Notwithstanding its academic prominence, the economic deterrence rationale has not dominated doctrine. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has all but rejected economic deterrence, by instead placing increasing emphasis on a competing retributive punishment rationale. But, since punitive damages lie squarely within the purview of state law, state legislatures and courts possess a degree of freedom to articulate state-based goals of punitive damages — such as economic deterrence — even in the face of heavy-handed federal constitutional review imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The insights from the absent-law situations have implication for several modern criminal justice issues, including the appropriate distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment, restorative justice programs, the movement to promote non-incarcerative sanctions, transitional justice and truth commissions, the use-of-force rules under international law, the procedures for fairness in criminal adjudication, and crime-control policies in fighting organized crime and terrorism.

This essay attempts to take up Williams' challenge, and to show that there are indeed significant practical benefits that flow from a variety of distinctions, some that Williams knew about and others that he did not. Its general claim is that there can be great practical value in investigating the interrelation among doctrines – both the similarities and the differences among different doctrines. This is not true of all distinctions; some may be of interest only to moral philosophers. But those that do have practical value ought to be incorporated into the framework of criminal law that governs how judges, lawyers, and lawmakers think about that body of law.

But they’re wrong. This Article provides a comprehensive response to the dormant Commerce Clause Skeptics from an historical and originalist perspective. Far from lacking legitimacy, the Clause has deep roots in Founding history. It addresses one of the central problems that drew the Framers to the Philadelphia Convention, and it employs the very device for reviewing state legislation the Framers preferred, judicial review. From a historical perspective, the Court’s modern dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is actually far more respectful of state authority than the understanding of the Clause likely held at the time of the Framing. But looking with presentist eyes, the Skeptics miss this entirely. The story of the dormant Commerce Clause is one of many twists and turns, nearly inscrutable doctrine, and political manipulations. But no matter what other problems the doctrine may suffer, its fundamental legitimacy is not among them.

After first comparing Hauerwas’s understanding of Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount with that of his two twentieth century predecessors, Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Neibuhr, the Essay turns to Hauerwasian public engagement and the prophetic temptation. The Essay then considers the implications of Hauerwas’s theology for three very different social issues, the Civil Rights Movement, abortion, and debt and bankruptcy.

After some background on AFCs and automatic stays, we provide our joint analysis of the costs and benefits of stays on the QFCs, with a focus on systemtically important financial institutions, including the special case of central market utilities. Following this, we state our respective policy conclusions. Briefly speaking, we both believe that repos (and certain closely related QFCs) that are backed by liquid securities should be exempt from automatic stays, or receive an effectively similiar treatment. Repos backed by illiquid assets, on the other hand, should not be given this safe harbor. We both believe that derivatives that have not been centrally cleared should be subject to automatic stays. One of us believes that stays should also apply to cleared derivatives. The other author favors an exemption of cleared derivatives from stays, except in the case of a failure of a regulated central clearing party.

The book also compares the social welfare function to other, more familiar policy-evaluation methodologies—traditional cost-benefit analysis, inequality metrics, poverty metrics, and cost-effectiveness analysis. Only the “social welfare function” provides a unified, implementable, and normatively plausible methodology that respects the most basic welfarist principles (such as the Pareto principle) and is sensitive to distributive considerations.

In this Article, Professors Benjamin and Rai analyze how government policy on innovation should be structured. Drawing on existing theoretical and empirical work, as well as their own original empirical research, they propose an executive branch entity that would both analyze pending agency action and offer regulatory suggestions of its own. This entity would introduce a new, trans-agency focus on innovation while drawing upon, and feeding into, existing executive branch processes that aim to rationalize the work of disparate federal agencies. This approach, Professors Benjamin and Rai contend, offers a great improvement over existing government institutions while avoiding a costly (and politically infeasible) remaking of the administrative state.

The relationship between public and private international law, the issue of the excellent book under review, has often been addressed. But the question is ever new because it is asked under ever-changing circumstances.