NYU Journal of International Law & Politics, Forthcoming
This essay, forthcoming in the NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, is adapted from the inaugural Robert A. Kindler Professorship of Law lecture at NYU School of Law. It develops an economic perspective on the utility of international law, identifying the reasons why international law is sometimes successful at orchestrating international cooperation and sometimes unsuccessful. It considers two general accounts of the gains from international cooperation, including the control of trans-national externalities and domestic commitment issues. It argues that international law is more likely to be successful when the gains from cooperation are symmetrical and reciprocal, which facilitates the creation of self-enforcing agreements. Examples of successful and unsuccessful cooperation are developed from various fields of international law, including international trade, the laws of war, immigration, human rights, and international investment law.
Date of Authorship for this Version
International law, international trade, international investment
Sykes, Alan O., "When is International Law Useful?" (2013). New York University Law and Economics Working Papers. Paper 348.