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Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment Bruce Hay, Harvard Law School Download the Paper (PDF format) - October 29, 2003 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing. ABSTRACT: This paper undertakes an economic analysis of "sting" operations, in which the authorities induce, or tempt, an individual to commit a crime or comparable rule violation. The paper considers the rationales for this law enforcement technique, including its potential advantages over alternative techniques such as ex post apprehension of offenders. Two functions of sting operations are emphasized and analyzed: (1) the informational function of identifying likely offenders; and (2) the behavioral function of deterring offenses. The paper examines the tensions between these functions, and offers a model of desirable sting operation policy. SUGGESTED CITATION: Bruce Hay, "Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment" (October 29, 2003). Harvard Law School. Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 441. http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard/olin/papers/441 | REPOSITORY HOME  | SEARCH  | MY ACCOUNT  | NELLCO HOME | Powered by bepress.