The aims of this essay are, first, to present the jurisprudential position that Ronald Dworkin set out in his penultimate book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011); and, secondly, to elaborate it a little further than Dworkin himself was able to. The position is a distinctive and interesting one. Although Professor Dworkin argued in all his earlier work that moral facts (about rights and justice) were among the truth conditions of legal propositions, now in Justice for Hedgehogs he argued that law is itself a branch of morality. This is a bolder and more radical claim and it requires some quite careful exposition to see how it might be made plausible.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Dworkin, law, legislation, morality, natural law, positivism, Raz, separation thesis
Waldron, Jeremy, "Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs" (2013). New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers. 417.