Title

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

Document Type

Article

Comments

Subsequently published in The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, No. 3, Summer 2002, 973-1035.

Abstract

This paper argues that once undistorted shareholder choice is ensured, which can be done by making it necessary for hostile bidders to win a vote of shareholder support, boards should not have veto power over takeover bids. The paper considers all of the arguments that have been offered for board veto, including ones based on analogies to other corporate decisions, directors' superior information, bargaining by management, pressures on managers to focus on the short-run inferences from IPO charters, interests of long-term shareholders, aggregate shareholder wealth, and protection of stakeholders, aggregate shareholder wealth, and protection of stakeholders. Examining these arguments both at the level of theory and in light of all available empirical evidence, the paper concludes that none of them individually, nor all of them taken together, warrants a board veto. Finally, the paper discusses the implications that the analysis has for judicial review of defensive tactics.

Date of Authorship for this Version

April 2002

Keywords

corporate governance