Title
Designing a Shareholder Access Rule
Document Type
Article
Comments
Subsequently published in Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 12, 2004, 28-32.
Abstract
This paper examines the specific features of the shareholder access rule recently proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. I suggests that, even accepting the Commission's generally cautious approach and its desire to limit shareholder access to cases where the need for it is evident, the restrictions included in the rule proposal are excessive and should be relaxed. In particular, I identify several changes in these restrictions that would contribute to attaining the policy goals that the proposed rule seeks to serve.
Date of Authorship for this Version
February 2004
Keywords
corporate governance
Recommended Citation
Bebchuk, Lucian, "Designing a Shareholder Access Rule" (2004). Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 461.
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/461