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Bayesian Juries and The Limits to Deterrence Ezra Friedman, Yale University Abraham L. Wickelgren, Federal Trade Commission Download the Paper (PDF format) - November 22, 2002 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing. ABSTRACT: We consider a model of crime with rational Bayesian Jurors. We find that if jurors are not perfectly informed, even when there is no limit to the size of the punishment that can be imposed, it is not possible to deter all crime. There is a finite lower bound on the crime rate which results from the difficulties in achieving a conviction with imperfect evidence and very low crime rates. Crime can not be reduced below this rate by increasing the penalty, but the lower bound can be decreased by improving the quality of evidence presented to jurors, or by increasing the threshold of evidence necessary for prosecution. SUGGESTED CITATION: Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren, "Bayesian Juries and The Limits to Deterrence" (November 22, 2002). Yale Law School. Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series. Paper 282. http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/lepp/papers/282 | REPOSITORY HOME  | SEARCH  | MY ACCOUNT  | NELLCO HOME | Powered by bepress.