In the first of these lectures, I present a conception of dignity that preserves its ancient association with rank and station, and (following Gregory Vlastos, James Whitman and others) a conception of human dignity that amounts to a generalization of high status across all human beings. The lectures argue that this provides a better understanding of human dignity and of the work it does in theories of rights than the better-known Kantian conception. The second lecture focuses particularly on the importance of dignity - understood in this way - as a status defining a person's relation to law: their presentation as persons capable of self-applying the law, capable of presenting and arguing a point of view, and capable of responding to law's demands without brute coercion. Together the two lectures also illuminate the relation between dignity conceived as the ground of rights and dignity conceived as the content of rights; they also illuminate important ideas about dignity as noble bearing and dignity as the subject of a right against degrading treatment; and they help us understand the sense in which dignity is better conceived as a status than as a kind of value.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Waldron, Jeremy J., "Dignity, Rank, and Rights: The 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC Berkeley" (2009). New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers. Paper 151.