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Harvard Law School

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The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives
Steven Shavell, Harvard Law School

Subsequently published in Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2006, 1-29.

Download the Paper (PDF format) - August 3, 2004 Tell a colleague about it.
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ABSTRACT:
The appeals process -- whereby litigants can have decisions of adjudicators reviewed by a higher authority -- is a general feature of formal legal systems (and of many private decisionmaking procedures). It leads to the making of better decisions, because it constitutes a threat to adjudicators whose decisions would deviate too much from socially desirable ones. Further, it yields this benefit without absorbing resources to the extent that adjudicators can anticipate when appeals would occur and would thus make decisions to forestall the actual occurrence of appeals.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Steven Shavell, "The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives" (August 3, 2004). Harvard Law School. Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 485.
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard/olin/papers/485




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