Document Type
Article
Comments
Subsequently published in The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior, Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith (eds.), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, 268-286.
Abstract
This essay, prepared for The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior (Francesco Parisi and Vernon Smith eds., 2004), examines implications of bounded rationality for traditional economic analysis of public law enforcement. A brief application to the enforcement of employment discrimination laws by public agents is offered.
Date of Authorship for this Version
September 2004
Recommended Citation
Jolls, Christine, "On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors" (2004). Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 494.
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/494
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