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MacCrate's Missed Opportunity: The MacCrate Report’s Failure to Advance Professional Values

Russell G. Pearce

The 1992 Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (the “Task Force”), Legal Education Professional Development – An Educational Continuum (the “Report”), popularly known as the MacCrate Report, was the most ambitious effort to reform legal education in the past generation. Some commentators have described the Report as “the greatest proposed paradigm shift in legal education since Langdell envisioned legal education as the pursuit of legal science through the case method in the late 19th century.”

Although the Report sought to promote education in both lawyering skills and values, its major influence has been in the area of lawyering skills. The Report has contributed little to promoting professional values. This result is not surprising. The Report’s treatment of values suffers two basic flaws. First, the text makes values a low

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1 Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham University School of Law.
3 Engler, supra note 3, at 114-115. As Russell Engler notes, Robert McCrate and others “placed the Report in the context of previous efforts including the Reed Report (1921), the writings of Jerome Frank in the 1930’s and 1940’s, and the Crampton Report (1979).” Id. at 115. See Robert MacCrate, Keynote Address – The 21st Century Lawyer: Is There a Gap to be Narrowed? 69 Wash. L. Rev. 517, 517-20 (1994). MacCrate expressly compared the work of the Task Force to project of the “Llewellyn Curriculum Committee” of the “1940s” in seeking “to create a conceptual vision of the lawyring skills and professional values that lawyers should seek to acquire.” Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 1001, 1127 (1997).
6 See infra .
priority and then does not explain them coherently. Second, the Task Force fails to consider that the dominant values of the bar and the academy oppose those of the Report.

Despite these inherent flaws, the Report has succeeded somewhat in its goal of catalyzing reflection on values. While this reflection may yet yield important results, the Report’s contribution could have been far greater. It missed the opportunity to focus the bar and the academy on the major changes in practice and legal education necessary to promote the very values the Report expressly endorses.

I. The MacCrate Report on Values

The Report describes a diverse profession united around core values. To build on the success of the modern profession, the Report seeks only to identify the core values and ensure that they receive proper attention in legal education and legal practice.

A. The Origin of the Task Force

In 1987, at a conference “celebrat[ing] twenty years of effort and achievement since the Ford Foundation . . . set in motion the clinical education movement,”7 Justice Rosalie Wahl of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Chair of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,” urged those in attendance to “recommit themselves to “teaching ‘students how to learn systematically from experience and simultaneously to educate them in a broader range of legal analysis and skills than have traditionally been taught.”8 She asked, “‘Have we really tried to determine what skills, what attitudes, what character traits, what qualities of mind are required of lawyers?’”9 In early 1989, Justice

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7 MacCrate, 69 Wash. L. Rev. at 520.
8 Id. at 521.
9 Id.
Wahl created the Task Force to answer these questions.10 After collecting data, holding public hearings, and conducting extensive deliberations during a period of almost three years, the Task Force issued the Report in July 1992.11

B. The Report Praises the Legal Profession and Its Values

The Report describes the progressive evolution of the legal profession to its current pinnacle. From a nadir in the early nineteenth century, the bar began to develop the institutional framework for self-regulation: law schools, bar associations, and judicial supervision.12 At the same time, in the “successive writings”13 of the first two American legal ethicists, Professor David Hoffman14 in 1836 and Judge George Sharswood15 in 1854, as well as in Judge Thomas Goode Jones’s Alabama ethical code of 188716 and the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics,17 “there gradually evolved a concept of professionalism for the American lawyer, based upon obligations and responsibilities both voluntarily assumed and required by society.”18 Professionalism asserted that lawyers had “a special body of learning and skills” and a “core body of values which . . . justifie[d] their claim to an exclusive right to engage in the profession’s activities.”19 The modern expression of these values is the “Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility,”20 which describes law as a “self-governing and learned profession” and

10 Id.; Report at xi.
11 Report at xi-xiii.
12 Id. at 104-05.
13 Report at 110.
14 For a discussion of the context of Hoffman’s contribution, see Pearce, Chicago Roundtable and cites.
15 For a discussion of the context of the contribution of Sharswood, who was the father of our modern field of ethics, see Pearce, Chicago & Pearce, Sharswood
16 Report at 109; Pearce, Sharswood at
17 Report at 109; Pearce, Sharswood at
18 Report at 110.
19 Id. at 108.
20 Id. at 111.
states that “[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”\textsuperscript{21}

Despite the many changes in the bar in the twentieth century, the core values represent a “loosely defined but distinct identity” that “[t]he profession has successfully created [and] with which most lawyers can identify.”\textsuperscript{22} The bar today is “larger and more diverse than ever before”\textsuperscript{23} in terms of types of practice and identity of practitioners.\textsuperscript{24} Nonetheless, the legal profession is “more organized and unified . . . than at any time in its history.”\textsuperscript{25} As evidence, the Report notes the dramatic increase in the percentage of lawyers belonging to the ABA and the “vast majority” who belong to any bar association,\textsuperscript{26} together with “the unifying experience” of law school “as the common gateway to the profession and the universal control by the judiciary over entry.”\textsuperscript{27}

The Report rejects the notion inherent in the Task Force’s title, “Narrowing the Gap,” that a serious gap actually exists between the bar and the academy.\textsuperscript{28} It suggests instead that the problem is one of communication and perception that would be solved if academics and practitioners could better appreciate each other’s role and contribution.\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, the Report applauds law schools for “tak[ing] seriously their responsibilities with regard to the teaching of ethical standards and professional values.”\textsuperscript{30} While acknowledging potential for improvement, the Report seeks to assist law schools, the practicing bar, and the judiciary in enhancing what they are already doing well --

\textsuperscript{21} ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble.
\textsuperscript{22} Id. at 111.
\textsuperscript{23} Id. at 11.
\textsuperscript{24} Report at 29-102.
\textsuperscript{25} Id. at 111.
\textsuperscript{26} Id. at 110-11.
\textsuperscript{27} Id. at 111 (capitalization omitted).
\textsuperscript{28} Id. at 8.
\textsuperscript{29} Id. at 4-6.
\textsuperscript{30} Id. at 235.
fulfilling their joint responsibility for educating skilled and ethical lawyers.31 The Report describes the task of “perpetuation of core legal knowledge together with the fundamental lawyering skills and professional values” as essential to survival of a “single [legal] profession in the 21st century.”32

C. The Report’s Articulation of Values and Recommendations for Promoting Them

In the SSV, the Report identifies four fundamental lawyering values (“Fundamental Values”) and two directly related skills. The Report draws its four Fundamental Values from the consensus of the bar around the values found in the Preamble to the ABA Model Rules.33 The first Fundamental Value, “Provision of Competent Representation,” derives from the lawyer’s duty as a representative of clients. The competence value offers the obvious commitment of any worker in any occupation to competence and a very general obligation to develop and maintain the “Fundamental Skills” listed in the SSV.34

The second Fundamental Value, “Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality,” derives from the lawyer being “a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” The standards for this value explain that the lawyer should realize these values “in one’s own daily practice,”35 in “[c]ontributing to the profession’s fulfillment of its responsibility to ensure that adequate legal services are provided to

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31 Id. at 8.
32 Report at 120.
33 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble.
34 It therefore requires little further attention in assessing the Report’s contribution to the area of professional values. What is more interesting about the value of competence is how it imports the view implicit in the Statement of Skills that the conventional pedagogy of the law school classroom teaches only 2 of the 10 skills necessary to competent lawyering (Skill 2: Legal Analysis and Reasoning and Skill 3: Legal Research). Report at 138-140.
35 Report at 213 (Standard 2.1). (capitalization and italics omitted).
those who cannot afford to pay for them,” 36 and in “contributing to the profession’s fulfillment of its responsibility to enhance the capacity of law and legal institutions to do justice.” 37

The third Fundamental Value, “Striving to Improve the Profession,” is an obligation of membership in a “self-governing” profession. 38 It requires the lawyer to “participat[e] in activities designed to improve the profession,” 39 “assist[] in the training and preparation of new lawyers and the continuing education of the bar,” 40 and “striv[e] to rid the profession of bias based on race, religion, ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability, and to rectify the effects of these biases.” 41

The fourth Fundamental Value, “Professional Self-Development,” refers to the obligations of the member of a “learned profession.” 42 It requires a lawyer to “seek[] out and tak[e] advantage of opportunities to increase one’s own knowledge and improve one’s own skills,” 43 as well as to “select[] and maintain[] employment that will allow the lawyer to develop as a professional and to pursue his or her professional goals.” 44 This value obligates lawyers continually to do their best to fulfill the first three Fundamental Values.

All Fundamental Skills, of course, relate to the first Fundamental Value of competent representation and the fourth Fundamental Value of professional development. Two Fundamental Skills are connected directly to the second Fundamental Value of

36 Id. (Standard 2.2) (capitalization and italics omitted).
37 Id. (Standard 2.3) (capitalization and italics omitted).
38 ABA Model Rules Preamble.
39 Report at 216 (Standard 3.1) (capitalization and italics omitted).
40 Id. at 216 (Standard 3.2) (capitalization and italics omitted).
41 Id. (standard 3.3) (capitalization and italics omitted).
42 ABA Model Rules Preamble.
43 Report at 218 (Standard 4.1).
44 Report at 219 (standard 4.2).
“promot[ing] justice, fairness, and morality.”\textsuperscript{45} These are Fundamental Skill 6 on “Counseling”\textsuperscript{46} and Fundamental Skill 10 on “Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas.”\textsuperscript{47}

Fundamental Skill 6 expressly seeks to implement the second Fundamental Value.\textsuperscript{48} Fundamental Skill Standard 6.4(d)(iv) requires a lawyer to counsel clients on “considerations of justice, fairness, or morality” to the extent “relevant” and “required or permitted by ethical standards.”\textsuperscript{49} Standard 6.1(a)(iii) requires a lawyer to the “extent to which it is proper” to “attempt[] to persuade the client to modify his or her decisions or actions to accommodate the interests of justice, fairness, or morality” and, if the client refuses, to “take[] action to safeguard the interest of third parties or the general public [or w]ithdraw[] from representation[].”\textsuperscript{50}

In contrast to Fundamental Skill 6, Fundamental Skill 10 does not acknowledge its direct connection to the Fundamental Values. Fundamental Skill 10 focuses primarily on “recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas” arising under the ethics rules.\textsuperscript{51} When Fundamental Skill 10 refers to “[t]he fundamental ethical rules that shape the profession and define what it means to be a legal professional,” it does not include the Fundamental Values. Instead, it mentions the ethics rules generally and the duties of competence, zealousness, loyalty, and confidentiality specifically.\textsuperscript{52} Nevertheless, Standard 10 in fact serves the goal of “promot[ing] justice, fairness, and morality” by requiring lawyers to consider “[a]spects of ethical philosophy bearing upon the propriety of particular

\textsuperscript{45} Id. at 213.
\textsuperscript{46} Id. at 176.
\textsuperscript{47} Id. at 203.
\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 177, 182, 184.
\textsuperscript{49} Id. at 181-82.
\textsuperscript{50} Id. at 177 (cross-referenced in Value Standard 2.1 (a) & (b).
\textsuperscript{51} Id. at 203-07.
\textsuperscript{52} Id. at 205.
practices or conduct,” as well as “[a] lawyer’s personal sense of morality.”  Of course, to the extent that following the profession’s rule of ethics promotes either “justice, fairness, and morality,” or “improve[s] the legal profession,” then the whole of Fundamental Skill 10 implements Fundamental Values.

Many of the Report’s 61 Recommendations jointly refer to skills and values. These include asking law schools to distribute the Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Values (“SSV”), identify the SSV content of classes, explain the “concepts and theories” underlying the skills and values, use “permanent faculty” for skills and values instruction, and assess how best to teach skills and values, as well as asking the ABA to emphasize “skills and values instruction in the accreditation process.”

Only a few of the Recommendations exclusively concern values. The Report urges law schools to teach that the fundamental values are “as important in preparing for professional practice as acquisition of substantive knowledge” and “convey to students that the professional value of the need to ‘promote justice, fairness and morality’ is an essential ingredient of the legal profession[.]” While law schools “should play an important role in developing the skill of ‘recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas,’ their effectiveness “is necessarily very limited compared to the variety and complexity of the dilemmas presented in practice.” Accordingly, the Report asks practicing lawyers to take responsibility “for inculcating professional values through contact with students in

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53 Id. at 204.
54 Id. at 331.
55 Id. at 331.
56 Id. at 333-34.
57 Id. at 330.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 332.
60 Id. at 333.
61 Id. at 332.
part-time work and summer jobs and as colleagues and mentors in the early years of practice.”62 They “should . . . impress on students that success in the practice of law is not measured by financial rewards alone, but by a lawyer’s commitment to a just, fair and moral society.”63

II. The MacCrate Report’s Marginal Influence on Professional Values

A. Ten Years After the Statement of Values and Recommendations

Absent the disciplined data collection Russell Engler proposes,64 an assessment of the MacCrate Report’s impact must remain largely anecdotal and impressionistic. The Report has inspired numerous conferences and articles,65 as well as an annotated bibliography which “group[s]” articles according to the MacCrate Report’s 10 Fundamental Skills, and lists “204 articles” on the subject of teaching skills in non-skills courses alone.66 The Report appears to have “provided an important impetus for the clinical and skills movement.”67 Gary Munneke notes that since the MacCrate Report “[c]linics and skills courses in law schools have continued to proliferate[; b]ar associations have increasingly offered skills-oriented continuing legal education and ‘bridge-the-gap’ programs[; and s]ome states have added a skill component to the bar exam.”68 As a result of the MacCrate Report, the ABA modified accreditation standards

62 Id. at 332.
63 Id. at 333.
65 Id., manuscript at 32-35.
66 Id., manuscript at 33 (citing J.P. Oglivy & Karen Czapanskiy, Clinical Education: an Annotated Bibliography, Clin. L. Rev. 36-37 (Special Issue No. 1, Spring 2001), also found on the web at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/Clinic/CLINEDU/Czapanskiy_bibliog..pdf).
67 Munneke, supra note , at 130.
68 Munneke, supra note , at 135-136.
for law schools, including the addition of a requirement of “adequate instruction in professional skills.” 69

The MacCrate Report’s work on values appears to have had much less of an impact. The Fundamental Values have generated far less attention than the Fundamental Skills, 70 and that attention largely appears limited to clinical scholars who either applaud the Report’s commitment to social justice or find it “inadequate,” 71 as well as to the meetings of the ABA Section on Legal Education that sponsored the MacCrate Report. 72 While many law schools have embraced the Fundamental Skills, 73 few report applying the Fundamental Values. 74 Those that have sought to fulfill the values, have made it a lower priority than skills 75 and have emphasized only a narrow portion of the duty to promote justice: enhancing public serve and pro bono. 76 The Report’s broader goal of

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70 Munneke, supra note , at 133; Engler, MacCrate, at 144-49.


73 See

74 Engler, MacCrate at 146 (noting that “[i]t would be hard to identify a school at which dramatic curricular changes were triggered by the MacCrate Report”). One rare example is Engler, MacCrate, supra note , at 1 and Engler, From 10-20, at .

75 Russell Engler’s account of the experience at New England School of Law is instructive. New England responded to the MacCrate Report by expanding skills training with “energy and creativity, . . . but with little movement on the values portion of the report, and in particular on the values that related to Pursuing Equal Justice.” Engler, MacCrate 10-20, at 39. Recognizing this, faculty advocates of public service used the MacCrate values to promote “the creation of a new Center for Law and Social Responsibility.” Id. at 4, 39-42. The Center has been the focus of efforts to encourage student and faculty initiatives. Engler concedes that “it remains to be seen whether these initiatives will comprise part of a lasting institutional change, or rather a burst of activity that will fade from view.” Id. at 49.

76 See note supra; Stephen F. Befort & Eric S. Janus, The Role of Legal Education in Instilling an Ethos of Public Service Among Law Students: Towards a Collaboration Between the Profession and the Academy on Professional Values, 13 J. L. & Inequality 1, 2 (1994) (suggesting MacCrate Report played a role in the
integrating the promotion of justice into all aspects of practice and of legal education appears to have been largely ignored. The Report has received little attention in the voluminous literature on professional values.

B. The Limits on the Report’s Influence

Major flaws in the MacCrate Report’s treatment of values presaged the Report’s minimal impact in that area. The Report undermined its commitment to values by making them a second priority and failing to express them coherently as skills. Even had the presentation of values been more effective, the Report’s influence still would have been circumscribed. The Report failed to confront obstacles in the dominant cultures of the bar and academy and to devise successful strategies for overcoming those obstacles.

1. Problems in Presentation of Values

development collaborative program between Minnesota bar and law schools to promote public service). Suprisingly, however, the major efforts to promote pro bono and public service in law schools made little or no mention of the MacCrate Report. See, e.g., Learn to Serve; Pursuing Equal Justice; Newsletter of the ABA Section on Pro Bono and Public Service, v. 1, Issue 1. Perhaps this is because the Report added nothing to the professionalism movement’s commitment to promote pro bono and public service dating from the 1980s. See, e.g., ABA Commission on Professionalism (1986).

77 For example, only a few commentators have referred to the Report’s recommendation that law schools teach that values are “as important in preparing for professional practice as acquisition of substantive knowledge.” Report at 332 (Recommendation 17). A cursory Westlaw search revealed only the following mentions in a footnote or in passing: Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., et al, Teaching Legal Ethics: Exploring the Continuum, 58 Law and Contemporary Problems, Summer/Autumn, 1995, at 153, and John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. Legal Educ. 157 (1993). Redo/double check Moreover, as Engler notes with regard to both skills and values, “there is little evidence to believe that the MacCrate Report transformed legal education, or led to sweeping changes when measured by the more ambitious criteria or goals. . . . It would [even] be hard to identify a school at which dramatic curricular changes were triggered by the MacCrate Report.” Engler, McCrate, at 146.

78 Munneke, supra note , at 134. For example, leading books on the legal profession published after the issuance of the MacCrate Report evidence almost no influence of the MacCrate Report’s work on values. See, e.g., Mary A. Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society (1994) (no reference to MacCrate Report in index); Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993) (same); Sol M. Linowitz & Martin Mayer, The Betrayed Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century 126 (1994) (one reference to Robert MacCrate’s perspective on legal education but with regard to skills and not values); Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession (2000) (no reference in index); check/add William Simon. Notable exceptions to this general observation are the work of some clinical scholars and the ABA Section on Legal Education, see supra note .
a. Values as Second Priority

By listing the four fundamental values after the ten fundamental skills, the MacCrate Report signaled that values are a lower priority. Indeed, if the Report had followed a logical order, it would have started with values. The values are the goals. Once those were identified, the Report would have determined which skills were necessary to fulfill those goals.

Why then did the Report place values after skills? Perhaps the Report reflects the widely-held perception that skills are more important than values. One common illustration is the situation of the star athlete who is caught up in a scandal. While some commentators bemoan the athlete’s failure to serve as a role model, the general conclusion is that so long as the athlete continues to star (and does not find himself in jail), the lapse is forgiven. Skills are more important than values.

Similarly, in law school and law practice, the major awards, like law review editorship or law firm partnership, are awarded primarily on the basis of skills. While extremely bad values may be a disqualification, whether an individual’s values are mediocre or excellent is generally irrelevant. Skills are more important.

b. The Confusing Integration of Values and Skills

Fundamental Skills 6 and 10, the two skills that should promote the value of promoting justice, fairness, and morality, do not succeed in providing adequate guidance for practitioners and students. Other skills, which implicitly promote particular values, fail to identify and explain those values.

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79 As Heyrman notes, many clinical faculty “have criticized the SSV for . . . placing too great an emphasis on skills rather than values.” Heyrman, supra note , at 390.
80 cite
81 cite
Fundamental Skill 6, and Fundamental Value 2 which it implements, fail to provide a persuasive justification for requiring lawyers to engage in moral counseling. Most lawyers conceive of their obligation to their client as excluding moral considerations other than furthering the client’s goals. The Report’s contrary conclusion is never clearly explained. The Report cites the authority of Roscoe Pound’s general assertion that the “‘primary purpose’ of a profession is the ‘[p]ursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service,” but it’s quite a leap from this general statement to require moral counseling. The Report also relies on provisions in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility that either state a non-binding aspiration to counsel on the morally just course or a binding obligation to refrain from prejudicing the administration of justice, which relates more to court appearances than client counseling. The reliance on the Model Code, which has been superseded by the Model Rules, and the absence of citation to the Model Rules, suggests that the ethical rules do not support the Report’s position. In fact, the Model Rules has a provision closely on point but it is not a requirement. It permits the lawyer discretion in advising a client to “refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”

In addition to failing to provide guidance on the source of the duty to counsel morally, Fundamental Skill 6 offers little guidance on when moral counseling is appropriate. Standard 6.4’s limit of moral counseling to occasions when it is “relevant” is

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82 Schwartz, Luban, Pearce
83 Report at 213.
84 Report at 214.
85 Rule 2.1.
confusing. Although it would seem that “justice, fairness, and morality” would be relevant to all decisions, the use of the term “relevant” suggests that some decisions do not implicate “justice, fairness, and morality.” Similarly, Standard 6.4 requires moral counseling when the ethical rules “require or permit” it. Nowhere does the Report identify when the rules require moral counseling. Use of the term “permit” suggests that the Rules would bar moral counseling under some circumstances, but nowhere does the Report identify when this would occur. Standard 6.4 similarly uses the phrase “to the extent to which it is proper.” If “proper” means required or permitted by the ethics rules, it suffers the same lack of clarity. If “proper” refers to a different standard of propriety, that standard is never identified.

Compounding the confusion is the facial inconsistency of Standards 6.4 and 6.1(a)(iii) with Standard 6.1(b)(ii)(B), which requires the lawyer to “guard against . . . be[ing] unable to . . . communicate to [the client] that the lawyer is committed to furthering the client’s objectives and interests.” Any time a lawyer urges the client to seek what the lawyer considers just, fair, and moral, the lawyer communicates that the lawyer has commitments other than “the client’s objectives and interests.” The specific requirements of Standard 6.1(a)(iii) to “persuade [the] client to modify his or decisions” and to take actions to safeguard non-clients or withdraw if the client refuses to do so go even further. They suggest that the lawyer is, or may be, opposed to “the client’s objectives and interests” and will act on that opposition.

Fundamental Skill 10, “Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas,” offers a different type of confusion. Standard 10 addresses “ethical dilemmas,” the “conduct of

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86 This phrase does not appear in standards for Value 2, which refers only to Standard 6.1 and not to 6.4.
87 In doing so, it tracks Fundamental Value Standard 2.1 (a) & (b).
88 Report at .
law as an ethical profession,” and matters of conscience, as well as questions of applying the ethical rules. Surprisingly, Standard 10 implies a separation between ethics and values. It urges lawyers to consider ethical philosophy, personal morality, and “fundamental ethical rules that shape the profession and define what it means to be a legal professional,” such as competence, zealousness, loyalty, and confidentiality. It does not even mention the obviously relevant Fundamental Values of promoting justice, fairness, and morality, or of improving the legal profession. Whether this is just an oversight, or an indication that values are not important to resolving ethical dilemmas, is not clear.

Another source of confusion is the Report’s failure to identify and explain values implicit in a number of the Fundamental Skills. For example, by placing knowledge of alternative dispute resolution procedures on a par with litigation in Fundamental Skill 8, the Report makes seeking alternative dispute resolution a priority.\(^{89}\) Even though important commentators have challenged the merit of alternative dispute resolution,\(^{90}\) the Report never acknowledges that it has made a values choice in encouraging this approach.\(^{91}\) Similarly, implicit in Skill 6 are views (sometimes inconsistent) on the priority of client autonomy in client counseling. This question is also the subject of great debate the literature.\(^{92}\) Here, too, the Report fails to identify or justify its value preferences.

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\(^{89}\) Report at 191-99.
\(^{90}\) Compare Owen Fiss, Against Settlement with Andrew McThenia & Thomas Shaffer.
\(^{91}\) Id.
\(^{92}\) Ellman, Simon, etc.
Indeed, the entire skills section is in part an attack on the dominant values of legal education. The Report identifies 10 “Fundamental Lawyering Skills,” only two of which – “legal analysis and reasoning” and “legal research” – are priorities of the pedagogy of the law school classroom. While commentators have recognized the paradigm shifting implications of the Report’s approach for legal education, the Report does not openly acknowledge or explain the decision to minimize the value of skills gained in the Langdellian classroom.

To be fair, the Report does invite “progressive[] refinement” of the SSV which could perhaps address these weaknesses in the text. However, even if that were done, major conceptual problems would remain.

2. Conceptual Obstacles

a. Failure to Make a Persuasive Case for Promoting Justice

The aspiration of promoting justice, fairness, and morality is an admirable one. It accords with the bar’s traditional understanding of lawyers as America’s governing class charged with identifying and pursuing the public good. In this view, lawyers played a key role in government and in the informal process of managing social and business relationships. In contrast to businesspeople who worked to promote their own self-interest, lawyers worked to promote the public good.

Unfortunately for proponents of lawyers’ commitment to the public good, the dominance of the governing class conception ended in the 1960s. Since that time, the
hired gun role has become the standard conception. Most lawyers view themselves as self-interested advocates who pursue the self-interest of their clients single-mindedly.

The two primary characteristics of this conception of the lawyer’s role are “extreme partisanship” on behalf of the client and “moral non-accountability” for the lawyer’s conduct in pursuing the client’s goals.

The Report offers no strategy for countering this understanding. Rather, with minor exception, it ignores the overwhelming sense among commentators that lawyers have betrayed their obligation to serve the public. In the face of this consensus, the Report made the incredible declaration that promoting justice, fairness, and morality represented a consensus value of the bar. This assertion relieved the Report from the task of confronting the dominant hired gun view and articulating a rationale for promoting justice that might appeal widely to lawyers and law students.

This failure guaranteed the Report’s irrelevance. The only lawyers and law faculty who would resonate with the value of promoting justice would be those who already accepted it. The majority in the bar who viewed lawyers as largely self-interested hired guns would have no reason to change their view. Indeed, they would likely view proponents of the Report’s values as elite lawyers and academics who were “hypocrites

99 Id. at
100 Id. at ; also Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift at 1236.
101 Schwartz; Luban
102 Buried in the comments to Fundamental Value 2 are citations to Chief Justice Rehnquist and the ABA Commission on Professionalism for the proposition that “profit maximization” has caused “many lawyers [to] fail to honor [their pro bono] obligation.” Report at 215.
103 This sentiment dates at least from Chief Justice Burger’s famous 1984 report to the ABA on the decline of professionalism. Pearce, Paradigm, supra note , at 1255. See id. at 1257.
104 Report at
doing one thing while saying another, cynics manipulating for their own purposes an ideology they reject, or naïve fools unaware of what everyone else knows.” 105

Even the limited influence the Report has had in encouraging pro bono and public service programs in law schools 106 is not likely to make a major difference in lawyers’ commitment to the public good. Historically, the growth of public interest law in the 1960s and the creation of the pro bono duty in the 1970s actually had the opposite effect. These developments facilitated the transition from the governing class role to that of the hired gun. The rise of a public interest bar removed responsibility for the public good from law firms and conferred it on the public interest law community. 107 Similarly, the pro bono duty shifted the public good from its integral place at the center of regular firm practice to the marginal arena of pro bono work. 108

Although public interest law and pro bono work add to the public good, proponents must be careful not to undermining lawyers’ commitment to promote justice in all aspects of their work. The Report admirably avoids this error by placing public service and pro bono in the context of the more general duty to promote justice. 109 Nonetheless, by failing to confront the dominant culture of the legal profession and to explain the harm resulting from narrowly equating justice with public service and pro bono, the Report may very well encourage such short-sighted endeavors. Ironically, in one of few value areas where the Report could have made a valuable contribution, its influence may prove to be counter-productive.

105 Paradigm 1265.
106 See supra
107 Pearce, Chicago Roundtable at
108 Pearce, Chicago Roundtable at
109 Report at .
b. Failure to Acknowledge the Ideology of Legal Academics

The Report also misses the ideological context of its proposals for implementation of teaching values to law students. The Report starts from the view that law schools are doing an exemplary job of teaching legal ethics.\footnote{110} To make the teaching of the ethics rules and values more effective, the Report asks law schools to make clear to students that learning values is as important as substantive knowledge.\footnote{111} The Report also asserts that law schools are limited in their ability to teach values and accordingly makes practicing lawyers responsible for teaching values to young lawyers, especially “to impress on students that success in the practice of law is not measured by financial rewards alone, but by a lawyer’s commitment to a just, fair and moral society.”\footnote{112}

The Report’s conception of lawyers and law students bears little resemblance to the reality others have described. As discussed above, asking practicing lawyers who by and large reject the primacy of a duty to the public good to take responsibility for teaching that duty is absurd.\footnote{113} Similarly erroneous is the Report’s assumption that law schools are committed to this goal.

Contrary to the Report’s glowing description of law schools’ success in teaching legal ethics is the legal academy’s widely noted disdain for the topic. As Roger Cramton and Susan Koniak observe, despite the ABA’s requiring the teaching of legal ethics in 1977 and significant developments in scholarship and case law, “legal ethics remains an unloved orphan of legal education.”\footnote{114} In the words of another commentator, legal ethics

\footnote{110} Ambiguity on whether legal ethics includes values, as in Skill 10.  
\footnote{111} Report at . Other proposals include permanent faculty, etc.  
\footnote{112} Report at 333 (Recommendation 19).  
\footnote{113} See supra .  
\footnote{114} Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 145, 146 (1996).}
is “the dog of the law school [curriculum] -- hard to teach, disappointing to take, and often presented to vacant seats or vacant minds.” 115 The teaching of legal ethics “occupies a minor academic role as a one- or two-credit required course in the upper-class years, often taught by adjuncts or by a rotating group of faculty conscripts,” 116 and “[s]erious scholarship in legal ethics is still considered somewhat of an oxymoron.” 117

The attitudes that underlie the disdain for legal ethics similarly undermine support for teaching the values of promoting justice and improving the legal profession. They fall within three perspectives. The first perspective consists of beliefs supporting the view that law school need not expressly teach values. Some commentators argue that the conventional classroom teaching using the Socratic method develops moral character. 118 Others find values teaching unnecessary because they believe in the Business-Profession dichotomy fundamental to ideology of professionalism. It assumes that lawyers work for the public good, unlike business people who seek to promote their own self-interest. 119

The second perspective is the belief that values cannot be taught. Many in the academy believe that students’ values have been fully formed before law school and cannot be changed. 120 Under this view, of course, teaching values is useless.

Third is the perspective that values should not be taught. This perspective has its origin in Christopher Columbus Langdell’s introduction of a scientific approach to legal

116 Cramton & Kioniak, supra note , at 147. See also Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, at 724 n. 44.
118 Pearce, Teaching, supra , at 737.
119 Id. at
120 Pearce, Teaching at 732- .
pedagogy. 121 The scientific paradigm “distinguished between facts, which could be taught, and values, which could not.” 122 As I have noted elsewhere:

While most law professors today would probably not believe themselves to be scientists, they continue to apply the same pedagogical approach as Langdell and to separate legal from ethical questions. The legal literature is full of stories of students who raise their hand to question the ethics of a particular legal doctrine only to be told by their professor that the subject of the class was law, not ethics. 123

The Report’s Recommendations offer no way to combat these perspectives. By assuming, contrary to reality, that the status quo was supportive of teaching ethics and values, the Report never made a case that would respond to these deeply and broadly held views opposing the teaching of values. Without this change, the Report’s specific suggestions, whether for permanent faculty to teach values 124 or for the law schools to make clear their commitment to values, would have difficulty gaining adoption and, even if adopted, would have the same fate as the ABA’s requirement of ethics teaching. The Report’s recommendation of pervasive teaching of values would suffer the same fate as the pervasive teaching of ethics – “little more than tokenism designed to satisfy the [ABA] accreditation requirement.” 125 Values would remain, at best, a secondary concern.

III. Conclusion: The Roads Not Taken

The MacCrate Report offered the opportunity for a major rethinking of how to

121 Pearce, Teaching at  ; Legal Ethics at 162.
122 Legal Ethics at 162.
123 Legal Ethics at 162.
124 Report at
125 Cramton & Koniak, supra note , at 148.
define and teach the fundamental values of the legal profession. By making values a
distant second priority, and ducking the most significant challenges involved in defining
and teaching values, the Report largely squandered this opportunity.

What the Report has done is to inspire symposia, conferences, and articles. These
efforts, though, appear to have had the same influence as the bar’s almost thirty year
campaign to promote professionalism through exhortations to lawyers and law students,
conferences, required continuing legal education courses, and tinkering with legal
education. Aside from generating a professionalism industry, the professionalism
campaign has had little or no effect on how lawyers understand their role or how the
public perceives lawyers.126

The effort to promote values need not be a dead end. Instead of the Report’s
reliance on the assumption that the promotion of justice in legal practice represents either
a mandate of the ethics rules or a consensus of the bar, the Task Force should have
accepted the reality of the bar and academy, and devised a strategy for changing attitudes.
A more persuasive effort to influence the culture of the bar would move beyond the
Business-Profession dichotomy of professionalism to an obligation to the public good
grounded more generally in a the responsibility that each person, whether in a business or
a profession, has to consider the public good in their work.127 As a result, lawyers are
morally accountable for their actions, even as a representative of clients.128

In legal education, the only way to promote values effectively is to rethink the
pedagogy that marginalizes them. Taking values seriously requires a curriculum of
values that would begin with a first year, first semester course of at least three credits to

126 Pearce, Origins, supra note , at
127 Pearce, Florida State
128 Pearce, Moral Accountability
provide the foundation for the student’s understanding of her training as a student and future work as a lawyer.\textsuperscript{129} Unless values and ethics rules are a primary focus of the first year curriculum, they become marginal to how the student understands what it means to be a lawyer.\textsuperscript{130} Required advanced courses in the second and third years would integrate the students’ increasing legal expertise and work experiences into their appreciation of values and ethics.\textsuperscript{131} Only then would the pervasive teaching of values, which the Report recommends, serve as a necessary complement to complete the teaching of values.\textsuperscript{132}

Today, the task of defining and teaching values continues to be an important challenge to the bar and the academy. The opportunity the Report missed is still open. Perhaps the Report’s goal of beginning a conversation – a goal that has succeeded – will provide the venue for the development of more productive approaches of meeting these challenges. Signs of hope include the engagement of large number of clinical education scholars, like Russell Engler, who are willing to reexamine professional ideology and legal pedagogy. Many clinicians bring to this debate a sensibility that may offer a way to ground the development of a moral community among lawyers. Their commitment to pursue justice in their work comes not from professionalism but from a personal moral commitment.

Other sources of hope are innovative thinkers and bar leaders, like Gary Munneke\textsuperscript{133} and Louis Craco,\textsuperscript{134} who are open to thinking outside the narrow confines of the bar’s dominant ideologies. To the extent that the MacCrate Report has played any

\textsuperscript{129} Pearce, Loyola Chicago & Journal of Legal Profession.
\textsuperscript{130} Pearce, Loyola Chicago.
\textsuperscript{131} Pearce, Loyola Chicago & Journal of Legal Profession.
\textsuperscript{132} Pearce, Journal of Legal Profession.
\textsuperscript{133} Unwilling to rest upon the trite clichés of professionalism, he challenges the legal profession to transform itself in response to dramatic societal transformations. Munneke, supra note \textsuperscript{.} See also cites.
\textsuperscript{134} Under his leadership, New York’s Judicial Institute of Professionalism has indicated a willingness to explore a far broader range of issues than did the MacCrate Task Force. Cite.
role in helping to bring these fresh perspectives to the examination of professional values, it has performed a quite valuable function. Whether these perspectives result in any significant changes remains to be seen.