This paper shows close connections between CEOs’ vacation schedules and corporate news disclosures. I identify vacations by merging corporate jet flight histories with records of CEOs’ property ownership near leisure destinations. Companies disclose favorable news just before CEOs leave for vacation and delay subsequent announcements until CEOs return, releasing news at an unusually high rate on the CEO’s first day back. When CEOs are away, companies announce less news than usual, mandatory disclosures are more likely to occur late, and stock prices exhibit sharply lower volatility. Volatility increases when CEOs return to work. CEOs spend fewer days out of the office when their ownership is high and when the weather is bad at their vacation homes.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Disclosure, corporate jets, CEO vacations
Yermack, David, "Tailspotting: Identifying and profiting from CEO vacation trips" (2013). New York University Law and Economics Working Papers. Paper 293.