects. First, unlike federal lawmakers, Delaware lawmakers would have strong incentives to resist lobbying for laws that would reduce Delaware’s attractiveness as incorporation domicile. As a result, in Delaware (and any other state that is actively competing), lobbying would be less influential than it would be in a system where attracting incorporations would not be a countervailing objective for lawmakers. If both lobbying and competition introduce a pro-managerial bias, it is a priori unclear when the bias is stronger. At least under some versions of the nuanced “to-the-bottom” theory (that take account of the

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subject to significant managerial lobbying); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L. J. 1521, 1568–94 (2005).

85 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1503–04.
fact that shareholders also have power over incorporation decisions), it is possible that the pro-management bias resulting from lobbying is the stronger one.

Second, not all states actively compete for incorporations. The law of non-competing states, like federal law, would be determined by political factors.\textsuperscript{86} To be sure, the political dynamic on the federal level may work differently than in the state level. In particular, interest groups would have very different incentives to lobby at the federal level, where they would be dealing with a large, monopolistic rule-maker,\textsuperscript{87} than they presently do at the state level, where they are dealing with a much smaller law-maker and may be able to escape any laws by reincorporating.\textsuperscript{88} But it is not evident whether federal law would therefore be more or less pro-management than the laws of non-competing states.

On the other side, commentators have suggested that federal law may impose excessive regulations that are purportedly in the interest of shareholders, but in fact reduce company value. In particular, such overregulation may be the political response to

\textsuperscript{86} Carney, supra note 43; Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 736-738; Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 47, at V.B.2.
\textsuperscript{87} Cf. Bratton, supra note 7, at 432 (noting presence of economies in federal lobbying).
\textsuperscript{88} See also Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 743.
Thus, Roberta Romano has analyzed various corporate governance mandates in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) and concluded that the empirical literature does not support the view that they enhance corporate value.90

However, many of the studies cited by Romano also do not show that SOX mandates reduce company value. In any case, it would be possible that federal law overreacts to corporate scandals, but at other times provides reasonably efficient regulation. Thus, SOX may not be emblematic of a wholesale federal corporate law. In sum, neither to-the-top nor to-the-bottom scholars have succeeded in establishing that federal law would be, respectively, inferior or superior to state laws on the pro-management/pro-shareholder dimension.

B. Other Considerations

1. Other Interest Groups

Several commentators have argued that groups representing labor, creditor and similar interests may be more influential on the federal level than they are in Delaware.91 To the extent that federal law will cater to such other interest groups, it

89 See Romano, supra note 84; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 77.
90 Romano, supra note 84, at 1529-43.
91 See, e.g., Roe, supra note 78; Kahan & Rock, supra note 77.
may result in lower benefits to shareholder or managers (or both). This may, or may not, enhance overall welfare.92

One particular interest group – lawyers – requires differentiation. According to Bill Carney, lawyers have a significant effect on the corporate law of states other than Delaware,93 and even Delaware law probably caters significantly to the interest of the bar.94 Unlike other interest groups, lawyers may thus have less influence in a federal regime than they do presently.

2. Judicial Quality and Network Effects

Delaware has an expert corporate law judiciary and, according to many commentators, Delaware law generates network benefits. A federal corporate law would presumably be adjudicated to a large extent by federal courts. Although federal judges are generally highly regarded, they would lack the specialized expertise of Delaware’s judiciary. However, companies incorporated in states other than Delaware may see a

92 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1505. Even at present, other interest groups may have influence over the corporate law of non-competing states. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 732 (noting influence of labor groups on certain provisions of New York law).
93 See Carney, supra note 43.
benefit in a greater opportunity to have corporate law disputes resolved by federal courts rather than state courts.

A uniform federal corporate law is also likely to generate network benefits. However, to the extent that the network benefits generated by Delaware law are dependent on the fact that Delaware corporate law disputes are resolved by Delaware’s small judiciary, they may exceed the network benefits arising under federal law.

3. Innovation

A federal lawmaker would lack incentives to update its law and adopt useful innovations in order to attract incorporations. As a result, the speed of innovation may be lower than it currently is for Delaware. This is likely true regardless of whether Delaware’s market power generates monopoly’s slack, as argued by some commentators, or increases its incentives to develop innovations, as argued by others. Other states, of course, presently adopt innovations at a lesser pace than Delaware does and federal law may compare favorably to at least some of such other states.

4. Rules versus Standards

To the extent that a regulatory agency would have authority

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95 See Romano, supra note 1.
96 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 47, at [V.A.3]
97 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 742.
to promulgate federal corporate law, federal law may be substantially rule based. Some commentators have suggested that Delaware law relies on open-ended standards more than is optimal. To that extent that this is correct, a more rule-based approach may be superior at the margin. There is, however, no particular reason to believe that federal law would be optimally rule-based or, for that matter, that it would be superior in this respect to the law of Delaware and other states.

C. Summary

While the specific parameters of federal law are unclear, there are some weak reasons to believe that federal law would be superior to the laws of non-competing states. Federal law would likely be superior in some respects - like the generation of network benefits and judicial quality - and there are no particular reasons to predict how it would differ in others. Whether federal law would be superior or inferior to Delaware law is not clear. Moreover, unlike in the present regime, firms would have no alternative to monopolistic federalist regulation if federal law turns out to be substantially suboptimal.

98 See Kamar, supra note 72; Branson, supra note 94; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 77.
99 Romano, supra note 84, at 2387.
IV. A Note on Competition for Incorporations Elsewhere

The notion that jurisdictions may compete for incorporations is not confined to the United States. There is a significant literature and debate about jurisdictional competition in the European Union and, to a lesser extent, in Canada. If there is one take-away point from this chapter, it is that the dynamics of how firms chose rules, whether and how jurisdictions compete, and how the resulting product would compare with a mandatory regime can play out differently, depending not only on the formal requirements for choosing the corporate domicile, but also the institutional and economic context.

As to firm choice, the factors that will affect whether it will trend to the top or the bottom, and by how much, include the extent to which firms have controlling shareholders; whether shareholdings among non-controlling shareholders are highly dispersed or more concentrated; the presence of information

intermediaries; the prevalence of non-law based devices that align the interests of managers and shareholders; and the degree to which legal rules are reflected in the IPO price.

Predicting whether and how jurisdictions will compete is even harder. We do not have a good model that explains when jurisdictions will act as profit-maximizers rather than as political actors. Perhaps the only factor one can identify with reasonable confidence is size: smaller jurisdictions are more likely to compete actively than larger ones. The extent to which jurisdictions will face political costs can also not be generalized. Finally, geographic and language barriers may impede competition. Thus, for example, some of the smallest countries in the European Union, such as Cyprus and Estonia, may make unlikely competitors.

Finally, multi-jurisdictional bodies can differ in the power and the political economy of the central government. Even just considering the constitutional structure, there are major differences. Thus, for example, Canada, like the United States, is a federal state; but as a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house, it is much easier to pass legislation than it is in the U.S. The European Union is a treaty-based union of sovereign member states, where the governments of member states have much
more influence over EU-wide legislation than state or provincial governments have over federal legislation in the U.S. or Canada.

Thus, the main lesson that other jurisdictions should draw from the U.S. experience is that it is difficult to draw any lessons. It is not only that different scholars have come to widely different conclusions regarding the three debates that make up the larger state competition debate. More importantly, however one views the dynamics that evolved in the United States, they may evolve differently elsewhere.

Conclusion

Absent clear evidence that federal law would be superior to the current system, one may be inclined not to advocate any major changes. For one, the devil we know may be better than the devil we don’t know. Delaware law works at least tolerably well, so why take a chance and replace it with some unknown federal rules. Moreover, the current system has at least the feature that, if the political process for some reason produces a deficient law, companies can opt into a different regime.

This suggests that commentators should focus on how to improve the present regime of state competition, rather than on how to replace it. To the extent that firm choice has features
that cause firms to choose sub-optimal law, can these features be changed? To the extent that states do not compete (and more competition would be desirable), can more states be induced to compete?

Perhaps the most interesting proposal in this vein has been advanced by Lucian Bebchuk, writing with various co-authors. They suggest that, as a matter of federal law, shareholders should be permitted to initiate and approve a reincorporation from one state to another without board approval. Although their premise is that the current system trends to the bottom, their proposal should also appeal to commentators who take a nuanced “to-the-top” position.

There are various complications and details with Bebchuk et al.’s suggestion that would still need to be worked out. Should large shareholders have a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders in pushing for a reincorporation? Should there be a built-in delay between the time shareholders first vote for a reincorporation and the time the reincorporation becomes effective? What would be the status of charter provisions that are invalid in the state that a company migrates to? Should a shareholder power to initiate reincorporations be mandatory or

102 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 Va. L. Rev. 111, 161-163 (2001); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 47, at ___.
should companies have the ability to opt out?

On the other hand, the proposal has some intriguing elements. The present requirement that boards recommend a reincorporation, together with the possibility that managers at least sometimes use their position on and relationship with the board to advance their personal interest, will bias firm choice at the margin downwards. This, in turn, will induce Delaware to position its law to cater more to managerial interests than it would if managers had less power over incorporation decisions. A shake-up in the rules on reincorporation may also induce other states to enter the competitive fray. Finally, even for to-the-top scholars, it is easy to think of reasons why Delaware would not, on its own, change its law to permit this option.\textsuperscript{103} Thus, even though at present it looks as if shareholders would not avail themselves of a power to initiate reincorporations on a regular basis,\textsuperscript{104} giving shareholders this power could improve the competitive dynamic and make the present regime more

\textsuperscript{103} For example, Delaware as the state with the largest market share may not want to adopt a rule that makes it easier for firms to change their state of incorporation.

\textsuperscript{104} At present, precatory shareholder resolutions requesting the board to propose a reincorporation are scarce and gain little shareholder support. For example, in 2013, there were two such proposals among S&P 1500 companies (each requesting a reincorporation from Oklahoma to Delaware) with neither gathering more than 5% shareholder support. See, GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2013).
attractive.
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