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Rachel E. Barkow
New York University School of Law, rachel.barkow@nyu.edu

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FEDERALISM AND CRIMINAL LAW: WHAT THE FEDS CAN LEARN FROM THE STATES

Rachel E. Barkow

*Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law. I am grateful to the many lawyers in attorney general and district attorney offices around the country who provided me with information about the allocation of authority in their respective states. Thanks to Dave Edwards, Joseph Fishman, Steven Horowitz, Danielle Kantor, Sallie Kim, Brian Lee, Edward Lintz, Sam Raymond, and Darryl Stein for superb research assistance. I also owe thanks to the Ford Foundation and to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at NYU for their generous support of this project.
Criminal law enforcement in the United States is multi-jurisdictional. Local, state, and federal prosecutors all possess the power to bring criminal charges. An enduring question of criminal law is how authority should be allocated among these levels of government. In trying to gain traction on the question of when crime should be handled at the federal level and when it should be left to local authorities, courts and scholars have taken a range of approaches. Oddly, one place that commentators have not looked for guidance is within the states themselves to see how they handle the issue of law enforcement allocation. States have the option of vesting authority in a state-level actor – typically, the Attorney General – or in local district or county attorneys. This choice, like the choice between federal and state authority, also requires a balancing of the advantages of centralization against the loss of local values. How states choose to strike that balance is therefore informative for the question of local versus federal authority because states are weighing the same issues.

This Article accordingly looks to the states for guidance on when criminal enforcement responsibility should rest with local authorities and when it should reside with a more centralized actor (be it one at the state- or federal-level). A comprehensive empirical survey of criminal law enforcement responsibility in the states – including a review of state codes and case law and interviews with state prosecutors – reveals remarkable similarity among the states about the degree of local control that is desirable. The states are virtually unanimous in their deference to local prosecutors, the small number of categories they identify for centralized authority in a state-level actor, and their support of local prosecution efforts with resources instead of direct intervention or case appropriation. This contrasts with the federal government’s increasing interference with local crime.

The Article explains the source of this difference: In the states, questions of procedure and sentencing are irrelevant to the allocation of power decision because they are the same at both levels of government. States thus serve as laboratories where sentencing differences and variation in procedural rules are taken out of the equation and the focus is on institutional competence. In contrast, the federal government typically decides to vest authority in federal prosecutors based on whether or not it agrees with local sentencing judgments. Because sentencing proves to be so central to federal involvement in crime, the Article concludes by urging those interested in federalism to pay greater attention to the role of sentencing as a driver of the federal government’s decision to get involved with question of local crime.
INTRODUCTION

Criminal law enforcement in the United States is multi-jurisdictional. Local, state, and federal prosecutors all possess the power to bring criminal charges. An enduring question of criminal law is how authority should be allocated among these levels of government. The Supreme Court has wrestled repeatedly with the issue of how the Constitution allocates criminal power between the federal government and the states.\(^1\) The first significant shot fired in the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution was \textit{Lopez},\(^2\) in which the Court held that Congress overreached in passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act because the possession of a gun near a school zone was a matter for localities, not the federal government, to police.

\(^1\) See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the application of the Controlled Substances Act against a federalism challenge); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating a civil remedy for violent crimes against women under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act because the prohibited conduct did not substantially affect interstate commerce against strong dissents); United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding the federal loan sharking statute as a valid use of Congress’s commerce clause power).

Indeed, jurisdiction over crime— and therefore the power to strip an individual of liberty—is the quintessential question of federalism and state power.

Scholars have also relentlessly pursued the issue of when crime should be a matter of federal concern and when it should be left to local prosecutors. In trying to gain traction on the question of when crime should be handled at the federal level and when it should be left to local authorities, commentators have taken a range of approaches. While the Court is limited to what the Constitution says about the division of power between federal and state governments, scholars are free to approach the question from a normative perspective and have considered arguments rooted in everything from political economy to civic republicanism to varying procedural advantages offered by different jurisdictions. All these methods are designed to answer the same question of when a centralized, uniform approach is preferable to local variation.

Oddly, one place scholars have not looked for guidance is within the states themselves to see how they handle the issue of law enforcement allocation. There are, after all, three layers of prosecution in the United States, not two. States have the option of vesting authority in a state-level actor—typically, the Attorney General—or in local district or county attorneys. This choice, like the choice between federal and state authority, also requires a balancing of the advantages of centralization against the loss of local values. How states choose to strike that balance is therefore informative for the question of local versus federal authority because states are weighing the same issues. If states are to be seen as laboratories of experiment, this is surely an area where the results bear on federal policy as well as the policies of other states.

Indeed, this intra-state perspective is particularly valuable because states have the primary responsibility for law enforcement in the United States and typically must pay the incarceration costs for those prosecuted, whether by local-level or state-level prosecutors. If local prosecutors are not using state prison resources

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3 For a sampling of the vast scholarly debate, see William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969 (2008) (addressing the relationship between equality and the location of law enforcement); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995) (arguing that there are too many federal prosecutions given the capacity of the federal courts and criticizing intermittent federal enforcement because of the disparities it produces in similar cases); Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1995) (providing an overview of the federalism debate); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247 (1997).

4 See infra Part I.A.


6 State prisons are run and funded by state governments. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 719-20 (1996). Local jails, which generally house misdemeanor offenders and state prisoners while their cases are pending, are funded by local jurisdictions. States have made some efforts recently to shift incarceration costs to localities by making greater use of local jails, but states continue to pay the lion’s share of incarceration costs. See, e.g., Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Richard Winton, Bid to Shift State Inmates to County Jails Denounced, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2009 (reporting on complaints about plans to divert state prisoners to local jails in order to shift costs of incarceration to local jurisdictions); Amy Gardner, Board Weighs Suing State Over Crowded Jails, WASH. POST, June 2, 2008 (same).
effectively or imposing externalities on other jurisdictions, states should have a
greater incentive to intervene than the federal government because they pick up the
tab for the prison costs with their limited budgets. Moreover, inefficient crime
fighting is far more likely to have spillover effects within a state than across state
lines because most criminal activity, and particularly violent criminal activity, is
likely to stay within a local area.7 The federal government, in contrast, is not on
the front-lines of most criminal law enforcement efforts and instead cherry picks
the cases it wishes to pursue.8 The law enforcement portion of the federal budget is
comparably miniscule, and it serves no disciplining effect on decisionmaking.9
Because of these practical realities, states are more likely than Congress to consider
the costs and benefits associated with how criminal law enforcement should be
allocated. All else being equal, states have strong incentives to get the right mix of
law enforcement to maximize the use of their prison resources. States therefore
offer a helpful comparative framework for the question of when local law
enforcement makes sense and when it does not.

This Article accordingly looks to the states for guidance on when criminal
enforcement responsibility should rest with local authorities and when it should
reside with a more centralized actor (be it one at the state- or federal-level). Part I
begins by explaining how knowledge of state practice fills a void in the existing
debate over the federalization of crime. Part II takes up the task of describing the
actual practice in the states. The information in Part II is based on a comprehensive
empirical survey of criminal law enforcement responsibility in the states, including
a review of state codes and case law and interviews with state prosecutors. What is
most striking about this data is the remarkable similarity among states about the
degree of local control that is desirable. The states are virtually unanimous in their
dedence to local prosecutors, the small number of categories they identify for
centralized authority in a state-level actor, and their support of local prosecution
efforts with resources instead of direct intervention or case appropriation. Part III
compares the states’ approach with the federal government’s push toward
centralization and away from local control and explains what accounts for the
difference. Whereas the states are focused directly on the relative institutional
competence of prosecutors at the state and local level, the federal government is

7 Samuel R. Gross, Jurisdictional Competition in Criminal Justice: How Much Does It
cause criminals to relocate, we expect them to travel as little as possible”); Rachel E. Barkow,
claims that many criminals will cross state boundaries).

8 Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276,
1305-1306 (2005).

9 Id. at 1301-1308.
just as likely to make prosecutorial allocation decisions based on whether or not it agrees with local sentencing judgments. Because sentencing proves to be so central to federal involvement in crime, the conclusion urges those interested in federalism to pay greater attention to the role of sentencing as a driver of the federal government’s decision to get involved with question of local crime.

I. THE FEDERALISM DEBATE IN CRIMINAL LAW

Over the last several decades, federal criminal law has mushroomed beyond recognition. The number of federal criminal laws now hovers somewhere over 4,000, with roughly 40% of the laws passed after the Civil War coming in the 25-year period between 1970 and 1998. Many of these laws are written in sweepingly broad terms, overlap with one another, and cover ground already addressed by state law, including violent crimes. Often, new federal laws are passed or existing laws are expanded in the wake of a highly-publicized crime, with little analysis of whether there is, in fact, an actual need for federal involvement. The result is a federal prison population that is now larger than the prison population of any single jurisdiction and a federal docket of almost 70,000

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12 Id. at 519.


14 See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 747, 755 (2005) (observing that legislation that is “drafted in response to whatever crime is the focal point in the media – even if that offense is already defined and punished harshly and effectively under state law”); Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as a Case Study, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 654 (2006) (noting that redundancies in the federal code “can be traced largely to the political desire to react to a given scandal . . . by enacting a “new” section that simply repeats existing prohibitions (and by jacking up statutory maximum penalties to underscore congressional resolve”); Task Force, supra note __, at 14-17 (noting that Congress often enacts new crimes “in patchwork response to newsworthy events” instead of “in response to an identifiable federal need”).

15 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dep’t of Justice, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2008: Statistical Tables (March 2009), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf (noting there were 201,142 federal prisoners at midyear 2008 compared to 173,320 in California, the state with the largest prison population). To give a sense of perspective of the growth of the federal prison system, the federal government did not even open a federal prison until 1895, and had only five as of 1930. Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 Hastings L.J. 1135, 1147 (1995). Between 1930 and 1989, however, the number of prisons grew to 47, and the population of federal prisoners went from 13,000 to 53,000. Id. at 1147-1148. In the last twenty years, the number of federal prisons has more than doubled to 115 institutions and the population has
criminal cases annually, roughly double the figure from 25 years earlier. The number of drug cases in particular has exploded, rising three hundred percent in the stretch from 1980 to 1990 and another 45 percent from 1990 to 2000.

An additional, roughly contemporaneous trend has been the centralization of prosecutorial power within the federal government. Increasingly, the Department of Justice in Washington (“Main Justice”) has sought to control the charging and plea decisions of federal prosecutors. Main Justice has issued a series of directives establishing charging practices in federal criminal cases against individuals and corporations, and a United States Attorneys’ Manual covers more specific policies. Federal prosecutors have also been ordered to seek approval from or provide notice to Main Justice with respect to 200 types of decisions, including whether to bring cases under a variety of criminal statutes (such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty in death-eligible cases, and obtaining a wiretap. Main Justice has almost quadrupled with a population of more than 209,000 prisoners. Federal Bureau of Prisons, About the Bureau of Prisons, available at http://www.bop.gov/about/index.jsp.

16 Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 400 & n.173 (2009). The number of federal criminal cases has not followed a steady upward trajectory. In 1932, there were more than 86,000 federal criminal cases. Little, supra note __, at 1040.

17 Brickey, supra note __, at 1153.


19 Beale, supra note, at 397-405 (chronicling the power shift to Main Justice); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1440-1443 (2008) (describing Main Justice’s efforts to centralize power since the late 1980s).


21 Beale, supra note __, at 402 and n.187.


24 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-7.010.
also spent more time keeping track of local statistics on which cases are brought, with an eye toward controlling the mix. 25 The firing of United States Attorneys in 2006 may have been, in the words of the Department’s Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility, “fundamentally flawed” and “severely damaging” to the Department’s credibility, 26 but it was nevertheless consistent with these other attempts to shift power over criminal law enforcement to Main Justice. 27 Main Justice has also grown increasingly vocal about the need to check regional variations among judges in their sentencing practices, another sign of its desire to have a single, central, uniform approach to federal criminal law. 28

Like the expansion of the federal criminal code, these efforts to give Main Justice more centralized authority come at the expense of local control over criminal enforcement. United States Attorneys may be federal appointees, but they are more responsive to local interests than Main Justice. 29 They are typically drawn from the district in which they serve, and they necessarily pay attention to the local values and practices in their district. 30 U.S. Attorneys and federal judges in a district are also more likely than Main Justice to take into account the attitudes and values of local juries in making their decisions. Thus, to the extent Main Justice takes on a decisionmaking role for itself or orders a particular standard that disregards local jury preferences, that, too has the effect of stripping local communities of some of their law enforcement power. 31

25 Richman, supra note __, at 2097-2098.


28 For example, Justice Department officials pushed for passage of the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act, which aimed to restrict judicial departures under the Sentencing Guidelines. Richman, supra note __, at 2098-2099. See also Eric Holder, Attorney General, Rethinking Federal Sentencing Policy, 25th Anniversary of the Sentencing Reform Act, Remarks for the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice and Congressional Black Caucus Symposium (June 24, 2009) (observing that the percentage of defendants sentenced within the Guidelines has decreased and that development “should be monitored carefully”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-0906242.html [hereinafter “Holder Speech”].


30 Richman, supra note __, at 2094-2095, 2105 & nn. 36-37, 39; Beale, supra note __, 422-424. See also Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. Judicature Soc’y 18, 18 (1940) (describing the U.S. Attorney’s “knowledge of local sentiment and opinion, his contact with and intimate knowledge of the views of the court, and his acquaintance with the feelings of the group from which jurors are drawn”).

31 This is not to say that all federal efforts have been towards centralization at the expense of United States Attorneys’ Offices. Dan Richman has explained the ways in which Congress has either accepted or supported decentralization at the federal level. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757, 805-810 (1999). In addition, Sara Beale has described other dynamics that help prosecutors in United States Attorneys’ Offices retain discretion and independence from Main
These trends have hardly gone unnoticed. The federal judiciary was one of the first institutions to offer critical commentary. The Federal Courts Study Committee cautioned in 1990 that the federal judiciary’s “most pressing problems . . . stem from unprecedented numbers of federal narcotics prosecutions.”\(^{32}\) In numerous year-end reports, Chief Justice Rehnquist warned of the increased burden on the federal courts because of federal criminal law’s growth.\(^{33}\) These warnings fell on deaf ears in Congress. Far from scaling back federal criminal law, Congress continued to expand it in the years following the judiciary’s reports.\(^{34}\)

The Supreme Court then offered its perspective on the issue in 1995.\(^{35}\) That year, the Court decided the case of *Lopez v. United States*, which invalidated a congressional statute that made it a federal crime to carry a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school.\(^{36}\) The Court disagreed with the government’s claim that the statute was a proper exercise of the Commerce Clause power. Five years later, under the same rationale, the Court struck down a law creating a federal civil


\(^{35}\) For an argument that the decision in *Lopez* was designed to stem the tide of criminal cases flooding federal courts, see Sara Sun Beale, *The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors*, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1646-1654 (2002).

remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence.\(^37\) In both cases, the Court “reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”\(^38\) In the Court’s view, there was “no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of victims.”\(^39\) These cases were the Court’s effort to remind Congress that it was a body with enumerated and limited powers and that it could not intervene with local power—and increase the burdens on the federal judiciary—at will. Unlike the judicial reports, these opinions had the force of law, and they unsettled what had been a consistently deferential jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause. Commentators were quick to observe that the Rehnquist Court’s approach in these cases was part of a larger federalism revolution.\(^40\)

Despite the rhetoric, the practical significance of the Court’s federalism cases on criminal law has been negligible. The cases did not stop Congress from its relentless push to pass new criminal laws.\(^41\) Lower courts failed to follow the Supreme Court’s lead, with few of them seeking to employ _Lopez_’s analysis to new contexts.\(^42\) The Court itself also put the brakes on any meaningful limits. It never regulated federal power to intervene with local criminal authority through the Spending Clause.\(^43\) And the Court has signaled that it will engage in very little additional substantive Commerce Clause regulation beyond the limited context of _Lopez_ and _Morrison_.\(^44\) The strongest indicator that the Court was throwing in the


\(^{38}\) Id. at 617.

\(^{39}\) Id. at 618.


\(^{43}\) For an excellent analysis of this issue, see Garnett, _supra_ note __.

\(^{44}\) The Court has cut back on some of its other federalism decisions as well. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (affirming Congress’ ability to allow money damages from states for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Nevada Dep’t of Human
towel on policing Congress’s Commerce Clause authority came in 2005, when the Court decided *Gonzales v. Raich*. In that case, the Court upheld Congress’s power to criminalize possession of marijuana that was neither intended for nor entered the stream of commerce and that was authorized under a state law that allowed marijuana for medicinal use. The Court conceded that the case was factually distinguishable from *Wickard v. Filburn* – the case that according to *Lopez* offered “perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity” – and three dissenting judges made clear their view that *Raich* was “irreconcilable” with and “materi ally indistinguishable” from the Court’s decisions in *Lopez* and *Morrison*. Yet a majority of the Court nonetheless accepted the federal scheme in *Raich* because it was part of a comprehensive statute addressing narcotics trafficking, even though the particular conduct at issue involved purely intrastate conduct with no demonstrated proof that if affected the broader market. As the dissent characterized it, the decision effectively made *Lopez* “nothing more than a drafting guide,” because all

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45 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
46 Id. at 7-9.
47 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In *Raich*, the Court admitted that it was “factually accurate” to note three differences from *Wickard*, namely that (1) the Controlled Substances Act at issue in *Raich* did not exempt small operations as did the agriculture act at issue in *Wickard*; (2) “*Wickard* involved a ‘quintessential economic activity’ – a commercial farm – whereas respondents [in *Raich*] do not sell marijuana”; and (3) the record in *Wickard* demonstrated that wheat production on individual farms, in the aggregate, did in fact have a “significant impact on market prices” whereas there was no record evidence in *Raich* that the use of medical marijuana affected the overall market. 545 U.S. at 20.
48 *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 560.
49 545 U.S. at 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 45.
51 See also id. at 54 (observing that “if the Court today is right about what passes rationality review before us, then our decision in *Morrison* should have come out the other way”). In both *Lopez* and *Morrison*, the Court had emphasized that when it had previously “sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.” *Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 611 (citing *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 559-560).
52 As the principal dissent noted, the majority’s decision in *Raich* “suggests that the federal regulation of local activity is immune to Commerce Clause challenge because Congress chose to act with an ambitious, all-encompassing statute, rather than piecemeal.” Id. at 45.
53 Id. at 46.
Congress needs to do to survive judicial review is to sweep its regulation of intrastate behavior into a broader regulatory scheme of interstate activity. In the wake of *Raich* and other decisions cutting back on the Court’s commitment to federalism, even those who proclaimed the Court’s initial efforts a “revolution” conceded that its time had passed.\(^5^4\) The Court’s federalism revolution seems to have gone out with a whimper, leaving little room for constitutional regulation of the issue.

But the normative questions of the proper role of the federal government in criminal law – including both the appropriate sweep of federal criminal law and its enforcement and whether Main Justice should attempt centralized control over federal prosecutors – remain. And a debate over those issues continues to rage in policy discussions and legal scholarship.

After describing the current state of the debate in Part A, Part B argues for opening a new line of inquiry about the proper allocation of criminal law enforcement power based on the relationship between states and their localities.

A. Current Methodologies

The expansion of federal criminal law and the Rehnquist Court’s attempts to police it have spawned an avalanche of scholarship. Much of the commentary on federalism is general in nature, without any particular emphasis on criminal enforcement in particular.\(^5^5\) Although the general costs and benefits of federal versus local control are, of course, relevant to the more specific question of whether responsibility for criminal law should be federalized, the most relevant and informative scholarship for those interested in identifying the proper scope of federal involvement in criminal law enforcement tends to tackle that question head-on. To the extent arguments from the larger literature are relevant, the specific pieces on criminal law typically incorporate them and discuss their particular relevance or irrelevance to crime.

And there has been no shortage of commentators interested in the specific question of when the federal government should play a role in criminal law enforcement and when it should leave matters to local control.

One school of analysis approaches these questions as the Supreme Court has, and is largely interested in what the Constitution has to say about the relationship among the different institutions. These scholars take what is essentially a doctrinal


approach to the federalism question, analyzing it much the same way a court would. This line of scholarship therefore looks at constitutional text, history, and theory to address what criminal powers are within federal Commerce Clause authority and what fall outside it.56

Another group of scholars focuses not on the constitutional question of where power must or can reside, but on the normative question of where power should reside. A subset of this group tends to focus on arguments grounded in “the political economy of the different governmental institutions” that make up the criminal justice system.57 These scholars, for example, analyze the incentives of officials at the different levels of government given voter and interest group demands.58 They also consider whether a “race to the top” or a “race to the bottom” might suggest the wisdom of greater or lesser federal involvement in crime.59 Efforts in this vein also include scholarship that addresses the political and institutional failings of federal law enforcement that may put it at a disadvantage compared to local actors.60

Still another major approach to the normative question of federalism in criminal law focuses on procedural differences between federal and state systems to decide where best to allocate power.61 Some advocates of federal law enforcement

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56 See, e.g., Brandon L. Bigelow, The Commerce Clause and Criminal Law, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 913, 941 (2000) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment should be an external limit on federal criminal law and that history can be used as a guide in calculating state sovereignty); Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 Emory L.J. 1, 93 (1996) (arguing that the history of federal criminal jurisdiction shows that, among other things, “a rigid dual federalism” has never been embraced); Thane Rehn, RICO and the Commerce Clause: A Reconsideration of the Scope of Federal Criminal Law, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1991, 2027 (2008) (arguing that the Commerce Clause should only “permi[t] aggregation of economic activity with a narrow exception for noneconomic activity that is essential to a larger regulatory scheme”).


60 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note __, at 20-22 (emphasizing that federal statutes are used quite rarely, which means they have little impact on crime rates but present a danger of selective and arbitrary prosecutions).

point to what they see as procedural advantages in federal court. These include fewer restrictions on the government’s use of informants,\textsuperscript{62} easier access to wiretaps and warrants,\textsuperscript{63} less generous discovery rights for defendants,\textsuperscript{64} and broader grand jury powers.\textsuperscript{65} The federal government’s superior witness protection program has also been cited as plus.\textsuperscript{66} Opponents of increased federal involvement in matters traditionally left to local prosecutors often look to judicial resources, typically observing that the size and structure of the federal judiciary is not suited for taking on a larger share of criminal matters.\textsuperscript{67}

Given the richness of the debate and the sheer quantity of articles addressing the question, it is perhaps hard to believe that anything more can be added to the vast literature on federalism and crime.

But there is an important omission from the current analysis. To the extent scholars are seeking to answer the normative question of when power over criminal enforcement should be centralized versus left with local authorities, they have overlooked a valuable source of information. As the next section explains, the states have been wrestling with that same basic question since their inception and their experience offers insights into the larger federalism debate.

B. The Relevance of State Practice

The question of how much control local actors should have over criminal law enforcement is not unique to federalism and the issue of national power. Just like the federal government, states, too, must ask when local prosecutors should retain authority over prosecutions and when a centralized, state-wide prosecutor should assume responsibility for an area of criminal law or otherwise intervene in a local action.

There is ample scholarship discussing the relevance of localism (that is, the relationship between states and their local governments) to questions of federalism (that is, the relationship between the federal government and the states and their localities). In both contexts, the values of centralization are weighed against the virtues of decentralization. Thus, local government law scholars have recognized the “natural points of connection” between federalism and localism\textsuperscript{68} and that the

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1101, 1125 (1995) (arguing that federal prosecutors should have a role in fighting organized crime (which they define as “group criminality involving violence) because federal procedure provides particular advantages for those kinds of cases).

62 John Jeffries and Judge John Gleeson point out that one of the main advantages for bringing organized crime cases in federal court is the ability of federal prosecutors to use uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note __, at 1104.

63 Beale, supra note __, at 1004.

64 Id.

65 Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note __, at 1108.


67 See Beale, supra note __, at 983-991.

68 David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke L.J. 377, 381 (2001). See also Frank S. Alexander, Inherent Tensions Between Home Rule and Regional
normative questions—and answers—of localism and federalism therefore often go hand-in-hand. Indeed, as Richard Briffault has noted, “the intellectual case for federalism’ often converges with the case for decentralization, or localism.”69 The normative argument for federalism rests on values such as democratic political participation, increased representation of diverse interests, and innovation—all of which are also hallmarks of localism.70 In fact, local governments are far more poised than state governments “to provide citizens with opportunities for political participation, to reflect diversity, to increase the likelihood of innovation and experimentation, and to engage in the kind of competition that constrains governmental behavior.”71 Thus, when states consider whether to defer to local governments, they are wrestling with the very same questions that the federal government considers when it decides whether to defer to states. At the heart of both is a debate over the merits of decentralization.72

Federalism scholars, too, have highlighted that federalism questions often are—or should be—about localism as much as they are about state power.73 This is true of federalism’s critics and proponents alike. Supporters such as Michael McConnell and Deborah Jones Merritt, for example, explicitly praise the fact that federalism respects local autonomy and the interests of communities.74 Critics like

Planning, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539, 542 (2000) (noting that both federalism and home rule debates involve “the question of at what point an issue is purely local and when is it a matter for determination by a larger community of interests”).


70 Id. at 1305, 1315 (“These virtues of federalism—participation, diversity, intergovernmental competition, political responsiveness, and innovation—are, of course, among the very values regularly associated with local autonomy.”).

71 Id. at 1348.

72 For a discussion of the relationship between centralized and decentralized units of government that shows the parallels between the relationship between state and local entities and the federal government and the states, see Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1352-1362 (1997).

73 Id. at 1311-1312 (noting that scholars and judges have rested the case for federalism on arguments about political decentralization). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 441 (2002) (observing that, “in functional analysis of the values that federalism serves, the significance of local governments is enormous”).

74 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note __, at 1511 (arguing that the case for federalism is an “argument for substantial state and local autonomy” and for the “devolution of governing authority to state, city, and community levels”) (emphasis added); Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Ed Rubin and Malcolm Feeley are critical of federalism doctrine because it focuses on the federal/state relationship when, in their view, any benefits of federalism would come from preserving the autonomy of local governments.\footnote{Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 919-20 (1994). Rubin and Feeley go on to argue that protecting states actually harms local political participation, but as Rick Hills persuasively argues, the evidence for this claim is lacking. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & Pol. 187 (2005).}

Even the Court has emphasized the value of local authority instead of speaking exclusively about state sovereignty when discussing federalism. For example, the Court in Lopez worried about an interpretation of the Commerce Clause that would “effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.”\footnote{514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); see also id. at 567-68 (worrying about an interpretation of the Commerce Clause under which “there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local”).}

Although the fundamental normative questions of federalism and localism are the same, no one has bothered to look to see how the states have answered them in the context of criminal law. Perhaps one reason the connection between federalism and localism is missed in criminal law is because discussions of federalism in this context, particularly at the Supreme Court, more often revolve around the rhetoric of sovereignty.\footnote{See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (noting criminal law enforcement is an area “where States have historically been sovereign”). See also Briffault, supra note __, at 1328 (“The Court has been more attentive to the formal differences between states and local government than the scholarly advocates of federalism, much as the Court has continued to employ the rhetoric of state sovereignty…”).}

In terms of constitutional doctrine, this makes sense because states are explicitly protected in the Constitution as sovereigns, whereas local communities are not. On the contrary, the Court has emphasized that localities are nothing more than “political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.”\footnote{Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); see also Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (“A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition of the will of its creator.”); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S.}

It is therefore no surprise that the Court typically addresses...
federalism issues as questions of state versus national power without much attention to how power is then allocated within a state.

But if one is interested in the question of power allocation as a normative question of institutional design and not about constitutional interpretation, the parallels between federalism and localism cannot be ignored. Both turn on striking the right balance between centralization and local control.

Certainly the questions of how much to protect local control and how much to centralize are at the heart of governmental decisionmaking about prosecutorial power. State legislatures, like Congress, must decide when to strip localities of authority over crime or provide concurrent authority in a state-level actor. The position of a state attorney general was created in some states in response to a concern with “sectionalism” and a desire “to protect public rights and redress public injuries throughout the entire state, independent of the attitude of local authorities who might be indifferent, incapable, or even antagonistic.” What authority states give to attorneys general is therefore quite telling, because that authority reflects the state legislative judgment of when the need for centralization outweighs claims of localism. Similarly, when state-level prosecutors are given discretion to intervene in local matters, they must decide, like their federal-level counterparts in United States Attorney’s Offices, whether to exercise it or whether their involvement would interfere too greatly in local matters.

182, 187 (1923) (“municipalities have no inherent right of self government which is beyond the legislative control of the state”).

79 Despite recognizing the parallels between normative questions of localism and federalism, Richard Briffault has argued that courts should avoid analyzing these normative values in reviewing congressional actions because those are “essentially political decisions” that “ought to have occurred in the political arena.” Briffault, supra note __, at 1350. This Article takes no position on how courts should assess federalism claims in criminal law, but instead argues that the “essentially political decisions” made by state political actors weighing the values of decentralization should inform the same political decisions made by federal political actors.

80 Barron, supra note __, at 381.

81 Various government reformers, for example, have put pressure on states over the years to employ more centralized control over prosecutorial power. See e.g., Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 433 (1960) (explaining that effective law enforcement and protection of individual rights are hampered in part by the lack of centralized control over the separate principalities of local prosecutors); Note, The Common Law Power of State Attorneys-General to Supersede Local Prosecutors, 60 YALE L.J. 559, 559 n.2 (1951) (citing sources); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 11-14 (1931) (citing decentralization as a reason that criminal justice in the states is “ineffective”); Earl H. De Long & Newman F. Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney, 23 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 926, 963 (1933).

82 State v. Bowles, 79 P. 726 (Kan. 1905).
To be sure, there are differences between the states and the federal government, but, if anything, those differences make the state experience an even more valuable frame of reference for federalism questions. Most of the ways in which federal and state practice differ revolve around the greater ability and willingness of the federal government to make symbolic gestures with crime legislation and enforcement, and the states’ relatively firmer grounding in practical realities. Thus, to the extent there is divergence in state and federal approaches to the question of when criminal law enforcement should be local, it is often because states are weighing more of the relevant variables than the federal government is.

To understand why, consider first that Congress and state legislatures are generally making different decisions about their respective jurisdiction’s involvement in criminal law enforcement and its relationship to local communities. Congress’s key decision affecting local authority is whether or not to create a federal crime at all, with enforcement of that law then left to the discretion of federal prosecutors.83

State legislatures, in contrast, do not primarily affect local authority by deciding whether to create a state crime. Most criminal laws that local prosecutors enforce, and every serious offense they enforce, are state crimes.84 Differences in state versus local prosecutions are therefore not based on the source of law being enforced. If state legislators wish to affect the state/local relationship, they must instead directly confront the question of whether to let local prosecutors enforce state laws exclusively or whether to give a state-level prosecutor concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction. Most states face no constitutional limitations on their ability to allocate power to state-level as opposed to local-level prosecutors.85 Although the current framework in most states gives the bulk of law enforcement power to local prosecutors,86 that is a conscious choice,87 not a dictate of state constitutional

83 Gorelick & Litman, supra note, at 973 (observing that Congress passes new laws with the expectation that federal prosecutors will exercise their discretion about when to intervene in areas where states have concurrent jurisdiction).

Although some commentators have raised the possibility of enforcing federal laws in state courts to address concerns about strained federal judicial resources, they have expressed doubt about whether Congress could insist that state prosecutors handle the cases. Beale, supra note __, at 1010-1014; Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 Emory L.J. 1, 79-80 (1996). The Supreme Court’s decision in Printz would seem to foreclose any option that mandated state prosecutors to bring actions. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).

84 McQuillan, at 23.6 at 698 (3d ed. 2007); Briffault, supra note __, at 1343 (“even under the most generous definitions of home rule, local governments lack power . . . to define and punish serious crimes”). For a discussion of the scope of local criminal laws, see generally Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1409, 1423-1435 (2001).

85 Barron, supra note __, at 392 (“There are few, if any, matters of concern to state residents that, as a formal legal matter, the state legislature would be barred from addressing because of the need to respect the rights of self-government to local communities.”).

86 See infra Part III.

87 See Barron, supra note __, at 390-391 (“state legislatures possess the formal legal power to delegate large swaths of authority to their local governments or to withhold such powers from them as the legislatures choose”).
Thus, because the question for state legislators is an explicit question of institutional allocation and they typically have freedom to make that decision however they think best, it is more likely that state legislators will focus on the institutional advantages and disadvantages of each actor than federal legislators will. That makes the state experience all the more informative for those interested in striking the right balance between federal and local allocation of power because the framework in the states is more likely to have focused directly on the question of enforcement allocation.

In addition, states are facing a somewhat different set of enforcement choices because state-level prosecutors are more independent than their federal counterparts. Whereas the Attorney General of the United States is appointed and removable by the President and serves his law enforcement agenda, almost all state attorneys general are separately elected from the governor and may not even be a member of the same party as the governor. Thus, while Congress has to decide whether it trusts giving the President’s appointee control over a criminal justice issue rather than just letting that issue remain within state control, state legislatures typically must decide which of two independently elected prosecutors it would prefer to enforce existing state laws: locally-elected prosecutors or a prosecutor chosen in a statewide election.

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88 Even when localities enjoy state constitutional grants of authority, that power is often subject to revision by the state or is easily overruled. See Richard C. Schragger, Can Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2558 (2006) (observing that authority is often subject to revision and “[s]tate legislatures have been “aggressive in overruling local decisions with which they do not agree”).

89 The Attorney General also has a duty to uphold the rule of law, regardless of the President’s agenda. Green & Zacharias, supra note __, at 191-192; Nancy V. Baker, Conflicting Loyalties 2-4 (1992).

90 The governor appoints the attorney general in five states: Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming. Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 56 REV. OF POLITICS 525, 529 (1994). See infra Part II. The attorney general is a member of the governor’s cabinet in Florida, Michigan, and Arizona, but is independently elected. The attorney general and governor of these states are not required to be on the same ticket or even be members of the same party, creating inevitable conflicts which have led scholars to debate the efficacy of these plural executives. Compare Michael Hoover, Turn Your Radio On: Bradley Odham 1952 "Talkathon" Campaign for Florida Governor, 66 THE HISTORIAN 701, 707 n.19 (2004) (discussing Florida and noting that the “plural executive system is considered a weak form of government because . . . [t]he governor must depend on the will of a potentially independent cabinet to administer effectively”), with Daniel Webster & Donald L. Bell, First Principles for Constitution Revision, 22 NOVA L. REV. 391, 419 (1997) (noting that while a cabinet of independently elected officers who may be political opponents “has been a source of vexation to many governors,” it “provides some worthwhile protection for the people”).
Consider first Congress’s choice about whether to delegate to a federal prosecutor. As a general matter, Congress is more likely to delegate power to an executive agency or official when the same political party controls the executive and the legislature. Under this traditional view, one might think Congress would prefer to leave matters with the states and local prosecutors if the alternative would be passing a law that would end up enforced by a presidential appointee of a different party. But this general framework for thinking about delegation is inapplicable to questions of criminal law. Members of Congress have little to gain from leaving things as they are—that is, with states and localities. In contrast, legislators typically benefit politically when they enact or expand federal criminal laws. As Bill Stuntz has persuasively explained, the politics of criminal law is less about party affiliation because both parties share the same incentive to appear as tough as possible. Thus, any delegation is a good delegation from the legislature’s perspective because they benefit from the symbolic act of passing the law. As the past three decades proves, Congress is thus nearly always willing to accede to an executive request for a new or more expansive or punitive criminal law, regardless of whether the president is in the same party as the governing coalition in the legislature and no matter what the politics in the states. If the executive then exercises its discretion in an unpopular manner, the blame falls squarely on it, not the legislature.

The focus of blame on the executive branch holds true in criminal law in a way it does not in other regulatory contexts because the enforcer is rightly seen as the key decisionmaker. In other regulatory areas, Congress’s role is more important than it is in criminal law because there are interest groups on both sides arguing about the substantive content of the law itself. In addition, whereas criminal procedure is dominated by constitutional rules, administrative procedure is largely a creature of legislative action. As a result, Congress can give regulated entities a greater or lesser role in how the agency shapes its policies. Again, that makes Congress a greater source of interest group attention in other contexts than in criminal law. In criminal law, the focus is rightly on the executive branch or, in the case of constitutional procedures, the courts. Thus, from Congress’s perspective, the politics are always in favor of more criminal law, no matter what party holds the White House, because it reaps only benefits from such a decision and does not pay a price.

Now consider the politics of the state allocation decision. State legislatures, like Congress, have the same political incentives to create new and expansive

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93 Stuntz, supra note __, 529–33.
94 Id. at 549–50 (explaining how “public displeasure toward overaggressive prosecution is more likely to be visited on the prosecutorial agent than on the legislative principal.”).
crimes and increase penalties. But, unlike Congress, which has only federal prosecutors as a relevant enforcement option if it wants federal involvement at all, state legislatures have the choice of which actor within a state should have enforcement power. In most states, both the attorney general and local prosecutors are elected.96 State legislatures thus cannot control either option with appointment or removal, nor, for that matter, can the governor in most places.97 Although the party-affiliation of the state attorney general might give a legislature more or less control over general enforcement policy – or, if not control, at least some level of predictability – it is unclear whether party affiliation will end up making much of a difference. For starters, as noted, both parties tend to coalesce on criminal justice policy far more than they differ. Second, the choice is not a binary one between a single statewide prosecutor and a single local prosecutor. Rather, there are numerous local prosecutors in a state, each typically independently elected by his or her community. Thus, some local prosecutors will share the party affiliation of the state legislature and some will not. It is unclear how legislatures weigh that mix against a state attorney general’s party affiliation. Certainly some state legislative representatives will push for local control in their district.98 Third, the state attorney general is less likely to be a puppet of party sentiment than a controller of it, because the attorney general is often a leader in state party politics and an aspirant for even higher office.99 Finally, because the enforcement allocation decision tends to long outlast a prosecutor’s term in office – because shifting policy as actors change with elections would create too much destabilization – it is less likely that legislators will make the decision based on the party affiliation of those in office at the time, unless those affiliations are relatively

96 Clayton, supra note __, at 530 (noting in 43 states, the AG is elected); Steven W. Perry, PROSECUTORS IN STATES COURTS, 2005, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., July 2006, at 11 (data showing local prosecutors are elected in 47 states; three exceptions are Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey).

97 In the few states that look like the federal model, the allocation of power between local and statewide prosecutors does not differ from the allocation of power in those states where the AG is elected separately or not a member of the governor’s cabinet. See infra Part II.

98 Hills, supra note __, at 213 (“state legislatures in the United States generally function as assemblies of ambassadors from the different local jurisdictions within the state” making them likely to “defer to each legislator on local matters within their own district”).

99 Clayton, supra note __, at 530 (observing that the AG’s “election and tenure provides the attorney general autonomy to represent whatever positions he or she believes are in the public interest or required by law, regardless of the preferences of the state’s governor or legislature”); Colin Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism, 33 PUBLIUS 37 (observing that “of the 166 attorneys general who served at least two years between 1980 and 1999, more than 70 ran for a governorship or a U.S. Senate seat” and “another 20 ran for or were appointed to a lower court seat, a federal agency post, or another position in state government”).
All this suggests that the allocation decision for state legislatures is less likely to turn on the ability of the legislature to control the prosecutor than on other concerns. Fiscal concerns likely top that list, which is another way in which state and federal politics differ. The states have more limited budgets than the federal government. This means that states may be more likely to cede control over criminal law enforcement to local prosecutors to keep those prosecutions funded by a local as opposed to statewide tax base. The federal government may be comparatively more willing to foot the bill for federal prosecutors from the federal tax base because it is not responsible for the enforcement of most criminal laws, as the states are, and because prosecution expenses are such a small part of the federal budget. From a comparative standpoint, scarcity alone does not dictate that decisions will be better or worse than those made with abundant resources, so the fact that states may seek to save money does not by itself make their decisions substantively better or worse than those made by a federal government with more resources.

But there are independent reasons to believe that state budget constraints are more conducive to rational decisionmaking than decisions made in the shadow of the federal budget. As I have explained at greater length elsewhere, focusing on the costs as well as the benefits of criminal justice policies improves decisionmaking because it allows the state to compare alternatives rationally, with an eye toward maximizing the social benefit from the money spent. In addition, focusing on costs as part of a cost-benefit analysis can help check various cognitive biases that the public and politicians may share about criminal justice policy, including a tendency to overestimate the frequency and intensity of particular types of violent crimes and a preference for short-term solutions, like incarceration, that may not always yield the most effective long-term results. As Bill Stuntz has pointed out, in the current political climate, “[t]here is only one reason for legislatures to hesitate to pass [ever harsher and broader criminal laws]: cost.” Considering the costs of enforcement and punitive strategies as well as their benefits can thus serve a valuable disciplining function, improve deliberation, and help increase the likelihood that the state adopts a course that will yield the greatest enforcement benefits. To the extent that cost decisions are driving state allocation decisions, then, those decisions may prove to be highly informative.

100 See Barron, supra note __, at 393-394 (explaining that local taxing authority is one reason for local power). Most local prosecutors receive the bulk of their funding from local sources. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 4 (2006) (noting that “[h]alf of all [local prosecutors’ offices] received at least 82% of their funds for prosecutorial functions from the county government” and that 32% of local offices relied on county funds exclusively).

101 Barkow, supra note __, at 1301.

102 Id. at 1291-1292.

103 Id. at 1293-1294.


105 Barkow, supra note __, at 1294-1297.
Moreover, state governments must pay the prison costs for all defendants, regardless of whether those defendants are prosecuted by a local prosecutor or a state appointee. So, even if states save money in prosecution and policing costs by giving prosecution power to localities, they have to weigh that savings against the fact that they lose direct control over prison costs. Because prison costs are a significant share of state budgets, states should have the incentives to make sure that those prison resources are being used most effectively. In turn, that should mean that states pay some attention to whether local or state officials are better at prioritizing crimes. If states are uniformly deciding that local actors are better suited to make those judgment calls, that lends support to the idea that whatever benefits are had by centralization, they are not worth the corresponding costs. If, in contrast, states are deciding that centralization is appropriate, that, too is likely to be based on a weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of centralized versus local authority. Either way, the state approach offers a valuable perspective that can inform the federalism question in a way that is currently missing from the existing debate because Congress is unlikely to be addressing any of these issues.

In addition, it is important to remember what federal legislators are deciding to do with their larger budgets. They are not creating federal prosecutors’ offices that are anywhere near large enough to enforce adequately all the existing federal laws on the books — including laws dealing with common offenses like theft, fraud, robbery, narcotics trafficking, and weapons possession and use. And Congress is certainly not funding a full-scale federal police force. On the contrary, the scheme established at the federal level is, relatively speaking, sparse. There are

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106 Because most states leave prosecutorial power with local communities, “local prosecutors effectively dictate the level of spending that the state legislature must maintain.” Misner, supra note __, at 720.

107 JOSEPH DILLON DAVEY, THE POLITICS OF PRISON EXPANSION 83 (1998) (observing that locally elected prosecutors “have little or no concern about how [state] prisons are funded”).

108 Spending on corrections has increased at a faster rate than spending in any other area, including other law enforcement costs such as police and courts. Misner, supra note __, at 726; Barkow, supra note __, at 1287 & n.49.


110 In fiscal year 2003, the federal government spent approximately $20 million on police protection, as compared to $11 million by the states and nearly $58 million by local governments.
over six times as many state and local police employees as federal. And local prosecutors outnumber federal prosecutors by a 5-to-1 ratio. As a result, the best federal prosecutors can do – and all Congress can reasonably expect them to do – is cherry-pick cases that would otherwise go to local enforcement without ever hoping to cover anything close to all or even a significant proportion of those cases covered by federal law.

States could adopt a similar scheme to the federal one in terms of having a central authority cherry-pick certain cases. Indeed, in most states, they could do it right now with the existing personnel in attorney general offices, because it is a regime that is heavier on symbolic message cases than it is on practical, large-scale enforcement. Thus, states could provide that state-level prosecutors could bring actions under any state law at their discretion and trust state prosecutors to choose when to do that given existing resources. States often have highly sophisticated investigative bureaus within their AG offices, so those investigators could provide state-level prosecutors with support similar to that provided to federal prosecutors by the Federal Bureau of Investigations. Thus, whether or not states opt to follow the federal model can offer some indication of its wisdom. If states are choosing to spend their law enforcement funds elsewhere, that, too, is valuable comparative data for thinking about the federal system because states have the capacity for this same scheme.

Relatedly, if states are following the same basic blueprint as the federal system and delegating broad authority to state AGs to use at their discretion, and those prosecutors are making different judgments about how to exercise discretionary authority than are federal prosecutors, that, too, is important information. If that is happening, one can seek to identify and analyze the possible reasons for the
different approach by state- and federal-level prosecutors.\textsuperscript{115}

In sum, because states face the same basic questions about local control over crime as the federal government and have greater incentives to get the answers right, looking at state practice offers a valuable comparative perspective for analyzing questions of federalism.\textsuperscript{116} In addition, to the extent state legislatures and Congress face different issues because of different institutional options or political dynamics, it is possible to evaluate those dynamics to determine whether, in an ideal world, we would want those to be the driving factors of the institutional allocation decision or whether, in fact, we would prefer to have the decision made on other grounds reaching different conclusions. Either way, there is a wealth of information to be had by looking at the states.

II. THE ALLOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE STATES

Because state practice can offer insights into the question of when federal law enforcement is appropriate, this Part looks at how the states divide responsibility between state and local prosecutors. Part A begins with a discussion of the methodology used to obtain intrastate allocation information. Part B then describes the dominant approach in most states of deferring to local actors. Part C provides a description of the few states that take an alternative view of a statewide prosecutor’s function.

A. Methodology

Before turning to the substance of the findings, a description of methodology is in order. Researching criminal law enforcement authority in all the states poses many problems. First, criminal law enforcement responsibility is often scattered across state codes, not limited to a section devoted to criminal law. Second, even if one accurately catalogs all the criminal laws on the books that describe which actor has the power to bring criminal charges, statutory law may not accurately reflect the law in practice because some laws are simply not enforced. Third, many state laws vest what appears to be broad residual authority in state attorneys general to prosecute crimes, either at the request of the governor or at the attorney general’s discretion. But the only way to know how these laws operate in practice is to talk to the people who administer them.

\textsuperscript{115} How prosecutors choose to exercise delegated power is an important locus of the federalism debate. Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note __, at 1101 (“[T]he right place to locate a debate about the federalization of crime is not the text of federal statutes, whether enacted or proposed, but the resources and priorities of federal prosecutors.”).

\textsuperscript{116} Barron, supra note __, at 381.
The goal, then, is to make the survey of state practice as complete as possible without devoting so many years to the effort that information becomes out-of-date before it can be put to paper. In that vein, the research methodology here followed this basic framework: The first step was to look at state constitutions and codes for the stated criminal jurisdiction of attorneys general. Second, for those states with laws that were unclear in any respect about the allocation of responsibility between attorneys general and local prosecutors, the state’s case law was consulted to determine if the judiciary resolved the issue. Third, each state attorney general’s website was reviewed to determine how the office itself characterized its authority. Fourth, and finally, in any state where the attorney general’s power was discretionary in any respect or where the law was otherwise uncertain, interviews were conducted with representatives from each AG office to find out more about how the AG has exercised that authority. Relevant information was gathered for the first three steps from all fifty states. In states that delegate all authority to the attorney general, steps one through three produced a full accounting of state practice. In the remaining forty-seven states, some follow-up was necessary for clarification or to confirm what appeared to be the practice from the written materials. Of those states, thirty-seven responded to requests for clarification or confirmation. Ten states did not respond to requests for information about how authority was exercised in practice, but in five of those states, the practice seems reasonably clear from the material obtained through steps one through three; interviews in those states were sought only to confirm, not to clarify, what appears to be the state practice. Moreover, given the consistency in the 40 states where full information is available, it is reasonable to assume that the states with missing interview data follow that same general pattern, particularly because the statutes, case law, and public relations information from those states all point in the same direction as the vast majority of states where interviews were obtained.

Piecing together these sources thus creates a well-informed general impression of state-versus local-level jurisdiction within a state, even if some individual cases or narrow categories of criminal law enforcement are overlooked or if survey data from a handful of states is absent.

B. The Consensus in the States

What stands out most in looking at state practice is the remarkable degree of uniformity. In almost every state, a conscious choice has been made to defer to local prosecutors. States have centralized authority in a statewide prosecutor in a handful of areas, and there is remarkable overlap among the states in terms of the

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117 Those states were Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island.

118 The states that did not return calls for additional information were Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin.

119 The written materials from New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin are quite specific about how the practice works in those states. For example, the New Mexico AG website explains that “[p]rimary jurisdiction for the majority of crimes lies with the local District Attorney” and that only “[o]n occasion” does a DA send a case to the AG’s Office. New Mexico Attorney General, Prosecution FAQs, available at http://www.nmag.gov/office/Divisions/Pros/faq.aspx#. Thus, while confirmation through an interview with someone familiar with the practice on the ground would have been helpful, the written materials that are available provide a fairly vivid picture of how things are working.
content of those areas. But outside these contexts, local prosecutors are responsible for the vast bulk of criminal law enforcement within a state. And these local prosecutors are operating in most states with little centralized supervision by a state-level actor.\textsuperscript{120}

1. The Limited Jurisdiction of State-level Prosecutors.

Most states vest state-level prosecutors – typically the attorney general – with exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over just a handful of areas that repeat themselves in state after state. This section provides an overview of those crimes that are often handled by state-level prosecutors.\textsuperscript{121}

a. Public corruption and election fraud. – States uniformly view public corruption, including local corruption, as an area that demands attention from a state-level officer to avoid both actual and perceived conflicts.\textsuperscript{122} States also

\textsuperscript{120} Criminal law thus mirrors what one sees in general across subjects: states are “far more likely to devolve power to elected local officials” than the federal government is. Hills, \textit{supra} note \_, at 210, 213.

\textsuperscript{121} This is not exclusive, of course. Some states give their state-level prosecutors additional jurisdiction in isolated areas. In Arizona, for example, the attorney general has jurisdiction over certain transportation code violations, \textit{Ariz. Rev. Stat.} \textsection{} 28-333, 28-5923(B), and fraud in Indian crafts, \textit{id.} 44-1231.03(A). Hawaii’s attorney general can bring criminal actions when there is a shortage of petroleum products. \textit{Haw. Rev. Stat.} \textsection{} 486H-17. The Illinois AG has responsibility for initiating criminal prosecutions for violations of the state’s Archaeological and Paleontological Resources Protection Act. \textit{20 Ill. Comp. Stat.} 3435/3.1. New Jersey gives the AG responsibility for handling terrorism prosecutions, \textit{N.J. Stat. Ann.} \textsection{} 2C:38-2(e), as does South Carolina, \textit{S.C. Code Ann.} \textsection{} 14-7-1630(A)(6). The goal here is not to create a comprehensive catalog, but to document the common areas seen across vast numbers of states.

frequently give state-level prosecutors authority over the related areas of voter and election fraud.\textsuperscript{123} Just as public corruption has statewide ramifications and is often poorly prosecuted at the local level because of conflicts of interest, voter and election fraud also present distinctly state-wide concerns.

b. \textit{Benefits fraud}. – State-level prosecutors handle federal benefits fraud claims in 49 states.\textsuperscript{124} Uniformity in this context is prompted by federal law, which requires states to operate Medicaid Fraud Control Units unless they receive a waiver from the federal government.\textsuperscript{125} The federal government funds 75\% of the operating costs of these units, with the states contributing the other 25\%.\textsuperscript{126} In addition to bringing fraud cases, these units handle claims of patient abuse and neglect, so charges can go beyond fraud, embezzlement, false claims and the like to include crimes such as negligent homicide and sexual abuse.\textsuperscript{127} State-level prosecutors in many states also handle others types of benefit fraud, such as welfare fraud\textsuperscript{128} and workers’ compensation fraud.\textsuperscript{129}
c. Regulatory Crimes and Consumer Protection.— State-level prosecutors typically have authority to bring regulatory crimes. Although states vary in the precise mix, most states have a state-level prosecutorial unit that handles environmental crimes.\textsuperscript{130} In addition, state-level prosecutors typically handle business and white collar crimes, including antitrust and sometimes securities violations, either exclusively or concurrently with local prosecutors.\textsuperscript{131} Many state

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}[\textsuperscript{130}]
\item See, e.g., Arizona Attorney General: About the Office, available at \url{http://www.azag.gov/AboutOffice/#CRM} (office has jurisdiction over “white collar crime”); California Office of the Attorney General, Antitrust and Business Competition, available at \url{http://ag.ca.gov/antitrust} (AG is responsible for civil and criminal antitrust enforcement); California Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Law Division, About Us, \url{http://ag.ca.gov/careers/descriptions/crimlaw.php} (describing special crimes unit, which prosecutors “largescale, investment and financial frauds and those in which the elderly were targeted”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-603 (giving both state AG and DA authority to prosecute securities violations); HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E-9(b) (vesting authority in AG to bring criminal actions under chapter dealing with corporate takeover law); id. § 480-20(a) (Hawaii AG can bring criminal and civil antitrust actions); id. § 485A-508 (Hawaii AG can bring criminal action for various forms of fraud under state securities act); IDAHO CODE § 301-14-508(g) (Idaho AG can prosecute under state securities fraud law); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/6 (1) (Illinois AG vested with concurrent authority to bring criminal antitrust actions); IND. CODE § 24-1-2-5 (Indiana AG can bring antitrust actions); IOWA CODE § 502.508(2) (Iowa AG can bring securities fraud cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-12a508 (Kansas AG can bring criminal actions under state securities act); Louisiana Attorney General, Criminal Division, available at \url{http://www.ag.state.la.us/Article.aspx?articleID=6&catID=0#WhiteCollarCrimesSection} (describing office’s white collar crime section); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1107 (AG responsible for prosecuting unlawful restraints of trade); MD. CODE ANN. § 11-207 (AG can prosecute antitrust violations); Maryland Attorney General, Law Enforcement, available at
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
AGs are also responsible for prosecuting criminal tax violations and consumer fraud. State AGs also enforce a host of other regulatory laws.

d. **Conflicts.** State AGs often have authority to step in when local prosecutors cannot handle a case because of a conflict. In addition to general provisions

http://www.oag.state.md.us/lawenforcement.htm (dedicated unit in AG’s office for white collar crimes); Michigan Attorney General, Criminal Prosecutions Bureau, available at http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,1607,7-164-19441-60568--00.html (office handles criminal securities/fraud); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-3-5-54 (AG has jurisdiction over white collar crimes); MO. REV. STAT. § 416.501(2) (jurisdiction over antitrust cases); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-211, 212 (AG has power over antitrust matters); Nevada Attorney General, Bureau of Criminal Justice, available at http://ag.state.nv.us/org/bcj/bcj.htm (describing AG’s securities fraud unit); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:9 (AG can bring criminal action to redress unfair or deceptive trade practices); New Jersey Attorney General, Financial Crimes and Antitrust Bureau, available at http://www.njdcj.org/fincab.htm (AG’s office has unit responsible for white collar and antitrust crime); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-10 (AG has authority for antitrust enforcement); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 358 (AG given authority to bring securities prosecutions in NY); id. § 342-b (AG given authority to enforce antitrust law); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 206(B) (AG can bring criminal actions under state antitrust law); S.C. CODE ANN. §14-7-1630(A)(7); Tennessee Office of the Attorney General and Reporter, Fighting Crime and Fraud, available at http://www.tennessee.gov/attorneygeneral/crime/crime.html (noting that the AG “exercises original prosecutorial powers in the areas of securities and state contract fraud”); TEX. CIV. STAT. art. 581-3; UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-21.5 (AG has concurrent jurisdiction to bring actions under state securities act).

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 42-1004(E); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-35-112; 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/16; Ind. CODE § 6-3-6-11; IOWA CODE § 421.19; KANSAS STAT. ANN. §§ 75-702, 12-189, 75-513; MINS. STAT. § 297E.13(6); New Jersey Attorney General, Financial Crimes and Antitrust Bureau, available at http://www.njdcj.org/fincab.htm; Okla. STAT. tit. 68, § 252(2); N.Y. TAX LAW § 512(3); Utah Attorney General, Criminal Justice Division, available at http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/criminaljustice.html.

See, e.g., Colorado Attorney General, Office Duties and Responsibilities, available at http://www.ago.state.co.us/about_agcfmcpvID=16.html (noting that the AG is responsible for enforcing consumer protection and antitrust laws); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-104 (authorizing AG and district attorneys to prosecute cases of residential mortgage fraud); IDAHO CODE § 41-213 (AG has concurrent authority with county attorneys over insurance fraud); Kansas Attorney General, Assisting Consumers, available at http://www.ksag.org/page/assisting-consumers (office is responsible for prosecuting violations of state consumer protection act); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.372 (authorizing AG to prosecute mortgage lending fraud); New Jersey Attorney General, Financial Crimes and Antitrust Bureau, available at http://www.njdcj.org/fincab.htm; Okla. STAT. tit. 68, § 252(2); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §63(3) (giving AG authority to prosecute upon request by various state agencies).
allowing the state AG to bring cases when there is a conflict, specific statutes also seem to reflect this policy.136

2. The Infrequent Exercise of Discretion To Intervene with Local Decisionmaking

Some attorneys general have broader authority under state law to intervene in local prosecutions. This power stems either from the state AG’s authority to indict cases that cross county or district lines or from a more generalized grant of statutory authority to bring charges whenever the AG is of the view that it would be appropriate. Although both of these sources of power could be used as a basis for large-scale state AG involvement in local matters, just about every attorney general with this kind of broad discretionary power opts not to use it except in rare cases.


136 In Louisiana, the AG can supersede local district attorneys “for cause,” LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8, and in the rare cases in which this power has been used, it was because the local prosecutor was self-interested in the prosecution at issue. See Charles J. Yeager & Lee Hargrave, The Power of the Attorney General To Supersede a District Attorney: Substance, Procedure & Ethics, 51 LA. L. REV. 733, 745 (1991). In Indiana, the AG has concurrent jurisdiction with local prosecutors to bring an action when a sheriff is accused of failing to protect the life of a prisoner in the sheriff’s custody. IND. CODE § 4-6-2-1.1(3). Because a local prosecutor’s office may have a conflict of interest in bringing a case against a local sheriff, this specific law reflects the same basic policy of using state-level prosecutors because a conflict of interest could undermine proper enforcement of the law.
a. Multi-jurisdictional Crime. Many states give a state-level prosecutor authority to address crimes that cross county or district lines. This authority is analogous to the power federal prosecutors have under the Commerce Clause to address crimes that cross state lines. Congress and federal prosecutors have used the interstate dimensions of crime—no matter how tenuous—to enlarge federal prosecutorial power to cover traditionally local crimes. 137

State-level prosecutors, in contrast, are virtually unanimous in their view that multi-jurisdictional crime should be interpreted narrowly. With few exceptions, 138 state AGs tend not to take expansive views of their power to bring charges for crimes that cross jurisdictional boundaries. For example, California has a Special Crimes Unit that works with local prosecutors upon request in complex cases involving multi-jurisdictional activity. This can include “high-tech crimes where the scope and complexity of the offenses exceed the investigative and prosecutorial resources of local law enforcement.” 139 In Colorado, the state AG brings multi-jurisdictional organized crime cases when a state investigator brings the case to the AG’s attention, but even then the AG’s office first obtains consent from the local prosecutors in the jurisdictions affected by the crime. 140

In Illinois, the law vesting the state attorney general with the authority to convene a state grand jury in cases involving more than one county contains numerous limits on the exercise of that power. In addition to showing that the offense involves more than one county, the AG must also show that a county grand

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137 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2004) (making arson a federal crime if the property set on fire is “any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce”); 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (creating a federal crime of car-jacking as long as the motor vehicle involved has “been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce”). The Senate passed a bill in 1994 that would have made it a federal crime to commit any crime committed with a handgun that crossed state lines, and if murder was committed with a gun that had crossed state lines, the bill would have authorized the death penalty. Beale, supra note __, at 1649-1650. As Judge Friendly observed, just because there is an element of a crime that crosses state lines does not mean that the crime itself is of federal interest. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 58 (1973) (asking “[w]hy should the federal government care if a Manhattan businessman takes his mistress to sleep with him in Greenwich, Connecticut, although it would not if the love-nest were in Port Chester, N.Y.?”).

138 See infra, Part II.C. Although I was unable to obtain an interview with someone in the Oklahoma AG’s office, the website description of the MultiCounty Grand Jury indicates that it is used largely for public corruption. See Oklahoma Attorney General, Office Sections, MultiCounty Grand Jury Unit, available at http://www.oag.state.ok.us/oagweb.nsf/oag_sections.html. The South Carolina AG has authority to bring a range of crimes to the state grand jury, most of which involve subject areas that are commonly within the jurisdiction of AGs in other states, such as election crimes, public corruption, securities crimes, and environmental crimes. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1630(A). But the AG in South Carolina also has jurisdiction over areas that are not typically brought by a state-level prosecutor in other states, including narcotics, criminal gang activity, terrorism, and false statements related to immigration. Id. The AG’s authority over drug crimes is directly tied to its multi-county nature, id. § 14-7-1630(A)(1). The office brings a number of these cases, but that number varies depending on which counties are involved. Interview by Darryl Stein of Curtis Pauling, South Carolina State Grand Jury Office (June 26, 2009).


140 Interview by Sam Raymond with Rob Shapiro, First Assistant Attorney General for Special Prosecutions, Colorado Attorney General’s Office (June 11, 2009).
jury cannot effectively investigate and indict the case and either that all relevant state’s attorneys consent to the state grand jury or, if one or more state’s attorneys objects to the statewide grand jury, that there is good cause for impaneling it.141

New York’s law is similarly restrictive. NY has an organized crime task force that addresses organized crime activities “carried on either between two or more counties” or between a county in NY and another jurisdiction.142 The task force includes a deputy AG, but the AG’s office cannot bring criminal charges without the approval of the governor and the appropriate district attorney.143 So, for example, because the Manhattan DA typically does not consent, the AG lacks authority to bring any such cases involving Manhattan.

b. Broad Grants Exercised Sparingly. Some states give the AG the authority to prosecute any criminal case and leave it to the attorney general to decide whether to intervene. On paper, this is a dramatic departure from the limited jurisdiction of state-level prosecutors in most states. In practice, there is typically little difference. Most state-level prosecutors who possess broad jurisdictional grants of power are exercising their discretion sparingly and with a focus on specific areas.

In California, the state constitution gives the AG “all the powers of a district attorney” to prosecute “[w]henver in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any county.”144 Yet, even with this broad constitutional mandate, the AG in California follows the model of AGs in other states and limits itself to post-conviction proceedings, benefits fraud, and complex white collar and high-tech crimes.145

Similarly, in Nebraska, the AG has the authority to prosecute “any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the state may be a party or interested.”146 In practice, the AG does “not normally get involved unless requested” by a county attorney, which happens in large measure because county prosecutors are part-time

141 725 ILL.COMP.STAT. 215/3. Circuit judges assess the AG’s claims. Id.
142 N.Y. EXEC. LAW §70-a(1)(a).
143 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 70-a(7).
146 NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-203. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-204 (AG has “same powers and prerogatives in each of the several counties of the state as the county attorneys have in their respective counties”).
and often need more resources.\textsuperscript{147} Without such a request, it is “very, very rare” for the AG to step in when a local prosecutor has decided not to prosecute.\textsuperscript{148}

The Oregon AG may, when he or she “considers the public interest requires, with or without the concurrence of the district attorney, direct the county grand jury to convene for the investigation and consideration of such matters of a criminal nature as the Attorney General desires to submit to it.”\textsuperscript{149} Despite having the legal power to act without approval from the district attorney, it is “extremely rare” and perhaps may never have been the case that the AG acted without the concurrence of the local prosecutor.\textsuperscript{150}

In South Dakota, the AG is authorized to bring criminal cases “whenever in his judgment the welfare of the state demands.”\textsuperscript{151} In practice, however, the South Dakota AG generally brings cases only when local prosecutors request assistance.\textsuperscript{152}

The Iowa AG likewise has the authority to prosecute cases “when, in the attorney general’s judgment, the interest of the state requires such action.”\textsuperscript{153} But the Iowa AG typically uses this discretion when a local prosecutor refers the case, which happens “when the county attorney has a conflict of interest” or “when an especially serious or complicated case requires prosecution resources in addition to those already available in the county attorney’s office.”\textsuperscript{154} The AG does take a more aggressive view of the state’s role in drug cases, with five state-level prosecutors responsible for bringing major methamphetamine drug cases,\textsuperscript{155} but

\textsuperscript{147} Interview with John Freudenberg, Criminal Bureau Chief, Nebraska Attorney General’s Office, June 2, 2009.

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Id.} One case where the AG did bring charges after the local prosecutor decided not to prosecute involved a 28-year-old who had sex with a 13-year-old girl and then married her. \textit{Id.} It is noteworthy that state law requires the AG to create a Child Protection Division, and that Division is authorized to prosecute cases if a county attorney declines to do so. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-205 (13).

\textsuperscript{149} OR. REV. STAT. § 180.070 (2).

\textsuperscript{150} Fussner Interview, supra note __.

\textsuperscript{151} S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-11-1(2). \textit{See also id.} §23-3-3 (AG has “concurrent jurisdiction” with state’s attorneys “[i]n any and all criminal proceedings in any and all courts of this state and in any county or part of the state”).

\textsuperscript{152} Sometimes the state’s Division of Criminal Investigation will bring a case to the AG, and the AG will prosecute it, but more often, the AG will give the case to local prosecutors unless the case is a major one. Interview by Sam Raymond with Katie Hanson, Assistant AG, South Dakota (August 14, 2009).

\textsuperscript{153} IOWA CODE § 13.2(1)(b).

\textsuperscript{154} Iowa Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Area Prosecutions Division, available at http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/fighting_crime/prosecuting_felony_offense.html (listing cases “requiring specialized legal training” as including “Medicaid fraud, violence against women, environmental crime, securities fraud, obscenity, correctional institution crime and tax crimes”).

otherwise the Iowa AG mainly follows the blueprint of most other states in terms of the areas in which it brings cases. 156

The Massachusetts AG similarly has broad authority to bring criminal charges, but in practice, the office “focuses on cases that reflect the statewide jurisdiction and areas of investigative and prosecutorial expertise not addressed by other law enforcement offices, particularly in the protection of taxpayer funds and the integrity of governmental agencies.” 157

The New Jersey AG may “participate in” or “initiate” “any investigation, criminal action or proceeding,” whenever the AG is of the opinion that “the interests of the State will be furthered by doing so.” 158 The New Jersey AG seems to have been more willing to exercise this power than some of her counterparts in other states, using this authority to tackle organized crime and gangs. 159 But, even with this somewhat more aggressive view of how discretionary authority should be used, the AG generally only exercises discretion to bring charges in major cases and will give cases to local prosecutors where there is less criminal activity than originally suspected. 160

156 Similarly, although some states recognize that the AG possesses broad common law powers, the AG almost never users those powers. For example, even though Arkansas recognizes broad common law powers in the AG, Williams v. Karston, 208 Ark. 703, 708 (1945), the AG does not exercise those powers to initiate prosecutions or intervene with the decisions of local prosecutors. Interview with Nicana Sherman, Assistant Attorney General, Arkansas (Jan. 29, 2009) (noting that the AG’s office would not get involved with an ongoing local prosecution and that AG prosecutors might assist local prosecutors at their request but otherwise AG does not initiate prosecutions except in specific categories of cases such as environmental, Medicare fraud, and business crimes). The Illinois AG also possesses common law powers, which include the authority to initiate prosecutions. Illinois v. Buffalo Confectionary Co., 401 N.E.2d 546, 549 (Ill. 1980). In practice, however, the AG brings cases in limited areas set out by statute, when local prosecutors request it, if there is a conflict with the local prosecutor, or the case is particularly complex. Atterbury Interview, supra note __.


159 Interview by Sam Raymond with John Quelch, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the New Jersey Attorney General (June 15, 2009).

160 Id. State AGs do not necessarily need broad discretionary authority to target organized violent crime. Many states have adopted a state version of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, which targets enterprise criminality. See Russell D. Leblang, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion under State RICO, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79, 80 (1990) (noting that more than half the states have a comparable RICO statute); A. Laxmidas Sawkar, Note, From the Mafia to Milking Cows: State RICO Act Expansion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1133, 1134 n.6 (1999) (citing 30 state RICO statutes). State RICO statutes could be used,
Some states allow AGs to bring any type of criminal action as long as it is at the request of the governor, one of the legislative branches, or some other government official. But these political officials have been no more willing to interfere with local prosecutors than state AGs. In Colorado, for example, the governor has requested the AG to bring a prosecution only once in 10 years. In Georgia, where the Governor can also request the AG to represent the state in any criminal case, the AG’s office estimates that the governor requested AG involvement fewer than 10 times in the past 12 years. Governors in Idaho, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington have been similarly reluctant to use their power to request AG involvement in criminal matters. In Kansas, either branch of the legislature or the governor can request that the AG prosecute an action, but this is seldom, if ever, done. Instead, the AG typically intervenes only when a county attorney requests help because of a like the federal RICO statute, to go after violent crimes by affiliated individuals. Neither my interviews nor a search of case law involving questions about state RICO prosecutions, however, revealed state RICO laws to be a widely employed source of criminal prosecution authority for state AGs outside areas already targeted by state-level prosecutors.

161 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-101(1)(a); GA. CONST. art. V, § 3, ¶ 4; IDAHO CODE § 31-2227 (2008); MD. CONST. art. V, § 3(a)(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.02 (governor can ask AG to prosecute a person who has been indicted).

162 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-702 (allowing the AG to prosecute “when required by the governor or either branch of the legislature”); MD. CONST. art. V, § 3(a)(2) (Generally Assembly can direct a prosecution by law or joint resolution); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.25 (1m) (Wisconsin’s statewide department of justice will appear in criminal matters, including as prosecutor, “[i]f requested by the governor or either house of the legislature”).

163 In Kentucky, the AG can bring criminal cases when requested “by the Governor, or by any of the courts or grand juries of the Commonwealth, or upon receiving a communication from a sheriff, mayor, or majority of a city legislative body stating that his participation in a given case is desirable to effect the administration of justice and the proper enforcement of the laws of the Commonwealth.” KY. REV. STAT. § 15.200.

164 Shapiro Interview, supra note __.

165 GA. CONST. art. V, § 3, ¶ 4.

166 McLaughlin Interview, supra note __.

167 Topmiller Interview, supra note __.

168 Alexander Interview, supra note __.

169 Interview by Sam Raymond with Ted Bruce, Deputy Chief Counsel of The Public Safety Division, Missouri Attorney General’s Office (June 11, 2009).

170 Interview with James Slagle, Chief of Criminal Justice Section, Ohio Attorney General’s Office (July 15, 2009).

171 Interview by Sam Raymond with Patrick Dorgan, Director of Criminal Prosecutions and Enforcement Division, Virginia Attorney General’s Office (August 14, 2009).

172 Interview by Sam Raymond with Sara Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Washington (June 4, 2009).

173 For a discussion of the historical reluctance of New York Governors to appoint special prosecutors to supersede district attorneys, see Lawrence T. Kurlander & Valerie Friedlander, Perilous Executive Power – Perspective on Special Prosecutors in New York, 16 Hofstra L. Rev. 35, 49-52 (1987).

174 Davidson Interview, supra note __.
conflict of interest or because of insufficient resources to handle the case.\textsuperscript{175} In Kentucky, the governor, a mayor, a majority of a city legislative body, a court or grand jury,\textsuperscript{176} and local prosecutors can also request that the AG intervene in cases.\textsuperscript{177} In practice, local prosecutors and judges are the ones who make these requests, not the governor, mayors, legislators, or sheriffs.\textsuperscript{178} In Louisiana, the Attorney General can institute or intervene in criminal proceedings or supersede the district attorney for cause with court authorization.\textsuperscript{179} The AG in Louisiana has sought to use this authority rarely.\textsuperscript{180} Instead, as elsewhere, the AG typically gets involved with local cases with the district attorney’s consent.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{175} Id. The Wisconsin Department of Justice, a statewide agency, is similarly authorized to bring charges in criminal matters upon request of the governor or either house of the legislature. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 165.25(1m). Although I was unable to interview anyone in this office, there is little evidence to suggest that this authority is exercised in Wisconsin to a greater extent than it is in other states that follow this framework. The Wisconsin Department does have a Division of Criminal Investigation that investigates crimes “that are statewide in nature or importance,” which the website identifies as arson, financial crimes, illegal gaming, computer crimes, drug trafficking, government corruption, and crimes against children. Wisconsin Department of Justice, Agency Division/Bureau Descriptions, available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/site/divs.asp. The Department will also assist local law enforcement at their request in homicide investigations and cases involving multi-jurisdictional fraud or theft. Id. But I did not find any indication that the Department brings its own prosecutions without the request of local prosecutors or that the governor or either house of the legislature is requesting the Department’s involvement on a regular basis.

\textsuperscript{176} Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.200.

\textsuperscript{177} Id. § 15.190.

\textsuperscript{178} Interview by Sam Raymond with Tom Marshall, Assistant Attorney General for Special Prosecution, Kentucky Attorney General’s Office (July 20, 2009).

\textsuperscript{179} La. Const. art. IV, § 8(3). The cause requirement requires the AG to show “‘a right or interest of the state is not being satisfactorily represented or asserted by a district attorney.’” Yeager & Hargrave, supra note __, at 737 (quoting Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 La. L. Rev. 765, 835 (1977)).

\textsuperscript{180} Id. at 735 (AG has used this power only twice as of 1991).

\textsuperscript{181} La. Const. art. IV, §8(2) (“upon the written request of a district attorney” AG can “advise and assist in the prosecution of any criminal case”); Brindisi Interview, supra note __. Similarly, in Tennessee, judges can appoint an attorney pro tempore under the Constitution if a district attorney fails to prosecute according to law, Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5, but judges have not used this power. Interview by Sam Raymond with Mark Fulks, Senior Counsel for the Criminal Justice Divisions of the Attorney General, Tennessee (August 14, 2009).
3. The Limited Supervisory Authority of State-Level Prosecutors

In most states, the relationship between state-level prosecutors and local prosecutors is coordinate, not hierarchical, with the exception of appellate jurisdiction.

   a. No Hierarchical Relationship. “In practically all jurisdictions, either the constitution or laws of the state make the two offices separate and distinct, and vest in the prosecuting attorney certain powers, and impose upon him certain duties, which can neither be increased nor decreased by the attorney-general.” Even in those states that have laws on the books that vest a state attorney general with supervisory powers, the relationship between local and state prosecutors is typically cooperative and the AG in most places does not seek to centralize authority over prosecution.

   In some states, this is because state courts have interpreted these provisions narrowly. For example, even though the California state Constitution gives the AG “direct supervision over every district attorney,” California courts have concluded that this “does not contemplate absolute control and direction.” Hawaii is similar. Local prosecutors in Honolulu are authorized to “[p]rosecute offenses against the laws of the state under the authority of the attorney general.” But the Hawaii courts have interpreted that provision not to confer “power to usurp, at his sole discretion, the functions of the public prosecutor.” Instead, the AG in Hawaii can intervene in local prosecutions when it is “clearly apparent that compelling interests require” it, a situation that has rarely been found by the AG because there are only four counties in the state, the AG believes they do a good job, and the AG is able to talk things through with local prosecutors whenever any issues arise. The Idaho AG has statutory authority “[w]hen required by the public service, to repair to any county in the state and assist the prosecuting attorney thereof in the discharge of duties.” The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted this narrowly, and the AG mainly uses this power in cases involving a conflict of interest by the local prosecutor or to support counties that are too small to bring complex cases on their own. Likewise, in Nebraska, though the AG “may [e]xercise supervisory powers over all district attorneys of the State in all

182 State v. Finch, 280 P. 910, 912 (Kan. 1929).
185 Revised Charter of Honolulu § 8-104(b).
187 Id. This includes a local prosecutor’s refusal to act when it “amounts to a serious dereliction of duty on his part, or where, in the unusual case, it would be highly improper for the public prosecutor and his deputies to act.” Id.
188 Interview with Bridget Holthus, Special Assistant to the Hawaii Attorney General (May 28, 2009).
189 IDAHO CODE § 67-1401 (7).
191 Topmiller Interview, supra note __.
matters pertaining to the duties of their offices,” the Nebraska Supreme Court has 
made clear that this “cannot sensibly be read as a grant of power to usurp the function of the district attorney.” The Nebraska AG therefore intervenes with local actions only when there is a conflict of interest.

Courts have taken a narrow view of statutory language that allows AGs to “assist” in local prosecutions “when, in [the AG’s] judgment, the interest of the people of the State requires it.” The Illinois courts have held this provision does not allow the AG “to take exclusive charge” of cases where the state attorney also has authority. More importantly, the AG’s office itself has used this power in a limited fashion. The AG does not intervene with local prosecutions, but instead provides assistance upon request by local prosecutors and takes over when there is a conflict or the matter is particularly complex. Indiana’s law mirrors that in Illinois. But just as its neighboring state uses this power sparingly, so does Indiana. The AG does not view itself as having a right to intervene in local judgments, but rather offers assistance when local prosecutors need it, particularly in complicated cases.

In New Jersey, the AG “shall maintain a general supervision over said county prosecutors with a view to obtaining effective and uniform enforcement of the criminal laws throughout the State.” The New Jersey Supreme Court has

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193 Fishburne Interview, supra note __.
194 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/4. The AG also has the duty to assist local prosecutors when they request it. Id.
196 Atterbury Interview, supra note __. Utah appears to follow a similar framework. The AG has authority “to exercise supervisory powers over the district and county attorneys of the state in all matters pertaining to the duties of their office.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-5-1(6). The AG’s website indicates that the AG’s office views this as a cooperative relationship more than a hierarchical one. The state-level prosecutors “regularly consult with and actively assist prosecutors throughout the state, often in high-profile and difficult or sensitive cases.” Utah Attorney General, Criminal Justice Division, http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/criminaljustice.html. State-level attorneys “frequently handle cases for county attorneys who have a conflict of interest” or in rural areas with small offices that “request assistance with major cases.” Id. Although no one from the AG’s office would calls to confirm, it appears from this description and a search of Utah case law that the AG is not exercising direct supervisory control or interfering regularly with local matters unless requested.
197 IND. CODE § 4-6-1-6.
198 Interview by Sam Raymond with Bryan Corbin, Public Information Officer for Policy and Litigation, Indiana Attorney General’s Office (June 16, 2009).
199 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-103.
clarified that this does not mean that there is an “ordinary chain of command between the attorney-general and the county prosecutors” even though the AG does have the authority to “ensure the proper and efficient handling of the county prosecutors’ ‘criminal business.’” And, as a matter of practice, the New Jersey AG typically intervenes only in cases where there is a conflict of interest with the local prosecutor.

The Attorney General in Pennsylvania “may petition the court having jurisdiction over any criminal proceeding to permit the Attorney General to supersede the district attorney.” But it is up to the judge whether to grant the petition, and the AG must “establish[] by a preponderance of the evidence that the district attorney has failed or refused to prosecute and such failure or recusal constitutes abuse of discretion.” As one court has observed, this is a “narrowly circumscribed power” that rests on “cumbersome court proceedings” and therefore does not undermine the district attorney’s autonomy. By requiring judicial review of any request to supersede, the Pennsylvania legislature was careful not to “‘impinge[c] upon the jurisdiction and duties of the constitutionally created office of county-elected district attorney.’”

Unlike the courts in other states, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has not interpreted a broad statutory grant narrowly. New Hampshire law states that the AG “shall have and exercise general supervision of the criminal cases,” and that county attorneys are “under the direction of the attorney-general.” The Supreme Court has concluded this “give[s] [the AG] the power to control, direct and supervise criminal law enforcement by the county attorneys in cases where he deems it in the public interest.” But while the highest court in the state has not limited the AG’s power under this law, the AG itself has taken a narrow view in practice. The New Hampshire AG’s office seldom intervenes in cases without the request of a county prosecutor.

201 Quelch Interview, supra note 1.
202 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 732-205(4).
203 Id.
205 Commonwealth v. Carsia, 491 A.2d 237, 251 (Penn. 1985) (quoting JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION TASK FORCE ON THE OFFICE OF ELECTED ATTORNEY GENERAL FINAL REPORT at 4 (1978)). For an example of a case in which a court rejected an AG request to supersede when a district attorney refused to bring a homicide, see Commonwealth v. Schab, 383 A.2d 819 (1978).
207 Id. § 7:34. See also id. § 7.11 (an “officer or person, in the enforcement of [any criminal] law, shall be subject to the control of the attorney general whenever in the discretion of the latter he shall fit to exercise the same”).
209 Interview by Sam Raymond with Stephen Fuller, Senior Assistant Attorney General, New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office (June 16, 2009).
This same kind of relationship between the AG and state’s attorneys exists in other states. Formally, the AG in South Dakota has the statutory power “[t]o consult with, advise, and exercise supervision over the several state’s attorneys of the state.”210 But in practice, the relationship is not hierarchical. The AG gets involved in local prosecutions only when local prosecutors ask for help.211 The story is largely the same in Montana. By statute, the Montana AG has the duty “to exercise supervisory power over county attorneys,” and that “include[s] the power to order and direct county attorneys in all matters pertaining to the duties of their office.”212 If directed by the AG, the county prosecutor must bring a prosecution.213 Although the AG has used this authority in Montana, particularly in capital cases and crimes against children, the power has been exercised “infrequent[ly]” and typically the AG does not intervene with local matters unless requested.214

To be sure, not every state AG has interpreted what seems to be broad statutory supervisory power so narrowly. In Iowa, the Attorney General has a duty to “[s]upervise county attorneys in all matters pertaining to the duties of their offices.”215 Unlike the AGs in some states, the Iowa AG does use this authority, particularly when the case involves a serious felony or the local prosecutor has fewer resources.216 Supervision in this context can mean telling local prosecutors to stop a prosecution or to commence one. But even though the AG interprets this power broadly, the office uses the authority “prudently.”217

b. State-level Prosecutors’ Control Over the Development of Law. While states typically take a hands-off approach in terms of local prosecutions, there is an exception. Even among those states that generally defer to local prosecutors,

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210 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-11-1(5).
211 Hanson Interview, supra note __.
212 MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501(5).
213 Id.
214 Interview by Sam Raymond with Mark McLaverty, Assistant Attorney General< Montana (June 11, 2009).
215 IOWA CODE § 13.2(1)(b).
216 Mullins Interview, supra note __.
217 Id.
218 A stark example of this is probably West Virginia, where the AG does not have authority to prosecute criminal cases, see West Virginia Attorney General, Criminal Matters, http://www.wvago.gov/attorneygeneral.cfm?fx=duties, but does handle appeals before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
almost all states give the state’s attorney general authority over appeals in the state’s highest court.\footnote{See, e.g., Ala. Code § 36-15-1(2); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §41-193(A)(1); Ark. Code, Ann. §25-16-704(a); Cal. Code § 12512; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-31-101(1)(a); Fla. Stat. ch. 16.01(4) (2008); Ga. Const. art. V, §§ 3, 4; Idaho Code § 19-4909 (2008); Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/4; Ind. Code § 4-6-2-1; Iowa Code § 13.2(1)(a); Kansas Stat. Ann. § 75-702; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020; Md. Const. art. V, §3(a)(1); Mich. Comp. Laws § 14.28; Minn. Stat. § 8.01; Miss Code Ann. § 7-5-29; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 27.050 (except misdemeanors); Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-501(1); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-205(10); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 228.140; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 7:6, 21-M:8(b); Interview with Paul Heinzel, New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, June 2, 2009 (AG can supersede in cases where county prosecutor appeals, though exercised rarely); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 8-5-2(a); State v. Aragon, 234 P.2d 356, 358 (N.M. 1950); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 114-2(1); N.D. Cent. Code § 54-12-01(1); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 109.02; Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 186(A)(1); Fussner Interview, supra note ___; S.C. Code Ann. § 1-7-40; S.D. Codified Laws § 1-11-1(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-6-109(b)(2); Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 402.021; Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1(2); Va. Code Ann. §2.2-511(A); W.V. Code § 5-3-2; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 165.25(1); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-1-603(a)(ii). In some states, like Kansas, the AG delegates this power to local prosecutors, who are permitted to handle the appeals, as long as they file the briefs with the AG’s Office. This gives the AG’s Office the opportunity to evaluate the briefs to determine whether the AG’s Office should handle the appeal itself. Davidson Interview, supra note __. New York law is somewhat analogous. While DAs can handle their own appeals, the AG is notified of such cases and can intervene if he or she thinks necessary. N.Y. Exec. Law §863(1) (general notice provision), §71 (AG entitled to notice when constitutionality of a statute, rule, or regulation is at issue). There are some exceptions. In Washington, the prosecuting attorneys in the counties handle their own appeals, and the AG steps in only “exceptional cases at the insistence of local prosecutors.” Olson Interview, supra note __. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, the AG handles appeals only “in his discretion, upon the request of the district attorney” or if a specific law otherwise allows. 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 732-205(c). In Connecticut, local prosecutors can bring appeals, see infra note __, though only two state’s attorneys currently do. In Georgia, the AG is responsible only for capital felony actions in the state’s highest court. Ga. Code Ann. § 45-15-3(5) (2009). But the AG’s office also files briefs in cases where it lacks jurisdiction if it is a case of significance to the state. McLaughlin Interview, supra note __. The Hawaii AG also lacks exclusive authority over criminal appeals before the state’s highest court. Holthus Interview, supra note __. The Massachusetts AG also lacks exclusive authority over appeals. Interview with David Friedman, First Assistant Attorney General, Massachusetts (June 8, 2009).}

4. Small States: The Exceptions that Prove the Rule

Some smaller states give state-level actors more control over criminal prosecutions, but on closer inspection, each of these states follows the same basic model of limited authority. Consider first the three states that give state-level prosecutors the primary responsibility for all criminal prosecutions. In Alaska and Rhode Island, that authority rests directly with the state Attorney General.\footnote{Carol J. DeFrances, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2001, 2 (May 2002); Alaska Stat. § 44.23.020(4).} In Delaware, the Attorney General appoints the State Prosecutor, who manages the Criminal Division of the state’s Department of Justice, which is responsible for bringing all criminal cases.\footnote{Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, §2504(6) (2008).} Because the State Prosecutor is appointed by the Attorney General and reports to the Attorney General’s Chief Deputy,\footnote{The heads of the three county offices in Delaware are also appointed by the Attorney General in Delaware and report to the State Prosecutor. Website of Delaware Attorney General, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/crime/crimeprevent.shtml.} it is fair to
characterize prosecutions in Delaware as under the control of a statewide prosecutor.

Although Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island give prosecutorial control to a statewide actor, they are still properly viewed as conforming to the general pattern in most states. Each of these states is so small “that they are functionally equivalent to the county or municipal governments of other states.” The population in Alaska and Delaware would not even put them among the top ten cities in the country. At just over 1 million, Rhode Island is more populous than Alaska and Delaware, but that merely puts Rhode Island on par with a large U.S. city. In terms of geographic area, Rhode Island and Delaware are the smallest states in the country. Thus, the state-wide prosecutors in these states represent relatively small communities and therefore reflect local preferences. Or, as Rick Hills puts it, states like these are themselves “local governments.”

This is also true of the three Northeastern states that vest authority in state-level prosecutors to bring homicide prosecutions and pursue other crimes that in most other states are brought by local-level prosecutors. In Maine, the AG has exclusive responsibility for bringing homicide prosecutions in the state. In neighboring New Hampshire, the AG brings all murder cases and investigates most homicides and prosecutes cases where the defendant is charged with a crime “punishable with death or imprisonment for life.” In Vermont, the AG is responsible for prosecuting homicides and for other criminal matters “when, in his

223 Hills, supra note __, at 211. Rhode Island (1,050,788) is more populous, but is still on par with a large U.S. city, U.S. Census Bureau July 2008 Resident Population Data, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ranks/rank01.html.


226 See Hills, supra note __, at 211-212 (discussing Connecticut and Rhode Island specifically and raising the more general point that small states are more properly viewed as local governments). In fact, Alaska, Connecticut and Rhode Island do not even have counties as relevant governmental units. DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK (Cong. Q. Press 2001). And Delaware has only three counties, the fewest of any state in the country.

227 Hills, supra note __, at 212.


229 Fuller Interview, supra note __.

judgment, the interests of the state so require,” which has in practice included a
variety of crimes that are elsewhere pursued by local officials, such as domestic
violence and felonies involving firearms.

James Tierney, the former AG for Maine, notes that having the AG’s office
handle homicides is a matter of efficiency, not politics. The handful of prosecutors
in the AGs office who bring homicide cases have developed a specialty in dealing
with these cases and with the two medical examiners who work on these cases in
the state’s lone crime lab. From the perspective of district attorneys, this
arrangement is also efficient. Because Maine is a rural state, individual districts
may go years at a time without a homicide, but then get three or four in one year.
Having the AG handle the cases keeps the work at a more consistent level.
Tierney’s description of why the Maine AG handles homicides thus comports with
a view of the state as essentially a local government. With one crime lab and rural
counties that may have inconsistent homicide numbers from year to year, it makes
sense to have one office take responsibility. That it is a state-level office is of little
moment because vesting authority at that level of government is not about the need
for centralization or uniformity, but efficiency in light of the state’s demographics.

And to the extent the AGs in New Hampshire and Vermont bring additional
charges that are traditionally brought by local prosecutors, that can be explained
in the same way the structure in Delaware and Rhode Island is explained. New
Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont are all sparsely populated, relatively homogenous
states; thus the state-level offices are themselves representative of a local
community.

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231 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 157. Although I was unable to conduct an interview to find out
more about how the office interprets the discretionary power, the office’s trial and investigative
unit states its focus is on “matters that are (1) statewide or multi-jurisdictional in nature, (2)
require significant resources beyond those normally available at the county level, or (3) involve
a conflict of interest for a State’s Attorney Office.” Vermont Office of the Attorney General, Trial
and Investigative Unit, available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/office-organization-
information/office-organization/criminal-division/trial-and-investigative-unit.php. In practice,
that appears to mean prosecutions that grow out of the efforts of the Vermont Drug Task Force,
which focuses on large-scale drug investigations, child sex assault, computer crimes, serious
felonies involving firearms, domestic violence, and elder abuse. Id. Thus, this office appears to
involve itself in a wide variety of matters, such as domestic violence prosecutions and firearm-
related crime, that would in most other places be conducted by prosecutors at the local level.

232 Email from James Tierney to Rachel Barkow, (June 9, 2009) (on file with author).

233 Id.

234 Aside from giving state-level prosecutors responsibility over homicides, neither Maine
nor New Hampshire differs much from other states in terms of the kinds of cases the AG’s office
handles: they bring the usual mix of benefits fraud, antitrust, consumer, and environmental cases.
See generally Maine Attorney General, Crimes We Prosecute, available at
http://www.maine.gov/ag/crime/crimes_weProsecute/index.shtml (listing types of cases
prosecuted by the AG); New Hampshire Department of Justice, available at http://doj.nh.gov/
(describing Division of Public Protection). And despite having the legal right to intervene in
local actions, the New Hampshire AG respects the independence of county prosecutors and rarely
gets involved with local matters unless asked. Fuller Interview, supra note __. The AG in
Vermont, in contrast, appears to bring a wider variety of cases. See supra note __.

235 Maine and New Hampshire are approximately the same size, with a population of
1,316,456 and 1,315,809, respectively. They are thus comparable to a medium-sized city like
A seventh state, Connecticut, has created a state commission, known as the Criminal Justice Commission, to select its Chief State’s Attorney236 and the State’s Attorney for each of its judicial districts.237 The Commission is a state body composed of the Chief State’s Attorney and six gubernatorial nominees (two of whom must be judges from the state’s superior court) who have been approved by the state’s general assembly.238 Thus, to the extent the state has put the appointment of local prosecutors in the hands of a state independent agency, there is more state-level involvement in prosecution in Connecticut than the model followed by most states where local prosecutors are elected by their communities.

Even with this appointment structure, Connecticut operates in practice much like other states that give local prosecutors primary responsibility for criminal law enforcement. The Office of the Chief State’s Attorney in Connecticut has only a handful of specialized units that handle prosecutions, and those areas largely mirror the ones seen in other states.239 The state’s attorneys retain primary responsibility for bringing almost all criminal prosecutions in their local districts, with little supervision or oversight by the Chief State’s Attorney.240

San Diego. Vermont has the second lowest population of any state in the country, with a population of 621,270. http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ranks/rank01.html.

236 In Connecticut, the Attorney General exercises only civil jurisdiction and lacks authority to bring criminal prosecutions. The Chief State’s Attorney is the state’s chief prosecutor, filling the criminal law enforcement role that in other states is performed by an attorney general. State of Connecticut, The Division of Criminal Justice, http://www.ct.gov/csao/cwp/view.asp?a=1795&q=285512.

237 CONN. CONST. art. XXIII; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-275a. Connecticut’s Constitution prior to 1984 vested authority in the state’s judiciary to appoint state’s attorneys. The state transferred that authority to an executive branch agency in part because of a concern that it created a conflict of interest to have the judges before whom prosecutors appear appoint them and in part to make the state prosecutors more accountable to the public. See Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary Part 2, March 5, 1984 (statement of then-Attorney General Joseph Lieberman); Connecticut Gen. Assembly House Proceedings, May 2, 1984, at 99 (remarks of Representative Tulisano). For its part, the judiciary appeared to endorse the switch because it no longer wished to retain its powers of appointment. See Connecticut Gen. Assembly, Senate Proceedings, May 8, 1984, at 153 (statement of Senator Owens).

238 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-275a (a) (2008).

239 The Chief State’s Attorney’s has bureaus to handle prosecutions for Medicaid fraud, elder abuse, cold cases, political corruption, and crimes that extend beyond one Judicial District or are “especially time-consuming or require specialized or technical resources,” including environmental and economic crimes. Office of the Chief State’s Attorney, Specialized Units in the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney, http://www.ct.gov/csao/cwp/view.asp?a=1795&q=285516#Units.

240 Telephone Interview with Patricia M. Froehlich, State’s Attorney Office, Danielson CT (Feb. 4, 2009).
Attorneys can even handle all of their own appeals if they choose. The Chief State’s Attorney cannot intervene in a state’s attorney’s case unless he or she finds by “clear and convicting evidence” that the state’s attorney is guilty of misconduct or has a conflict of interest, and the Criminal Justice Commission must agree with that assessment after receiving written statements from the State’s Attorney and the Chief State’s Attorney. Moreover, the Chief State’s Attorney cannot appear in district court on his or her own without getting the consent of the state attorney in that district. Finally, to the extent that state-level involvement is greater in Connecticut than elsewhere, it is important to note that like other small states, Connecticut closely approximates a local government with a population of just 3.5 million.

C. A Few Exceptions

Not every state fits comfortably into the limited authority model. There are exceptions where states have given a state-wide prosecutor greater authority over violent and other crimes that elsewhere are handled predominantly if not exclusively by local prosecutors. But even though these states depart from the traditional state approach to a degree worth noting, they still interfere with local authority far less than the federal government does.

1. Florida’s Statewide Prosecutor

The state that diverges most dramatically from the limited authority model and most closely approximates the federal approach is Florida. In 1986, Florida amended its Constitution to create a position in the Attorney General’s Office known as the statewide prosecutor. Florida vested the statewide prosecutor with the authority to bring criminal charges in just about any type of case – from murder

241 Currently state’s attorneys in two judicial districts handle their own appeals. Telephone Interview with Patricia M. Froehlich, State’s Attorney Office, Danielson, CT, (Feb. 4, 2009).

242 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-277(d)(3) (2008). State’s attorneys also cannot be removed from their offices except by the Criminal Justice Commission after due notice and hearing. Id. § 51-278b(b).


244 Michigan likely belongs in this category. The AG’s website indicates that the office handles domestic violence cases in Northern Michigan, firearms-related assaults in Detroit as part of the “Joshua Project,” RICO prosecutions, and child pornography and Internet predator cases. Michigan Attorney General, Criminal Prosecutions Bureau, available at http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,1607,7-164-19441-60568--,00.html. This suggests a robust practice of violent crime prosecution at the state level. But because no one from the Michigan AG’s office would return repeated calls for more information, I was unable to determine how many cases were brought in these categories and what the relationship was with local prosecutors in bringing such cases. The Mississippi AG’s Office has an Internet Crimes Against Children Unit that brings child pornography cases over the Internet, but because it otherwise leaves violent crimes to local prosecutors, it does not fit the general profile outlined above. Interview with Stan Alexander, Assistant Attorney General, Mississippi Attorney General’s Office (June 18, 2009). Virginia has a similar regime. The AG can bring prosecutions for violations of laws against child pornography, but most crimes are handled by local prosecutors. VA. CODE ANN. §2.2-511(A); Dorgan Interview, supra note __.

245 FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
to prostitution, robbery to larceny – as long as the offense occurred “in two or more judicial circuits” or “any such offense is connected with an organized criminal conspiracy affecting two or more judicial circuits.” Florida created the position because of a perceived need to address organized crime that transcended the state’s circuit boundaries.

Unlike other state AGs that use multi-jurisdictional authority sparingly, the statewide prosecutor in Florida has used his power to prosecute a range of cases, some of which are more traditionally local matters. Just like the caseload of other state-level prosecutors, the Florida statewide prosecutor’s docket has a large proportion of fraud, white collar, and computer crime cases. But unlike most other states, Florida has a statewide prosecutor who also spends a great deal of time on crimes that are elsewhere prosecuted locally. One out of five cases brought by the statewide prosecutor is a narcotics or violent crime case. The office also targets cases involving gangs and many of its theft cases would be prosecuted locally in most other states.

246. FLA. STAT. ch. 16.56(1)(a) (2008).
248. In 2005, these categories combined to make up 44% of the office’s docket. Letter from James J. Schneider, General Counsel, Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida, to Ed Lintz, New York University (March 9, 2009) (on file with the author). Another 12% of cases involved identity theft, an issue also pursued by some other state AGs in recent years. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 15.231 (AG has concurrent authority with local prosecutors to bring identify theft cases); Martha Coakley, 970 PLI/Pat 333 (2009) (describing Massachusetts’ AG’s increasing role in fighting identify theft); Miss Code. Ann. § 97-45-23 (Mississippi AG can bring identity theft prosecutions); S.C. CODE ANN. §14-7-1630(A)(10); National Association of Attorneys General, Cyberspace Law, available at http://www.naag.org/cybercrime.php (working group providing training to AGs on computer-related crimes, including computer-aided identity theft). In 2006, the same issues represented 68% of the caseload. Schneider, supra. In 2007, they represented 61% of the caseload. Id. In that year, the office tracked RICO cases separately, and they made up an additional 7% of the docket. Id. In 2008, 51% of the cases were made up fraud, computer crime, identity theft and other white collar crimes. An additional 11% were RICO cases. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (gang-related cases made up 3% of the caseload in 2008). South Carolina’s AG also has authority to bring charges for gang-related activity. S.C. CODE ANN. §14-7-1630(A)(2). The AG has had this power since 2008, but since that time, only one gang crime was prosecuted as of June 26, 2009. Pauling Interview, supra note __.
Florida therefore most resembles the federal government in its approach. Just as the federal government takes a broad view of organized crime and views it as properly the subject of centralized oversight by the government,252 so too, does Florida.

One difference between Florida and the federal government, however, is that the Florida statewide prosecutor has indicated he will not bring a case if the local state attorney objects.253 According to the statewide prosecutor, this “is not generally a large issue” because “[t]he case-types that make up a majority of our case load are not usually sought after by the local prosecutors.”254 While the federal government also typically acts with the consent of local prosecutors,255 that is not always the case.256 Thus, even the most aggressive state view of centralized authority over prosecution is not as far-reaching as that of the federal government.

Despite this important difference, Florida does mirror the federal approach to a significant extent. If other states followed Florida’s pattern, that would provide evidence that states share the federal government’s view of the balance between centralization and local authority. But because Florida is the only state that closely resembles the federal government, it is more telling that 49 states have rejected anything remotely close to this model.

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252 See, e.g., Gorelick & Litman, supra note __, at 976-77; Brief of the United States in U.S. v. Leija-Sanchez, available at 2009 WL 3867203.

253 Schneider Letter, supra note __ (noting that the statewide prosecutor brings cases committed “by an organized criminal conspiracy affecting multiple [judicial circuits]” “so long as the local state attorney has no objections”).

254 Id. at 3, n.2.

255 Until the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual was revised in 1997, local prosecutors were given virtual veto power over U.S. Attorneys for certain enumerated crimes. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-103.132 (“United States Attorneys are required to obtain the approval of the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division prior to seeking an indictment or filing an information . . . if the state or local prosecutor with responsibility for prosecuting a state charge . . . objects to a federal prosecution.”); Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921, 966 (1997). Although the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual no longer requires consent from local prosecutors, some federal guidelines still mandate reliance on local prosecutions unless federal interests cannot be adequately addressed, giving local prosecutors a limited power to maintain control of a case. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 8-3.170, 9-27.240 & 9-61.111; The Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 909 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United States) (explaining the DOJ’s “backstop policy” of initially deferring to state and local authorities).

256 See Michael A. Simmons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 893, 930-36 (2000) (detailing the incentives and ambiguities that often lead federal prosecutors to expand the reach of their power, regardless of state prosecutorial interests); see also Miller & Eisenstein, supra note __, at 262 (“Local prosecutors’ willingness to work with federal authorities is a relatively new phenomenon; nexus relations have a checkered past, with the typical scenario involving aloof or downright hostile relations.”).
2. Alabama’s State-Level Review

Alabama also departs from the limited authority model. Alabama vests power in the Attorney General “at any time he sees proper, either before or after indictment” to “superintend and direct the prosecution of any criminal case in any of the courts of this state.”257 While Alabama’s AG could use this authority to intervene with any local matter, he has traditionally exercised that power in a more targeted way. The office has established divisions that mirror those seen in states that vest AGs with more limited jurisdiction: environmental crimes, public corruption, election fraud, bid-rigging and other white collar crimes, and Medicaid and welfare fraud.258

Alabama has gone beyond the traditional list, however, in creating a violent crimes division. This unit brings violent cases not only when district attorneys have conflicts or request help—a practice common throughout the states—but also at the request of victims.259 The Alabama AG’s office views its state-level lawyers as “prosecutors of last resort” for victims or family members260 who have been turned away by local prosecutors.261 For instance, at the urging of victims or their families who were dissatisfied with district attorneys who were not going forward with their cases, the Alabama AG’s office successfully prosecuted a state trooper for murdering his wife for insurance money, secured a conviction against a county commissioner who assaulted his son’s high school basketball coach, and brought charges against a man who murdered his 17-year-old wife.262 Alabama’s state-level prosecutors are thus getting involved in areas that are reserved for local prosecutors in other states. The chief of the unit that handles these cases, Don Valeska, has

257 ALA. CODE § 36-15-14. The Attorney General in Alabama also has the authority to direct district attorneys to “aid or assist in the investigation or prosecution of any case in which the state is interested.” Id. § 36-15-15.

258 Pryor, supra note __, at 264.

259 Telephone Interview with Don Valeska, Division Chief of Violent Crimes, Assistant Attorney General, Alabama (Jan. 28, 2009).

260 Pryor, supra note __, at 267.

261 Valeska Interview, supra note __. Although the AG’s office has authority to get involved if a DA has brought a case but the victim is unhappy with how the case is proceeding, the chief of the unit that handles these cases says that is “relatively rare” and could not think of an example where it had occurred. Id. Instead, the AG’s office typically gets involved in cases where the DA is not proceeding with the case at all or where the DA asks for help. Id.

262 Pryor, supra note __, at 167-268.
explained that Alabama believes this kind of oversight is important to keep local prosecutors accountable and protect the interests of victims and their families.263

Alabama’s approach is therefore not so much about substantive disagreements with local prosecutors or a view that state-level prosecutors handle certain categories of cases more effectively. Instead, the Alabama AG gets involved in those cases where it appears that victims are being unjustly ignored, perhaps because of some kind of bias by local prosecutors. The cases against the county commissioner and the state trooper, for instance, appear to have stalled at the local level because of a reluctance by local prosecutors to bring actions against these specific public officials, not because of a considered view about the merits of the cases. The chief of the unit that handles the cases has explained that the office requires the victims or their families who are requesting assistance to write a letter to the AG explaining why AG involvement is necessary, a process he says helps demonstrate that the AG’s involvement is at the urging of individuals and not for political grandstanding.264

3. Arizona’s State-Level Drug Enforcement

Arizona’s Attorney General has authority “when deemed necessary by the attorney general” to “prosecute and defend any proceeding . . . in which the state . . . is a party.”265 In many respects, the Arizona AG uses this authority relatively sparingly. The AG in Arizona, like the AG in most states, has jurisdiction over traditional areas such as consumer fraud, white collar crime, environmental crime, public corruption, and cases where local prosecutors have conflicts.266 And, despite this sweeping authority, the AG’s office does not normally take on violent crimes like homicides or sex offenses.267

But the Arizona AG has used this authority to establish a Drug Unit, which takes on drug trafficking and money laundering organizations in the state. Even in its Tucson office, which is quite small,268 drug cases are brought on a regular basis.269 To be sure, most cases are still brought by county prosecutors, but because the state-level prosecutor is more involved in drug cases than in other states, it would not be fair to group Arizona with the overwhelming majority of

263 Valeska Interview, supra note __. Valeska is “always amazed when we talk to prosecutors of other states that they don’t have that leeway.” Id.

264 Id.


267 Telephone Interview with Reina Gallego, Tucson Office, Arizona Attorney General (June 3, 2009). The office does, however, have authority to prosecute sex offenses against children that span more than one jurisdiction. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 21-422(B), -427(B).

268 The office had 5 prosecutors as of June 2009. Id.

269 Id.
state-level prosecutors who leave those cases virtually exclusively with local prosecutors.270

III. LEARNING FROM THE STATES

The state relationship with localities contrasts markedly with the federal relationship to localities in several respects.

A. The States and Federal Government Compared

One important difference between states and the federal government involves centralization. Whereas the federal government has increasingly sought to achieve centralized control of its local outposts, there has been almost no comparable effort in the states. Aside from giving state-level prosecutors control over appeals to the state’s highest court, and thus development of the law in the state, most states allow local authorities to operate without much oversight.

Second, state legislatures differ markedly from Congress in their enforcement allocation choices. While both levels of government have their share of symbolic legislation, there are important differences in how those laws get enforced. As noted above in Part I, states have more freedom than Congress does to dictate enforcement discretion. And most states do not follow the federal model that gives prosecutors the option of bringing what would otherwise be local charges at their discretion. Instead of giving statewide prosecutors flexibility to bring prosecutions at their discretion, the majority of state legislatures identify specific categories suitable for the state-level prosecutor or pass laws that give local prosecutors the right to request assistance from statewide prosecutors or place a gatekeeping function in the governor or some other elected official so that state-level prosecutorial discretion is not unlimited.

There is a third important difference between the federal government’s allocation decisions and those of the states: the kind of involvement with local practice each has pursued. Some commentators have pointed out that federal prosecutions bring benefits to local communities otherwise starved for crime-fighting resources. Particularly in cases involving complex crimes, the additional

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270 The Utah Attorney General’s Office has a Meth Lab unit, so it is also likely bringing drug cases on a regular basis at the state level. But the Meth Lab is funded through federal money, so this is not an independent judgment of the state that these cases are particularly appropriate for state-level enforcement. Utah Attorney General, Criminal Justice Division, available at http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/criminaljustice.html (“The Meth Lab prosecutors are funded through federal money”).
resources of the federal government are often highlighted as a benefit.\textsuperscript{271} But, of course, there is no reason that the federal government has to provide resource support only by taking over the prosecution. The state experience demonstrates that resources are easily provided without having to shift prosecutorial authority. States have offered local jurisdictions help with everything from electronic surveillance to technical support to additional manpower to prosecutorial training,\textsuperscript{272} all without taking over criminal prosecutions at the state-level. There is no reason the federal government could not do the same thing, as many commentators have advocated.\textsuperscript{273} Yet the federal approach has been less about providing resources than taking over the entirety of the prosecution or allowing states to use the threat of federal involvement for greater leverage.\textsuperscript{274}

\textsuperscript{271} See, e.g., James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice’s Centralization Efforts in Historical Context, 31 Seattle U. L. Rev. 219, 223-224 (2008) (noting that one reason federal prosecutors get involved in matters it that local prosecutors “lack the competence or motivation” to deal with certain local problems or “the magnitude of the problem or complexity of a prosecution overwhelms local resources”); Richman, supra note \_ at 783 (noting that local communities can benefit from federal prosecutions because they can use federal resources for “expensive tools such as electronic surveillance, witness protection, and prosecutorial support for investigations”).

\textsuperscript{272} See, e.g., Missouri Attorney General, Missouri Office of Prosecution Services, available at http://ago.mo.gov/prosecutors.htm (provides technical assistance to all state prosecutors); Montana Dep’t of Justice, Opinions and Law Resources, Prosecution Services Bureau, available at http://www.doj.mt.gov/resources/default.asp (provides training and assistance to local prosecutors); Interview by Sam Raymond with Forrest Bright, Director of the Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigation (June 3, 2009) (noting that a branch of the AGs office investigates cases but then turns the cases over to local prosecutors to bring charges); Oregon Department of Justice, District Attorney Assistance, available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/divisions/criminal_justice_index.shtml (Oregon has a state-level program that “provides trial and investigative assistance, technical-legal and prosecutorial advice and services, and legal education and training in areas of criminal law and procedure” to district attorneys); Texas Attorney General, Resources for Law Enforcement, available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/criminal/maincrim.shtml (noting that the AG provides help with “specialized and technical matters such as computer forensics, complex financial investigations, money laundering, white collar crime, and election fraud” and that its prosecutors will assist county and district attorneys with difficult areas of criminal law, such as capital murder, election fraud, and public corruption, at their request); West Virginia Prosecuting Institute, available at http://www.wvpai.org/ (providing training, legal research, and technical assistance to county prosecutors); Wisconsin Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement Services, available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/ (ensures that local and state police meet recruiting and training qualifications and provides technical assistance and training).

\textsuperscript{273} See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note \_ at 55 (noting that the federal government can support local crime fighting by providing financial and technical resources); Beale, supra note \_ at 1008; Stuntz, supra note, at 2025 (noting that today “the federal government is a key source of law” in state criminal matters when it should instead be “a key source of money, especially for cash-strapped urban police forces”); Shapiro, supra note \_ at 78 n.1 (observing that “[a] good example” of an area in which the federal government should take a hands-off approach except through grants or revenue support “may well lie in certain areas of criminal law enforcement involving activity essentially local in its impact”).

\textsuperscript{274} That is not to say the federal government has not provided law enforcement resources to states and localities. It has. See Beale, supra note \_ at 1009-1010 (describing federal funding for local police and community-based justice programs as well as FBI technical support for state and local police). But federal funding is slight compared with state and local needs. For instance, in 2003, state and local expenditures for crime totaled more than $155 billion dollars. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR
Finally, even in those states that follow the basic federal framework and similarly give statewide prosecutors the ability to bring prosecutions at their discretion, that discretion is getting exercised very differently at the state level than at the federal level. As Part II explains, this discretionary power is rarely used in the states. Federal prosecutors, in contrast, often step into matters that could otherwise rest with local authorities. So, prosecutors vested with the same discretionary power are making very different choices about how to exercise it.

Comparing the states with the federal government thus reveals fundamental differences: the federal government is more likely to centralize prosecutorial decisionmaking and to give prosecutors wide discretion to take on local matters themselves, and federal prosecutors are more likely than state prosecutors to exercise discretionary authority that has been granted to them to prosecute cases that could otherwise be brought locally.

B. The Importance of Sentencing Policy

What accounts for the two different paths being followed by federal and state governments? Here it is helpful to consider first the differences at the legislative level and then to analyze the differences at the executive level.

One reason Congress and state legislatures make different decisions is that, as noted above, federal and state legislators have different choices available to them. While both have the power to pass symbolic laws – and both do – state legislators have the freedom to dictate expressly which level of government is responsible for prosecution. Congress, in contrast, cannot mandate local prosecutions of federal law. If it passes a federal criminal law and wants to see it enforced, federal prosecutors will get the nod.

But Congress has other options that are comparable to the states. Intervention with local decisions does not need to consist of taking over prosecutorial power. Instead, Congress could opt to provide resources to local prosecutors and to use that power of the purse to influence crime policy. Congress could, for instance, offer financial incentives for states to bring prosecutions of federal violations, as it

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275 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”).
has done with Medicare and Medicaid fraud. It could also spend more money on crime labs, equipment, or local police forces. If witness protection is an issue, Congress could fund that.

Congress certainly knows how to use this power, but it chiefly uses its spending power to get states to alter sentencing policies. For example, in its Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress provided incentive grants for states with the goal of encouraging them to adopt Congress’s preferred truth-in-sentencing policy that required violent offenders to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences. Congress has also created incentives for states to adopt certain sex offender registration laws and minimum sentencing terms. The Anti Car Theft Act similarly seeks to change state sentencing policy with the promise of federal grants.

That Congress uses its grant power chiefly to influence sentencing is telling because sentencing policy differences are the main root of the differing approaches of the states and the federal government. As noted above, local and state prosecutors apply the same state laws, so there is no sentencing differential when one or the other brings the case. In contrast, federal law typically establishes higher sentences than state law for the same conduct, so one of the chief motivators for federal involvement is a different view of what sentence is appropriate. Congress is often quite explicit about this. For example, when it passed the Violence Against Women Act that provided a civil remedy for gender-motivated crimes of violence that were already covered by state law, it explained that a reason for the intervention was “unacceptably lenient punishments” for those convicted in state courts.

It is not just Congress that is making decisions with a focus on sentencing. That same factor is also the most persuasive explanation for why federal prosecutors are more likely to use their discretionary power than statewide prosecutors are in those states where state prosecutors can intervene at their

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276 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (2006) (creating the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, which gives the Attorney General the right to allocate grants to local governments); Richman, supra note __, at 391-392 (discussing federal funding programs). For a discussion of the merits of in-kind aid versus direct funding, see id. at 401-02.


278 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000) (federal funding contingent on state adoption of certain registration and notification requirements for sex offenders); Aimee’s Law, 42 U.S.C. § 13713 (2000) (creating incentive for states to adopt minimum terms for sex offenders by exempting states that adopt such sentencing laws from having to reimburse other states that have to prosecute the parolees of the exempted state).


281 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620. See also Richman, supra note __, at 783 (noting that federal prosecution is advantageous for state and local law enforcement because it “generally result[s] in higher sentences for defendants”).
discretion. When federal prosecutors choose to exercise their discretion to bring a prosecution instead of leaving the matter to localities, they are making a decision to charge a defendant under a federal law that typically imposes a more severe sentence. For example, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales touted the use of the federal RICO law to target gangs because it “is an innovative approach to fighting criminals with tough penalties that may be unavailable in the state system.” Similarly, when former Attorney General William Barr announced support for Project Triggerlock, a program that uses federal firearms laws to prosecute “the most dangerous violent criminals in each community,” he noted that “[v]iolent criminals typically prosecuted in State court will be prosecuted federally to take advantage of stiff mandatory sentences without the possibility of parole.”

Indeed, the motto for Project Triggerlock was “[a] gun plus a crime equals hard Federal time.” The U.S. Attorney’s office in Richmond touted a similar program, Project Exile, because it made use of stiffer federal sentences and the federal prison system, which was likely to mean the offender served his or her time far from home. Thus, in the 1990s, the federal government made an “institutionalized commitment . . . to take cases that would have otherwise been

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282 Federal prosecutors have the option of bringing charges even when local prosecutors already have without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause because the states and federal government can each charge the same conduct under the dual sovereignty doctrine. But a Department of Justice policy, known as the Petite policy, discourages federal actions when state prosecutions have already been brought. This policy precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution following a prior state or federal prosecution unless three substantive prerequisites are satisfied. First, the matter must involve a substantial federal interest; second, the prior prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably unvindicated; and third, applying the same test that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the government must believe that the defendant's conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction by an unbiased trier of fact. In addition, the prosecution must be approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY MANUAL § 9-2.031.

283 Miller & Eisenstein, supra note __, at 243 (citing an empirical study of cocaine distribution cases in Pennsylvania in state and federal court from 1997 and 1999 and finding that federal defendants received sentences roughly 2.5 times as long as state court defendants, controlling for drug quantity and prior record); Beale, supra note __, at 996, 998 (observing that defendants in federal court usually receive higher sentences than those prosecuted for the same conduct in state court).


286 Richman, supra note __, at 396 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

287 Id. at 397-98.
pursued locally” precisely because federal sentences were more severe.\textsuperscript{288} The United States Attorneys’ Manual makes this explicit. In advising federal prosecutors whether or not to decline to prosecute because a matter could be brought in another jurisdiction, the Manual tells federal prosecutors to consider “[t]he other jurisdictions [sic] ability and willingness to prosecute effectively” and “[t]he probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted in the other jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{289} The Manual then reflects the Department’s view that the two are inextricably linked by explaining that “[t]he ultimate measure of the potential for effective prosecution in another jurisdiction is the sentence, or other consequence, that is likely to be imposed if the person is convicted.”\textsuperscript{290} Thus, the Department’s own express policies reflect that increased federal involvement in local matters is often based on the fact that federal prosecutors disagree with state judgments about the appropriate sentence for criminal conduct and what makes an “effective” prosecution.

To the extent federal procedural advantages are touted as justifying federal involvement in local crime, those procedural advantages are often dependent upon the ability of federal prosecutors to credibly threaten defendants with longer sentences to gain cooperation. For example, when John Jeffries and Judge John Gleeson argue that federal prosecutors do a better job bringing organized crime cases than state and local prosecutors, they argue it is because of various aspects of federal law. Although their list of federal procedural advantages includes the ability to use uncorroborated accomplice testimony and hearsay evidence before the federal grand jury, the real driving force aiding federal prosecutors is federal sentencing law. Jeffries and Gleeson themselves admit as much noting that “much of the credit for [federal prosecutors and investigators’] success [against organized crime] goes to the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\textsuperscript{291} After all, it is the operation of the Guidelines that gets accomplices to testify in the first place, whether before a grand jury or at trial. Without that threat, the other differences would not matter nearly as much, if at all. Sentencing therefore drives much of the federal push for involvement, whether by legislators or prosecutors.

State-level prosecutors, in contrast, are not able to choose different laws with different sentences than the ones being considered by local procedures. Nor are there procedural differences because the matters will be brought in state court
regardless of whether the prosecutor is a state or local official. If there are differences between the two, they are institutional and cultural differences about whether one office has more or less resources than the other and about whether the local community has a greater or lesser interest than the state. Thus, when a statewide prosecutor has discretion to bring a prosecution but chooses not to, the statewide prosecutors is concluding that institutional differences are not sufficient and if anything, the better course is to leave matters with local prosecutors and to provide resource support if needed. That explains why out-and-out intervention tends to occur only when there is evidence of local corruption or a conflict of interest, or in substantive areas where the state interest is strong, such as with regulatory and business crimes that affect the entire state economy and not just the local community.

This is not to say that when the federal government intervenes in local matters to pursue higher sentences, it does so without local approval. On the contrary, local and federal prosecutors often cooperate on cases. Local prosecutors are often happy to have federal prosecutors take on local cases so that defendants receive longer sentences or because the prospect of federal prosecution gives local prosecutors leverage in their own plea negotiations with defendants. Local police officers also often prefer the federal option for the same reasons. But, of course, it is not necessarily the case that local officials making these assessments reflect the views of the larger electorate in a community or that federal involvement and the higher sentences it brings, on balance, produces better policy.

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292 Miller & Eisenstein, supra note __, at 252-259. In some instances, state prosecutors can be designated as federal prosecutors and try the federal cases. See Brickey, supra note __, at 1159-1160.

293 Miller & Eisenstein, supra note __, at 243, 254-259; Richman, supra note __, at 783 (observing that “[t]he threat of federal charges carrying higher effective penalties can be used by state prosecutors to extract guilty pleas from defendants in their own system”); Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEx. L. Rev. 1203, 1250 (2006) (noting how the threat of federal prosecution benefits state prosecutors in their plea bargains).

294 See, e.g., Testimony of Larry Casterline, Chief of Police, High Point, North Carolina, Before the United States Sentencing Commission, Regional Hearing, at 116 (Feb 10, 2009) (noting that federal jurisdiction is the “most effective tool . . . to deter repeat and serious drug offenders.”); Testimony of Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner, New York, New York, Before the United States Sentencing Commission, Regional Hearing, available at http://www.uscc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/Kelly_testimony.pdf (July 10, 2009) (noting the value of stricter federal sentences in getting “a number of suspects to give up information”); Dennis E. Curtis, The Effect of Federalization on the Defense Function, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 85, 90-91 (quoting a police officer explaining his choice of whether to take a case to federal or state prosecutors as “like buying a car: we’re going to the place we feel we can get the best deal”).
The point here is not to answer the question of whether federal sentences are more appropriate but to highlight that this, in fact, is the question that we should often be asking when we talk about federalism and crime. The different approach to federal and state relationships with localities largely boils down to this difference: The federal government – Congress and prosecutors – largely decides to prosecute crimes that could be handled locally on the belief, which may be shared by local law enforcement officials, that federal sentences (and, to a lesser extent, procedures) are preferable to state sentences. In the states, questions of procedure and sentencing are irrelevant to the allocation of power decision because they are the same at both levels of government. States thus serve as laboratories where sentencing differences and variation in procedural rules are taken out of the equation. What is left is a question of institutional competence assuming the same rules. And when that is the question, states are overwhelmingly of the view that it makes more sense to leave matters to local control except in the handful of areas where the nature of the crime makes more centralized enforcement appropriate, particularly crimes involving commerce that crosses jurisdictional lines, crimes where local enforcers might have a conflict of interest, or areas that require specialization that a centralized office is well-suited to develop, such as regulatory crimes.

Thus, unless just about every state is mistaken, all that is left to support federal involvement in traditionally local criminal matters – except those areas involving public corruption, regulatory crimes, or conflicts of interest where there are strong reasons for centralization (as the state experience confirms) – is the federal government’s ability to pursue a higher sentence. Federalism seen this way, then, is not really about federalism at all, but instead is about sentencing law and policy. Sentencing policy, then, should be the focal point when analyzing federal criminal prosecutions that touch on traditionally local concerns.

CONCLUSION

The states and the federal government both assess the value of local control over crime when they make decisions about whether to centralize or decentralize power. But while the value of local prosecutorial power is the same in both contexts, it is being weighed against different variables. At the state level, centralization brings its values of uniformity, consistency, and the possibility for specialization. In most cases, states have found those values are not enough to trump the benefits of local law enforcement. To be sure, there are areas where institutional competence pushes the states toward centralization, and here, again, the uniformity is striking. Public corruption, regulatory crimes, and matters where local prosecutors have conflicts make up the AG’s docket in most states precisely because the benefits of bringing those cases at a higher level of government outweigh the costs to local autonomy. To the extent the federal government

\[295\] There is no serious debate or disagreement with the federal government addressing crime that “intrudes upon federal functions, harming entities or personnel acting in a federal capacity, or when it addresses offenses committed on sites where the federal government has territorial responsibility, or when it addresses matters of international crime.” TASK FORCE, supra note __, at 47.
focuses on these same areas, it can also be explained as a reliable weighing of institutional competence. But the federal government weighs more than just institutional competence in making decisions about whether to take on an area of criminal law. It also considers the value of having a different set of substantive sentencing policies. This disagreement over sentencing policy goes a long way toward explaining why the federal government has intervened in a host of areas of traditional local control that states have left untouched.

The debate over the federalization of crime, viewed in this light, thus boils down to a question of sentencing policy and whether (and when) it is appropriate for the federal government to step into an area of traditional local authority over crime because of a differing view of sentencing policy. It is beyond the scope of this Article to make substantive comparisons between federal and state sentencing laws in those areas where the federal government has opted to intervene where the states have not.

But it is the goal of this Article to shift attention to the fundamental role that sentencing is playing in choices about federalization. With all the attention in federalism debates to constitutional history and institutional competence, it is easy to overlook or discount the role of sentencing in actual allocation decisions. But the state experience reveals that sentencing is likely the driving force in the federal government’s determination to take greater charge of criminal matters from localities in those areas where the states have opted not to intervene. Endorsing federal involvement in those areas thus should depend to a large extent on whether one believes the federal government is more likely to set the “correct” levels of punishment or one agrees with the punishments the federal government has selected. That is a different debate than the one that has dominated the federalism literature, but my hope is that this Article will help get that conversation started.

296 This would also be true of those offenses involving unique national concerns that do not present themselves as questions of localism, such as offenses against the federal government itself, corruption cases involving state actors, and criminal activity with international dimensions. The Judicial Conference has identified these areas as appropriate for federal involvement. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, at 23 (Dec. 1995).

297 For an argument that the political process in the states is more likely to produce sound sentencing outcomes than the federal political process, see Barkow, supra note __, at __. This is consistent with other research on the advantages of local control over law enforcement. Bill Stuntz recently described the historical connection between local control and more egalitarian punishment schemes. As he puts it, “[i]n our time, centralized democratic power seems associated with discrimination and severity” whereas “[i]n the past, local democratic control of criminal justice appears to have produced equality and lenity.” Stuntz, supra note __, at 1975.