This article reprises Chief Justice Burger’s proposal, calling for the establishment of a National Corrections College that would be the nation’s “brain center” for correctional research, curriculum development, and leadership training. As Justice Burger observed three decades ago, an investment in a full-fledged national-level correctional training and research center would “cost less in the long run” than the failure to make such investment.

This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of collateral consequences in the taxation context. In contrast to the overwhelmingly negative portrayal of collateral consequences in the criminal law literature, this Article shows that collateral tax sanctions may offer previously unappreciated social benefits. Collateral tax sanctions can promote voluntary tax compliance more effectively than formal tax penalties alone, especially if governments increase public awareness of collateral tax sanctions. Governments should therefore embrace collateral tax sanctions as a means of enforcement, and taxing authorities should affirmatively publicize these sanctions.

After considering the effects of collateral tax sanctions under each of the predominant theories of voluntary compliance, I propose principles that governments should consider when designing collateral tax sanctions. These principles suggest that recent state initiatives to revoke recreational and professional licenses from tax delinquent individuals will likely promote voluntary compliance. However, whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Kawashima, in which the majority voted to uphold the deportation of two lawful permanent residents who filed false tax returns, will have a positive effect on voluntary compliance is far less certain. I conclude by suggesting additional tax offenses that could be subject to collateral tax sanctions and additional benefits that governments could revoke, or limit, to foster voluntary compliance.

This article takes these claims on in empirical, theoretical, and cultural terms. Empirically, claims of legally unconstrained presidential power turn out to rest on thin evidence, rarely confront conflicting evidence; the empirical case is indeterminate and perhaps impossible Posner and Vermeule see presidents as Holmesians, not Hartians. Yet even if we enter their purely consequentialist world, in which presidents follow the law not out of any normative obligation or the more specific duty to faithfully execute the laws but only when the cost-benefit metric of compliance is more favorable than that of noncompliance, powerful reasons suggest that presidents will comply with law far more often than Posner and Vermeule imply.

In the area of presidential studies, the Posner and Vermeule approach is particularly fresh. For many decades, legal scholarship on presidential power was confined to assessing how much formal legal power the President should be understood to have, as a matter of the original understanding at the time of the Constitution’s adoption or subsequent legal and political practice. In other disciplines, scholarship on the presidency was heavily personality based — organized around studies of individual presidents, or case studies of particular episodes, or narrative accounts of how various presidents had, for example, used military force. But the greater emphasis in the social sciences in recent decades on institutional analysis has recently reached presidential studies, and an emerging series of works now seeks to analyze the presidency not through individual personalities but through the more systematic tools of empirical and theoretical analysis. Posner and Vermeule’s book, in its effort to theorize systematically about the actual (rather than formal) scope of presidential power, should be seen in this light.

In this Essay, I used Douglas as a lens through which to explore two concepts: first, whether courts can act as “prompters,” pushing federal agencies to discharge their duty to weigh in on whether a conflict between federal and state law exists in a given context; and second, whether there can exist a synergistic relationship between courts and agencies in determining whether a conflict between federal and state law exists. Specifically, I explore two questions left unresolved by the Court’s Douglas decision: (1) Why permit a preemption cause of action at all in situations where there is a viable administrative action? And (2) where parallel proceedings persist, should agency determinations receive varying degrees of deference in each?

This Article discusses the potential detrimental impact of Padilla’s ambiguous holding and the creation of a two-tiered admonishment system on a defendant’s ability to remain in the United States as well as the confusion it causes for defense counsel and the courts. Part I discusses the history of the right to advice on the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction under the Sixth Amendment. Part II highlights some of the key points that were left unanswered by Padilla and explores the impediments to achieving Padilla’s goal of assisting noncitizen defendants in avoiding removal from the United States. Part III suggests ways to ensure that all noncitizen defendants are given adequate advice on the immigration consequences of criminal conviction now and in the future. This Article concludes that the Padilla decision was an incremental and positive step towards reform in criminal representation but that legislative action, increased implementation of professional standards, and future progressive litigation will be necessary before all defense counsel can consistently advise their noncitizen clients about the immigration consequences of a conviction. If lawyers fail to build on its promise, Padilla will not be the landmark decision it was meant to be.

The study’s findings include many matters either not previously observed or not previously established. Thus, for example, in addition to showing that resignations have been at historically low rates in recent decades, the authors were able to confirm a link between age at appointment and resignation. By calculating precise ratios of service in senior status to regular active service and gathering data on the work performed by judges in senior status, they were able to derive imputed workloads for judges in senior status. Responses to a questionnaire sent to all judges in senior status (with a return rate of 83%) permitted the authors to confirm that the two major influences on the decision to take senior status are the desire to help the judge's court by creating a vacancy and the desire to take advantage of federal tax (FICA) savings. Those responses also confirm that, contrary to much of the political science literature, strategic partisan behavior plays only a very small role in these decisions.

Although the responses to the senior status questionnaire suggest wide-spread satisfaction with senior status, they also provide evidence of substantial unhappiness about Congress's failure to grant a salary increase since 1991 and its failure to provide annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). Thus, numerous respondents stated that they were considering retirement or would have retired years ago if they had known then what they know now. The responses to a questionnaire that was sent to all retired judges (also with a return rate of 83%) confirm such unhappiness and demonstrate that financial considerations were the primary driver of retirements in the study period. Although the retirement rate increased only modestly over the four decades of the study, there are reasons to fear that retirements will increase, perhaps substantially, in coming decades. Indeed, in the two years after the end of the study period, there was a large increase in the number of judges retiring.

A sustained substantial increase in retirements could undermine the system of service in senior status. The same is true if substantially more judges chose to remain in regular active service, and the authors therefore explore what has influenced judges to remain active for three years or more after eligibility to take senior status or retire. As expected, the primary influences are the desire to retain a judge's previous role and status, whether manifested in a courtroom and courtroom staff or in participation in en banc review by the court of appeals. Data gathered for the study demonstrate possible adverse influences on judges assuming senior status, and they make it possible to locate current problem areas.

In the concluding section of the study, the authors explore the policy implications of their research, focusing on the potential threat that retirements and decisions to remain in regular active service represent to senior status and the critically important role that senior status plays in enabling the federal judiciary to accomplish its work. The authors calculate the number of judgeships that would have to be created to do the work currently done by judges in senior status. They also provide a basis for calculating the costs and benefits of senior status. Although the authors recommend a number of steps that could reduce the threat of retirements, the preferred approach is for Congress to restore the ground lost to inflation by providing COLAs not conferred. Apart from financial measures, the authors also identify some non-financial disincentives to senior status that should be addressed, and they suggest reconsideration of the preference for decentralized decision making on matters of chambers, courtrooms and staff at a time when flexibility in deploying resources nationally is ever more important.

The concept of institutional free exercise, as articulated in case law and legal scholarship, provides a framework for distinguishing between the religious exercise and substantial burdens of religious institutions and individual adherents and for understanding the distinct ways in which institutions experience burdens. In addition, the treatment of religious and non-profit institutions in comparable land use contexts, particularly hardship claims under landmark laws and the expansion of nonconforming uses, can provide a helpful framework for evaluating institutional RLUIPA claims. The analytical approach advocated in this Article both reframes the interpretation of RLUIPA and provides insights applicable to evaluating hardships on other civil society institutions. It also offers a starting point for further scholarship on how Hosanna-Tabor and the concept of institutional free exercise should affect institutional challenges in other contexts.

First, the debate about the proper scope and form of the quasi-class action too frequently relies on the class action as the touchstone for legitimacy in aggregate litigation. References to the class action, however, are more often misleading than helpful. The basic assumptions behind the class action are different in degree and in kind from the reality of the quasi-class action. Overreliance on the class action as the conceptual framework for aggregation carries the significant risk of unintentionally shackling courts in their attempts to coordinate litigation. The very reason the quasi-class action emerged as a procedural device — the ossification of the class action model of litigation — suggests that courts and commentators should look for another reference model when assessing what is proper or improper in quasi-class actions.

Second, bankruptcy serves as a better model for judging when to use, and how to order, non-class aggregation of mass tort litigation. The entirety of bankruptcy practice need not be imported to realize that bankruptcy may provide a useful lens for viewing aggregation more generally. That lens helps to clarify some of the most troubling concerns about the quasi-class action, such as the proper role of lawyers and the place of claimant consent. Bankruptcy serves as a superior reference model because it starts with an assumption that collective resolution is necessary but tempers the collective with individual and subgroup consent as well as with institutional structures to counterbalance excessive power by lawyers or particular claimants.