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Why Continental European Takeover Law Matters
Allen Ferrell, Harvard Law School
Subsequently published in "Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe," (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 561-574.
ABSTRACT:
This paper addresses the following question in the context of considering the recommendations of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Takeover Bids: Why does Continental European takeover law matter given the concentrated ownership structure of most Continental European firms? In answering this question, the paper discusses the interaction between takeover rules and ownership structure and the possible lessons that can be drawn from the British and American experience with takeover regulation. While a ban on the use of defensive tactics without shareholder approval (possibly in conjunction with a mandatory bid rule) can theoretically have the effect of either encouraging or discouraging the adoption of dispersed-ownership structures, the empirical evidence suggests that the former would be the more likely result. Moreover, the British and American experience highlights the importance of adopting a takeover regime earlier rather than later in time.
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Allen Ferrell,
"Why Continental European Takeover Law Matters"
(December 29, 2003).
Harvard Law School.
Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series.
Paper 454.
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard/olin/papers/454
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