By enacting a workable insolvency mechanism, Congress could avoid using public money or credit to rescue a troubled GSE’s creditors. Congress should specify priorities among creditors’ claims, authorize appointment of a receiver, and empower the receiver to reorganize the GSE or establish an interim firm to carry on the GSE’s business. Alternatively, Congress could allow GSEs to liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code.

JEL Classifications: G18, G21, G28, G33, K29

In the past decade, increasing numbers of lawyers have been turning to religion to find meaning in their work. This article traces the history and development of the “religious lawyering movement,” and how it challenges professional images of lawyers as neutral and fungible, or as “hired guns” in the adversarial system. It then discusses how the religious lawyering movement might respond to three common objections: that religion adds nothing to already commonly recognized secular values; that religious lawyers will unfairly impose their views on clients; and that religious approaches to lawyering are dangerous for democracy.

The article proposes an approach to legal practice that both encourages lawyers to draw on the substantive critiques and contributions of their religious traditions, and respects the basic values of liberal democracy. It invites the legal profession to allow room for lawyers to integrate religious values into their professional lives, so that, as Martin Luther King might put it, “the host of heaven and earth might pause to say, here lived great lawyers who did their job well.

This article demonstrates that the Rehnquist Court’s recent decisions interpreting Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power to enforce constitutional rights, which are based on the framers' intent, are contradicted by the framers' legislative actions to secure constitutional rights. It argues that the Rehnquist Court's understanding of Congress's power to secure constitutional rights is contradicted by the federal government's actions to enforce constitutional rights from the founding of the nation through the Civil War era, and it should be reevaluated.

Analyzing a number of key cases including the Boy Scouts and burning cross cases, I show that, contrary to the Court’s reductive assumptions, these cases are fundamentally about speech and equality. Rather than artificially force a case into a speech or equality box, my approach would fuse speech and equality doctrine. After setting forth a general framework to speech-equality intersections, this Article reconstructs the analysis of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul to show how a more balanced approach would produce a finer-grained analysis reflective of a holistic conception of the Constitution.

Professor Lee suggests that there is marked variation in the extent to which higher educational institutions seek to, and in fact, confer these two sorts of benefits. Accordingly, the compelling interest test as formulated in Grutter should, by its own terms, take account of this variation in mission and causation, with the logical consequence that student body diversity might not suffice as a compelling government interest in every single higher educational context. Liberal-arts colleges represent the strongest case for the discourse benefits of student body diversity. The selective military academies represent the strongest case for the gate-keeping leadership benefits of student body diversity, although graduate and professional schools in today's America, where graduate education is an increasingly important credential for leadership, can also assert a strong case for leadership benefits. The proliferation of graduate education simultaneously detracts from the claim to leadership benefits of undergraduate institutions, and to the extent that a discourse-only rationale for diversity is troubling to members of the Court and the public at large, suggests an unsteady future for race-conscious policies at four-year college and university programs.

This Article critiques the Vesting Clause Thesis on both textual and historical grounds. As for text, the difference in wording between the Article I and Article II Vesting Clauses can be explained on a number of other plausible grounds and need not be read as distinguishing between a limited grant of legislative powers and a plenary grant of executive power. As for history, the narrative that is offered by proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis has two central features. First, it presents a story of continuity, whereby European political theory is carried forward, relatively unblemished, into American constitutional design and practice. Second, the narrative relies on what could be called “executive power essentialism” – the proposition that the Founders had in mind, and intended the Constitution to reflect, a conception of what is “naturally” or “essentially” within executive power. We argue that this historical narrative is wrong on both counts. Among other things, the narrative fails to take account of complexity within eighteenth century political theory, the experience of state constitutionalism before 1787, and the self-conscious rejection by the Founders of the British model of government. The narrative also understates the degree to which the constitutional Founders were functionalists, willing to deviate from pure political theory and essentialist categories in order to design an effective government.