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The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law
Dan M. Kahan, Yale Law School
ABSTRACT:
The Logic of Collective Action has for decades supplied the logic
of public policy analysis. In this pioneering application of public choice
theory, Mancur Olson ele gantly punctured the premise -- shared by a
diverse variety of political theories -- that individuals can be expected to
act consistently with the interest of the groups to which they belong. Absent
externally imposed incentives, wealth-maximizing individuals, he argued,
will rarely find it in their interest to contribute to goods that benefit
the group as a whole, but rather will "free ride" on the contributions that
other group members make. As a result, too few individuals will contribute
sufficiently, and the well-being of the group will suffer. These are
the assumptions that dominate public policy analysis and ultimately public
policy across a host of regulatory domains -- from tax collection to environmental
conservation, from street-level policing to policing of the internet.
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Dan M. Kahan,
"The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law"
(December 11, 2002).
Yale Law School.
Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series.
Paper 281.
http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/lepp/papers/281
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