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Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons Francesco Parisi Norbert Schulz Ben Depoorter Download the Paper (PDF format) - March 20, 2003 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing. ABSTRACT: This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation. SUGGESTED CITATION: Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz, and Ben Depoorter, "Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons" (March 20, 2003). Yale Law School. Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series. Paper 279. http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/lepp/papers/279 | REPOSITORY HOME  | SEARCH  | MY ACCOUNT  | NELLCO HOME | Powered by bepress.