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Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard Law School Jesse M. Fried Subsequently published in Berkeley Business Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 2004, 291-326. Download the Paper (PDF format) - August 3, 2004 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing. ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes an important form of “stealth compensation” provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements. Our study also highlights the importance of having information about compensation arrangements not only publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders. We propose requiring public companies to place a monetary value on all retirement benefits to which their executives become entitled. In particular, firms should disclose to investors the annual buildup in the monetary value of executives’ retirement benefits, including the value of tax savings reaped by executives at the company’s expense. SUGGESTED CITATION: Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, "Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits" (August 3, 2004). Harvard Law School. Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 487. http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard/olin/papers/487 | REPOSITORY HOME  | SEARCH  | MY ACCOUNT  | NELLCO HOME | Powered by bepress.