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Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt Mitu Gulati, Duke University Law School George G. Triantis, Harvard Law School Download the Paper (PDF format) - March 1, 2007 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing. ABSTRACT: Although extralegal enforcement is widely acknowledged, the conventional understanding of written contract provisions, such as the complex and detailed provisions in bond contracts, is that they are drafted to be enforced by law. This framing neglects the value of contracts in shaping extralegal forces, particularly where litigation is unlikely or not possible. Sovereign debt contracts provide an example in which lengthy and detailed contracts play a key role even though the debtor is largely litigation-proof. We examine how contract provisions in sovereign debt contracts improve the efficiency of creditor control outside the realm of legal enforcement. SUGGESTED CITATION: Mitu Gulati and George G. Triantis, "Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt" (March 1, 2007). Duke Law School Working Paper Series. Duke Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 89. http://lsr.nellco.org/duke/fs/papers/89 | REPOSITORY HOME  | SEARCH  | MY ACCOUNT  | NELLCO HOME | Powered by bepress.