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Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court Jeffrey R. Lax, Columbia University Charles M. Cameron, Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Department of Political Science Download the Paper (PDF format) - October 9, 2006 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing. ABSTRACT: We formulate a new game-theoretic model of bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court. In the model, a degree of monopoly power over policy endogenously accrues to the assigned writer despite an “open rule” for the other justices. We assume justices are motivated ultimately by a concern for judicial policy, but that the policy impact of an opinion depends partly on its persuasiveness, clarity, and craftsmanship—its legal quality. The effort-cost of producing a high quality opinion creates a wedge that the assignee can exploit to move an opinion from the median without provoking a winning counter-offer. We use this bargaining model as the foundation for a formal analysis of opinion assignment. Both the bargaining and opinion assignment models display rich and tractable comparative statics, allowing them to explain well-known empirical regularities as well as generate new propositions, within a unified and internally consistent framework. SUGGESTED CITATION: Jeffrey R. Lax and Charles M. Cameron, "Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court" (October 9, 2006). New York University School of Law. New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers. Paper 39. http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/39 | REPOSITORY HOME  | SEARCH  | MY ACCOUNT  | NELLCO HOME | Powered by bepress.