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Performance of HAMP Versus Non-HAMP Loan Modifications – Evidence from New York City

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Abstract: Policymakers are relying heavily on mortgage modifications to address the foreclosure crisis. However, not enough is known about whether modifications actually help borrowers stay current over the long run, or about what kinds of modifications are most successful. We use logit models in a hazard framework to explain how loan, borrower, property, servicer and neighborhood characteristics, along with differences in the modifications, affect the likelihood of redefault. The dataset includes both HAMP and proprietary modifications. Our results demonstrate that borrowers who receive HAMP modifications have been considerably more successful in staying current than those who receive non-HAMP modifications.

KEYWORDS: mortgage modification, HAMP, foreclosure prevention

1. Introduction

From November 2007 through March 2011, over 2.1 million mortgages were modified in the United States (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 2011). Policymakers have heralded such modifications as a key to addressing the ongoing foreclosure crisis, because a successful mortgage modification can help borrowers (by allowing them to stay current on their loans and thereby avoid foreclosure) as well as servicers, lenders and investors (by helping them to avoid the high costs associated with foreclosures). However, there is little research about whether modifications are successful at helping borrowers stay current on their loans over the long run. That question is crucial, because if modifications simply delay an eventual foreclosure, they actually may add to the cost and length of the foreclosure process, to the detriment of lenders, borrowers who make payments under the modification, future borrowers, and the neighborhoods in which the homes are located.

Mortgage modifications can help a borrower remain current on her loans by lowering the monthly payment to an affordable level. Some proponents also suggest that by altering the terms of the loan, modifications may give an underwater borrower who may have been inclined to strategically default on her loan an incentive to continue paying the mortgage.

Servicers can employ a variety of methods to modify mortgages. These include: (1) reducing the principal balance, (2) freezing or lowering the interest rate of the loan, and (3) extending the term of the loan, sometimes by adding missed payments to the principal. Generally a combination of these modification strategies will result in a lower

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monthly payment for the borrower. Some modifications, however, have employed these tools in such a way that the monthly payment actually increased.

In 2009, the Obama administration introduced the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a streamlined structure for modifications that includes financial incentives for servicers to modify loans, as well as federal subsidies for the modifications themselves.[1] Prior to HAMP, servicers could offer a range of proprietary modifications using the same tools (but with no requirement that they follow the same guidelines), and servicers can continue to offer proprietary modifications for borrowers who do not qualify for HAMP.

Given the HAMP's perceived importance, its effectiveness has been of great policy interest since its inception. However, little research assesses whether either HAMP or proprietary modifications are more successful in keeping borrowers in their homes. More generally, we know little about what features of a modification are associated with sustained home-ownership. Further, while prior research has shown that default rates vary considerably based on borrower, property, loan and servicer characteristics, we know little about whether these same characteristics predict which borrowers will default

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[1] Supplemental Directive 09-01 specified the following incentives:
For Servicers: one-time payments of $1,000 for each completed HAMP modification (plus $500 each if the borrower was current under the original mortgage loan); where modifications reduce monthly payments by 6% or more, annual payments of the lesser of (a) $1,000 or (b) one-half of the reduction of the borrower's annualized mortgage payment, for up to three years as long as the loan is in good standing;
For Borrowers: where modifications reduce monthly payments by 6% or more, annual payments of the lesser of (a) $1,000 or (b) one-half of the reduction of the borrower's annualized mortgage payment, for up to five years as long as borrowers remain current to pay down the principal on the mortgage;
For Investors: in addition to the cost-sharing scheme that appears above, one-time payments of $1,500 for each completed HAMP modification with a borrower who was current under the original mortgage loan.

on their loans after receiving a modification.

In this paper we use a unique dataset that combines data on loan, borrower, property, and neighborhood characteristics of modified mortgages on properties in New York City to examine the determinants of successful modifications, with an emphasis on the impact of HAMP on the post-modification loan performance. The dataset includes both HAMP modifications and proprietary modifications.

Our analysis advances the literature in two ways: 1) by controlling for underlying borrower, property, and neighborhood characteristics not available in other modification datasets, we can ensure that we are isolating the effects of the modification itself; and 2) by comparing HAMP and non-HAMP modifications, and controlling for the nature and magnitude of the terms of modifications, we can assess the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the HAMP program.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the HAMP program compared to proprietary modifications, and an overview of relevant literature. Section 3 presents the empirical model, section 4 describes the data, and section 5 discusses the results. The last section contains conclusions and policy implications.

2. Background and Literature Review

2.1 HAMP vs. Proprietary Modifications

By January 2011, about 2.5 million homeowners had applied for a modification under HAMP, and of those, about 60 percent, or about 1.5 million, had qualified for and begun a "trial period plan." About 740,000 of those had their temporary modifications

canceled for various reasons, another 145,000 were still in a temporary modification, and the remaining 600,000 had their temporary modifications converted to permanent modifications (although about 60,000 of those were subsequently cancelled) (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2011a).

Under HAMP guidelines, a borrower is eligible for a modification if the mortgaged property is a single family home (one to four units) that is the borrower's primary residence, the mortgage was originated on or before January 1, 2009, the first-lien mortgage payment is more than 31 percent of the borrower's gross monthly income (calculated using the borrower's front-end debt-to-income ratio[2]), and the mortgage's unpaid balance does not exceed $729,750[3] (GAO, 2011a). If an applicant is eligible for the HAMP modification, servicers must perform a Net Present Value (NPV) calculation, assessing whether expected cash flows from a modified loan would exceed those from the same loan with no modification, using specified assumptions.

If a borrower meets the eligibility requirements, and the NPV test is positive, HAMP requires participating servicers to adjust the monthly mortgage payment on the first lien mortgage to 31 percent of a borrower's total monthly income according to the following "waterfall":[4] first by reducing the interest rate to as low as two percent, then if necessary, extending the loan term to 40 years, and finally, if necessary, forbearing a portion of the principal until the loan is paid off and waiving interest on the deferred

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[2] The percentage of a borrower's gross monthly income required to pay the borrower's monthly housing expense: mortgage principal, interest, taxes, insurance, and if applicable, condominium, co-operative, or homeowners' association dues.

[3] Higher limits apply for two, three or four unit properties. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011a.

[4] Before beginning the waterfall, servicers must capitalize accrued interest and certain expenses paid to third parties and add this amount to the principal balance.

amount.[5] Servicers may write-down the principal amount at any stage of the waterfall.[6] The modified monthly payment is fixed for five years as long as the loan is not paid off and the borrower remains in good standing. After five years, the borrower's interest rate may increase by 1 percent a year, up to the Freddie Mac rate for 30-year fixed rate loans as of the date of the modification agreement (GAO, 2011a).

The decision to grant or deny an application for a HAMP modification is supposed to be made within 30 days of the servicer's receipt of the completed application, but counselors report that it actually takes four to seven months or more on average. (GAO, 2011b). Under HAMP, borrowers must complete a 90-day trial modification period – making all of the modified payments in full and on time – to be eligible for conversion to a permanent modification. Again, however, counselors report a different reality – with 96 percent saying that trials typically run for more than three months, and 50 percent reporting that trials typically lasted 7 months or more. The delays appear to be improving, however, and at the end of March 2011, the share of all active trials had been initiated at least 6 months earlier fell to about 19 percent (GAO, 2011b).

Prior to HAMP, servicers could offer a range of proprietary modifications using the same tools, but with no requirement that they following particular guidelines. After HAMP, servicers can offer modifications on terms other than those HAMP requires to borrowers who are not eligible for HAMP, borrowers for whom the NPV of a

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[5] The first loss – the difference between the existing mortgage payment and 38 percent of the borrower's monthly gross income -- is absorbed by the mortgage holders and investors. For non-GSE loans, TARP funds are then available to match the cost of reducing the payments to 31 percent of the borrower's monthly gross income. For GSE loans, matching funds are available from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011a.
[6] Later directives allowed a servicer to vary the waterfall if the servicer wrote down the principal balance in specified ways.

modification is not positive, or borrowers who fail the HAMP trial period (Karikari, 2011). Indeed, HAMP guidelines require servicers to consider all potentially HAMP-eligible borrowers for such other loss mitigation options as proprietary modifications, payment plans, and short sales prior to a foreclosure sale (GAO, 2011a). The GAO estimates that approximately 18 percent of borrowers with canceled HAMP trial modifications received permanent proprietary modifications, and an additional 23 percent had pending but not yet approved permanent modifications (GAO, 2011a).

2.1 Literature Review

The OCC (2011) has reported that redefault rates on modified loans were at 41 percent in the second quarter of 2011 (with redefault defined as 60 or more days delinquent one year after the modification), and other studies have reported even higher rates (40 to 50 percent in Adelino, Gerardi, & Willen, 2009, and 60 percent in Mason, 2007) in prior years.[7] To better understand those rates, existing studies have focused primarily on testing whether and how the different types of modifications affect the performance of modified loans, while controlling for a limited set of other factors. Quercia, Ding, and Ratcliffe (2009) examined the relationship between redefault rates and different types of loan modifications based on a sample of nonprime loans modified in 2008 and found that modifications that reduce the principal loan amount or lower mortgage payments by at least 5% lower the risk of re-default, while modifications that increase payments do not. Haughwout, Okah, and Tracy (2009), also used data on

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[7]Adelino, Gerardi, & Willen (2009) define re-default as a loan that is 60 or more days delinquent, in the foreclosure process, or REO within 6 months of the modification. Mason (2007) defines re-default as a default within 12 to 24 months of modification.

subprime modifications that preceded HAMP, and found that the re-default rate declines with the magnitude of the reduction in the monthly payment, and that the re-default rate declines relatively more when the payment reduction is achieved through principal forgiveness rather than lower interest rates.

Richard Brown, the Chief Economist for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation analyzed the redefault rates of modifications extended under the IndyMac modification program, and found that redefault was associated with higher levels of delinquency at the time of the modification, and with lower reductions in monthly payments (Brown, 2010).

The GAO examined the characteristics of the borrowers who had received trial or permanent HAMP modifications through September 2010, and assessed which characteristics were associated with cancellation of the trial modifications. It found that borrowers who qualified for a trial modification on the basis of stated, rather than documented income (a practice now forbidden under HAMP), borrowers who were in the trial modifications for less than four months, and borrowers who were 60 to 90 days delinquent at the time of the modification were more likely to have the trial cancelled. Those with high mark-to-market loan to value ratios, those who had received forgiveness of at least one percent of their principal balance, and those who had received larger monthly payment reductions were less likely to have their trials cancelled (GAO, 2011a). The GAO also found that redefault on permanent modifications for non-GSE loans was more likely for those borrowers with longer periods of delinquency at the time they were evaluated for a trial modification, those with lower credit scores, those who had received lower payment reductions, and borrowers with lower levels of debt before modification

(GAO, 2011a).

Similarly, Karikari (2011) found that about 21 percent of the borrowers who fail trial modifications under HAMP fail because they default, and borrowers are more likely to default in their trial if they were delinquent prior to the modification (rather than being current but in danger in imminent default). Finally, Agarwal *et al.* (2011), using a sample of prime and nonprime loans from an earlier release of the same database we use, find that larger payment or interest rate reductions are associated with lower redefault rates, while the capitalization of missed payments and fees is associated with higher redefault rates.

The research to date is incomplete, however, for several reasons. First, most of the studies rely on older data from the beginning of the wave of modifications that resulted from the current housing crisis, and follow the loan performance for short spans of time following modification. Therefore, they may be of limited generalizability to the current effectiveness of HAMP, an issue of great policy interest as policymakers decide whether to extend HAMP beyond its December 31, 2012 sunset date. Second, most of the research faces serious data limitations -- some studies infer modifications in the absence of direct data, for example, and most include a very limited set of controls and only cover nonprime loans. The GAO research laments the inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the HAMP data it used, and the significant gaps in the data about such borrower characteristics as race and ethnicity (GAO, 2011a). Last but not least, because of data limitations or methodological choices, most studies do not use hazard models, even though those models are most appropriate to assess how various factors affect the probability that a borrower will stay current after a modification. Our very rich data set

allows us to address these shortcomings in the existing research.

3. Empirical Model

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the factors that determine the performance of modified loans. The outcome of interest is whether a modified mortgage redefaults, where redefault is defined as being 60+ days past due. Specifically, our empirical strategy employs logit models in a hazard framework to explain how loan, borrower, property, servicer and neighborhood characteristics, along with differences in the types of modifications, affect the likelihood of redefault.

The data is organized in event history format, with each observation representing one month in which a modified loan remains current, to allow for time-varying covariates.[8] A loan drops out of the sample after it redefaults.[9] With the data structured in event history format, the logit has the same likelihood function as a discrete time proportional hazards model (Allison, 1995). In the logit framework, the probability that the loan i redefaults at time t conditional on the loan remaining current until then (i.e., the hazard of redefault) is given by:

$$P_{it} = \frac{e^{\beta X_{it}}}{1 + e^{\beta X_{it}}},$$

where X_{it} are the explanatory variables observed for loan i at time t (indexed by month in this paper), and β are the coefficients to be estimated. We include time since the

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[8] A loan is considered current if there are no delays in payments or the payment is only 30 days past due.
[9] In principle, a loan could also drop out of the sample by being paid off. This would occur if the loan is refinanced or the house is sold, and would require a competing risk hazard model, where the competing risks would be redefault and paid-off. However, only about 100 modified loans in our data were paid off and we eliminated these loans because it was not feasible to estimate a competing risk model with so few observations for one of the outcomes.

modification process was completed among the covariates to allow the hazard to be time-dependent. To control for city-, state-, or nation-wide macroeconomic factors, we include quarterly fixed effects. To control for systematic changes in mortgage lending over time, we include origination year fixed effects. To control for unobserved heterogeneity and possible dependence among observations for the same loan, we use a cluster-robust variance estimator that allows for clustering by loan.

The logit coefficient estimates are used to calculate the effects of the explanatory variables on the conditional probability of redefault, in the form of odds ratios. Additionally, coefficient estimates are used to compute the effects of the explanatory variables on the cumulative probability of redefault over a specified time period since modification. These latter effects are differences (for indicator variables) and derivatives (for continuous variables) of one minus the survivor function evaluated at the variable means for the specified time period.[10]

To gain a better understanding of the effects of various types of modifications on loan performance – an issue of heightened policy interest in the current economic environment – we estimate four regression specifications that differ by the modification features that they include. While all specifications include a HAMP indicator, the first one (M1) does not include any other modification features; the second one (M2) adds the change in monthly mortgage payment; the third one (M3) replaces the change in monthly mortgage payment with changes in individual loan terms including the change in loan balance, the change in interest rate, and a term extension indicator; and the last one (M4)

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[10] The cumulative probability of delinquency over a T-month period-at-risk is $1-S_i(T)$, where $S_i(T)$ is the survivor function over the T-month period. In the discrete time framework of our model, $S_i(T)= (1-P_{i1}) (1-P_{i2})\ldots(1-P_{iT})$.

includes both the change in monthly mortgage payment and the changes in individual

loan terms. Thus, the first regression captures a more inclusive effect of HAMP on loan

performance, but does not distinguish between effects that may be due to differences in

the magnitude of payment reductions and individual term changes between HAMP and

non-HAMP modifications, and effects that may be due to differences in program design.

Differences in program design may include, for example, HAMP-specific features such

as the specificity and order of the waterfall, the incentive payment to borrowers who

remain current on their payments after the modification for specified periods, and the

requirement that borrowers work with HUD-approved counselors to reduce their debt

below 55 percent (if post-modification back-end debt-to-income (DTI) is greater than or

equal to 55%).[11] While HAMP-specific eligibility criteria such as requirements that the

borrower be an owner-occupant and that the current unpaid loan balances be within

conforming loan limits also could be considered program design differences, our

regressions include specific controls for such features.[12] Other distinct features of HAMP,

such as the eligibility criterion that qualifies only borrowers who had a front-end DTI of

more than 31% at loan origination, and the requirements that this front-end DTI be

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[11] Another program design feature of HAMP, the requirement of a trial period prior to the borrower being granted a permanent modification, has been adopted by many servicers for their proprietary modification programs since the enactment of HAMP in 2009, and thus it is less likely to be responsible for any differences in redefault rates between HAMP and non-HAMP modifications in our data.

[12] Specifically, we include a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for owner-occupied properties and 0 otherwise, and the current unpaid loan balance in log terms. In preliminary work we also included additional indicators of HAMP eligibility such as property structure (1-4 family vs. multi-family) and a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan balance at modification time was below the HAMP limit; however, these variables had very low statistical significance, likely due to the lack of variation of our sample across these dimensions (e.g., 99% of the observations corresponded to 1-4 family properties and 98% of the observations had a loan balance below the HAMP limit), and thus were excluded from the final regressions. In addition, we experimented with a single indicator that captured the joint HAMP eligibility under the loan limit, owner occupancy, and property structure criteria. This indicator also had very low significance level and its inclusion left the results virtually unchanged. Results from these alternative specifications are available upon request from the authors.

reduced to 31% and that the resulting loan must pass an NPV test, tend to result in a larger reduction in monthly payment for those borrowers who receive a HAMP modification (by comparison, proprietary modifications may be granted to borrowers with original front-end ratios below 31%, but whose payment problems are due to excessive back-end debt, and may also often result in a front-end ratio greater than 31% in order to pass NPV).

The second, third, and fourth regressions help distinguish between the program design effects and those related instead to the magnitude of payment reductions and individual term changes. The last regression also tests whether changes in individual loan terms have an impact on loan performance beyond any effects that would occur through payment changes.

In additional specifications, we explore variation in the effects over time, and test whether the effects of modification features such as payment change, balance change, rate change, and term extension vary with the borrower's credit score (FICO) and loan to value (LTV) levels. Temporal variations in any performance differential between HAMP and non-HAMP modifications may occur as a result of changes in the structure of proprietary loan modifications (perhaps in part due to the advent of HAMP itself) as well as to changes in HAMP rules (e.g., such as those in Supplemental Directive 10-01 from June 2010 including new rules regarding documentation requirements and amendments to policies and procedures related to borrower outreach and communication).

To explore these temporal dynamics, we supplement model M1 with two variables that capture the pre- and post-HAMP enactment time trends, a post-HAMP enactment dummy variable, and an interaction between the HAMP indicator and the post-

HAMP enactment time trend.[13] The time trend and post-HAMP dummy variables describe the comparative loan performance of older and newer vintages of proprietary modifications, allowing for a direct comparison of the performance of the pre-HAMP and post-HAMP proprietary modifications. The HAMP indicator and its interaction with the post-HAMP trend capture temporal variations in the differential performance of HAMP modifications versus proprietary modifications granted in the post-HAMP period.

To test whether the effects of modification features vary with the FICO and LTV levels, we extend models M2 through M4 to include interactions between the relevant modification changes and indicators for the lowest FICO category (FICO less than 560) and for underwater borrowers (LTV greater than 100 percent), respectively.

4. Data Description

To investigate the determinants of the performance of modified loans, we analyze performance between January 2008 and November 2010 for all first lien mortgages in the OCC Mortgage Metrics database that were originated in New York City from 2004 to 2008, still active as of January 1, 2008, and received a permanent mortgage modification during the study period. OCC Mortgage Metrics provides loan-level data on loan characteristics and performance, including detailed information about loan modifications, for residential mortgages serviced by selected national banks and federal savings associations. The database includes loans serviced by 9 large mortgage servicers covering

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[13] The post-HAMP enactment period is assumed to start in September 2009 when the first permanent HAMP modifications were completed, according to our Mortgage Metrics data extract for New York City. Thus, the post-HAMP time trend is equal to 0 if the modification was completed prior to September 2009, is equal to 1 if the modification was completed in September 2009, is equal to 2 if the modification was completed in October 2009, etc. The pre-HAMP time trend is equal to 0 if the modification was completed in August 2009 or later, is equal to -1 if the modification was completed in July 2009, is equal to -2 if the modification was completed in June 2009, etc.

63 percent of all mortgages outstanding in the United States, and includes all types of mortgages serviced, including both prime and subprime mortgages (OCC, 2011).[14] Nationally, the loans in the OCC Mortgage Metrics dataset represent a large share of the overall mortgage industry, but they do not represent a statistically random sample of all mortgage loans. Only the largest servicers are included in the OCC Mortgage Metrics, and a large majority of the included servicers are national banks. The characteristics of these loans may differ from the overall population of mortgages in the United States. For example, subprime mortgages are underrepresented and conforming loans sold to the GSEs are overrepresented in the OCC Mortgage Metrics data (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2008).

An observation in the data set is a loan in a given month. Although we look at all loans originated between 2004 and 2008, monthly performance history for those loans is only available from January 2008 through November 2010. If a loan was originated in 2004 and went through foreclosure proceedings in 2007, therefore, we will never see that loan. Although OCC Mortgage Metrics provides detailed information on borrower characteristics, loan terms, payment history and modifications, it contains no information on borrower race or gender and provides little information about property or neighborhood characteristics. We therefore supplement the loan level data with information from multiple sources.

To match loan level information from the OCC Mortgage Metrics database to other sources, we relied on mortgage deeds contained within the New York City

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[14] The number of servicers in the OCC Mortgage Metrics has varied over time since the onset of the data collection in 2007, primarily due to mergers and acquisitions among the initial servicers that provided the data. As of 2011, the servicers in the OCC Mortgage Metrics include 8 national banks and one thrift with the largest mortgage-servicing portfolios among national banks and thrifts (OCC, 2011).

Department of Finance's Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS). Using a hierarchical matching algorithm, we were able to match 65 percent of the loans in the OCC Mortgage Metrics database back to the deeds records, which thus gave us the exact location of the mortgaged property.[15] This 65 percent sample is not significantly different from the full universe in terms of the loan and borrower characteristics that we use in the analyses below.

After we had a unique parcel identifier matched to each loan record, we were able to match on many other sources. First, we attach some additional borrower characteristics, including race and ethnicity, from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data.[16] Second, we merge information on whether the borrower received

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[15] Our procedure for matching OCC Mortgage Metrics to ACRIS is similar to the method used by Chan et al. (2010) to match LoanPerformance to ACRIS. Our data from ACRIS do not include Staten Island and thus we had to drop this borough from our analysis. We merged OCC Mortgage Metrics loans to ACRIS mortgage deeds using three common fields: origination or deed date, loan amount and zip code, using six stages of hierarchical matching. At the end of each stage, loans and deeds that uniquely matched each other were set aside and considered matched, while all other loans and deeds enter the next stage. Stage 1 matched loans and deeds on the raw values of date, loan amount and zip code. Stage 2 matched the remaining loans and deeds on the raw values of date and zip code, and the loan amount rounded to $1,000. Stage 3 matched on the raw values of date and zip code, and the loan amount rounded to $10,000. Stage 4 matched on the raw values of zip code and loan amount, and allowed dates to differ by up to 60 days. Stage 5 matched on the raw value of zip code, loan amount rounded to $1,000, and allowed dates to differ by up to 60 days. Stage 6 matched on the raw value of zip code, loan amount rounded to $10,000, and allowed dates to differ by up to 60 days. We believe it is valid to introduce a 60-day window because in ACRIS, there may be administrative lags in the recording of the deeds data. The chance of false positive matching is low because we are matching loans to the full universe of deed records, and only considering unique matches. The relatively low match rate of 65 percent is due to the fact that we were unable to match loans made on coop units in the OCC Mortgage Metrics data to ACRIS deeds because coop mortgages are recorded differently in ACRIS and do not list a loan amount. During our study period, 28 percent of residential property sales in the four boroughs studied were coops. Further, our match rate was lowest (44 percent) in Manhattan where 48 percent of sales during the study period were of coop units. This evidence suggests that had we been able to exclude coop loans from our original OCC Mortgage Metrics dataset prior to matching to ACRIS, our final match rate would have been much higher (around 90 percent).
[16] We merged HMDA records to ACRIS deeds based on date, loan amount and census tract, using the same six stage hierarchical matching technique as for the OCC Mortgage Metrics-ACRIS match. We then paired each of the OCC Mortgage Metrics records with HMDA records based on the unique deed identification number from ACRIS. In the end, we were able to match 73 percent of the OCC Mortgage Metrics-ACRIS matched loans (or 48 percent of all OCC Mortgage Metrics loans) to the HMDA records. While other researchers have matched loan level data (such as OCC Mortgage Metrics) directly to HMDA by using the

foreclosure prevention counseling or other assistance[17] from any of the non-profit

organizations coordinated by the Center for New York City Neighborhoods (CNYCN).[18]

Third, we merge in repeat sales house price indices the Furman Center for Real Estate

and Urban Policy compiles to track appreciation in 56 different community districts of

New York City.[19] Fourth, we link information on the demographic characteristics of

census tracts using the 2000 Census. Finally, we add the rate of mortgage foreclosure

notices (*lis pendens*) at the census tract level.[20]

When available, we matched data at the observation level to show information

about the specific property being studied. When observation level data was not available

(e.g., educational attainment) or was not appropriate (e.g., 6 month prior neighborhood *lis

pendens* rate) we used neighborhood level data instead. We define neighborhood as a

census tract, the smallest geographic level available, whenever possible. However, for

several variables – specifically, the unemployment rate and the rate of house price

appreciation – census tract data was not available, so we had to use community district

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zip code as a common geographic identifier, our matching strategy is likely more reliable as it uses a more precise common geographical identifier (census tract).

[17] HAMP requirements stipulate that borrowers obtain counseling if the monthly payments on their total debt are more than 55 percent of their gross monthly income. But borrowers may seek counseling voluntarily to help them navigate the modification process.   Counselors report that borrowers most commonly seek help because their servicer claims to have lost documents necessary for the modification application, they have been in a trial for more than the required 90 day period, they believe they were wrongly denied a HAMP modification, or they have had difficulty contacting their servicer. Government Accountability Office, 2011b.

[18] CNYCN is a non-profit organization, funded by grants from government, foundations, and financial institutions, to coordinate foreclosure counseling, education, and legal services from a variety of non-profit providers throughout New York City to homeowners and tenants at risk of losing their home to foreclosure. CNYCN directs borrowers who call 311 or CNYCN directly about problems with their mortgages to local foreclosure counseling or legal services. Each of the partner organizations then reports back to CNYCN on which borrowers received foreclosure prevention counseling or legal services. One of the co-authors serves on the Board of Directors for CNYCN.

[19] See Been et al. (2010) for a description. We transform quarterly indices into monthly series by linear interpolation.

[20] The *lis pendens* are from Furman Center's calculations based on data from Public Data Corporation. The rate is computed as the number of *lis pendens* per 1000 housing units recorded over the 6-month period preceding the month of loan performance.

level data.[21] To illustrate the relative size of each jurisdiction, Figure 1 shows census tract boundaries, community district boundaries and *lis pendens* filed in the four boroughs of New York City in 2009.[22]

Our data is limited to New York City, because it is just not possible to match data on modifications back to deeds records and other local data on a national scale. Differences among the states in foreclosure processes, the timing of the housing boom and bust, unemployment patterns, the availability of foreclosure counseling services, and other important variables will mean that the prevalence, timing and nature of modifications, and borrowers' performance under a modification, may differ somewhat across jurisdictions. Any national study would be likely to miss important variables on local conditions, and any local study will reflect idiosyncratic features of the local market. But our design compares the performance of HAMP modifications to the performance of proprietary modifications, and it is less likely that those differences will be affected by local conditions, because so many of the servicers are national in focus, and the HAMP requirements and design are uniform across jurisdictions.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the dataset used in the estimation, organized in six panels: A – delinquency rates; B – modification features; C – loan characteristics; D – borrower and property characteristics; E – neighborhood

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[21] Community districts are political units unique to New York City. Each of the 59 community districts has a Community Board that makes non-binding recommendations about applications for zoning changes and other land use proposals, and recommends budget priorities.

[22] For readability purposes, we do not show zip code boundaries in this map. We note however that the typical zip code size, both in terms of area and population, is larger than the typical census tract size but smaller than the typical community district size.

characteristics; and F – servicer characteristics. Panel A shows that nearly 30 percent of the modified loans in our data became seriously delinquent following modification. A more informative description of the performance of modified loans is provided by the Kaplan-Meyer survival graph in Figure 2A. The survival graph plots, over time since modification, the fraction of the modified loans that have "survived", in that they have not yet redefaulted. Given our definition of redefault as the payment becoming 60 days past due, the first month that a loan is "at risk" is in the second month after modification, and the origin of the survival plot in Figure 2A corresponds to the first month following modification. Notice that, starting in the second month after modification, there is a steady transition of loans into serious delinquency with the pace diminishing beyond the 15th month following modification. The survival rate one year after modification is just below 60 percent. Figure 2B shows sharp differences in survival rates between the loans that received HAMP modifications and those that received proprietary modifications. For example, the survival rate of HAMP loans one year after modification is over 30 percentage points higher than the survival rate of non-HAMP loans.

Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the types of the modifications in our sample. One third of the loans received HAMP modifications. The modification process resulted in payment reductions for most – but not all - loans. While over 80 percent of the modifications resulted in payment reductions, almost 7 percent resulted in payment increases and nearly 4 percent produced no payment change. On average, the mortgage payment was reduced by 28 percent. A majority of the modifications resulted in higher balances, while only about 10 percent resulted in lower balances and almost 15 percent produced no balance change. On average, the balance was increased by 2.6

percent. The prevalence of balance increases is not surprising given that capitalization –

the addition of arrearages to the loan balance – is a frequent component of the

modifications in our data, whereas principal write-down is very rarely used.[23] Over 75

percent of the modifications resulted in a decrease in interest rates, and the rate

reductions were substantial -- 2.8 percentage points, on average. Approximately 45

percent of the modifications included term extensions, however the actual size of the term

change was largely missing in our data and thus we could not use this information in our

analysis. Overall, these patterns suggest that servicers aim to make the loans more

affordable while minimizing losses in the underlying principal.

Panel C presents descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the loans in our

dataset. Our dataset covers a range of loan products. Of the 6,541 modified loans in our

dataset: there is a fairly even split between prime and non-prime loans;[24] 57 percent have

fixed interest rates while the remainder have adjustable rate mortgages; 14 percent were

interest only at origination and 79 percent are conventional mortgages. Our sample also

includes a mix of loans that were privately securitized, bought by the GSEs and held in

portfolio. This robust mix of loan products, uses and investors allows us to give a more

complete analysis than the existing literature because our conclusions are not limited to

only one loan type or group of loans.

The relative interest rate after modification for FRMs is calculated as the interest

rate minus the Freddie Mac average interest rate for prime 30-year fixed rate mortgages

during the first month after the modification was completed. For ARMs, it is the interest

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[23] Almost 90 percent of the modifications involved capitalization whereas only about 2 percent included principal write-down.
[24] Loans are categorized as prime or non-prime based on the credit grades defined by the servicers.

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rate minus the six-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) during the first month after the modification. In our sample, nearly 30 percent of the fixed rate loans have relative interest rates between 1 and 2 percentage points over the market index and over 50 percent of the adjustable rate loans have relative interest rates larger than 4 percentage points at origination.

The performance of the modified loans was poor prior the modification. The average loan was seriously delinquent in 37 to 45 percent (depending on origination year) of the months from the pre-modification period covered by Mortgage Metrics (i.e., starting from the beginning of 2008). Additionally, 78 percent of the loans were seriously delinquent at the time of modification and 17 percent of the loans had a *lis pendens* (notice of foreclosure) filed before being modified.

Because certain characteristics of the loans change over time, we construct loan-months for every month during our study period in which a loan was active, for a total of 42,380 loan-months. The last six descriptive statistics in Panel B are measured across all loan-months in our sample. Only a small proportion of the loan-months for ARMs (14 percent) involved a rate that had been reset before the month being studied.[25] The average current LTV for all of the loan-months in our sample was 107.7 percent.[26]

As Panel D shows, over 90 percent of the borrowers in our sample report that they are owner-occupiers.[27] We constructed borrower-months for those borrower level

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[25] Those rate resets do not include those due to a modification.
[26] LTV is based on the first lien only. We do not have data on outstanding balances, delinquencies or other outcomes for junior liens.
[27] To be eligible for a HAMP modification, the borrower is required to be an owner-occupier, but some proprietary modifications are extended to non-owner-occupiers.

variables that change over time. The current FICO score[28] has a mean of 597 across all borrower-months, and over 60 percent of borrower-months have FICO scores of 620 or less. On average, FICO scores of the borrowers in our sample declined by 88 points from origination to the month in which the loan was modified. Only 3.5 percent of the borrowers received foreclosure counseling at some point prior to being granted the loan modification.

Some of the characteristics of the neighborhoods in which the properties in our sample are located (shown in Panel E) are different from the neighborhood characteristics of the four boroughs of New York City included in our analysis. Specifically, the properties in our sample are: (1) more likely to be located in neighborhoods with high concentrations of non-Hispanic blacks; (2) less likely to be located in neighborhoods with high concentrations of Hispanics; and (3) more likely to be in neighborhoods with median incomes between $40,000 and $60,000 and less likely to be in neighborhoods with median incomes less than $40,000 or more than $60,000.

Panel E also reveals some interesting neighborhood shifts from the time of modification to the loan month studied. In particular, in the neighborhoods where the loans in our sample are located, house prices decreased, on average, by 6 percent between the month the modification process was completed and the loan month being studied.

Our model also includes servicer fixed effects. Panel F shows the range of FICO scores and LTV ratios at the time of loan origination for the modified loans in our sample

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[28] The current FICO score is based on periodically updated information provided by the servicers. The score is typically updated quarterly however the frequency of updates may vary across servicers and even for the same servicer.

across the 9 servicers that serviced them. Average FICO scores range from 644 to 695.

LTVs range from .731 to .794.

One of the main goals of our study is to evaluate the impact of HAMP, among

other modification features, on the post-modification loan performance. To alleviate

concerns that any estimated differences in redefault rates between loans modified through

HAMP and loans that received non-HAMP modifications may be due to unobserved

differences in the quality of loans that received different types of modifications, our

models include a comprehensive set of borrower, loan, and neighborhood characteristics,

as detailed above. Additionally, we also note that the vast majority of the loans in our

sample satisfy the basic HAMP eligibility criteria with respect to loan limit, owner-

occupancy, and property structure.[29] Nonetheless, it is reassuring to note that differences

in many observed characteristics between the HAMP and non-HAMP loan samples do

not indicate that one set of loans is clearly "better" than the other. As Table 2 shows,

while HAMP is associated with significantly more advantageous changes in loan terms,[30]

the loan, borrower, and neighborhood characteristics of the two loan samples are, in

general, fairly similar. For example, the average FICO score and LTV, both at the time of

origination and at the time of modification, are very similar. The two pools of loans also

appear to have had similar performance prior to modification, as measured by the

percentage of months the loans were seriously delinquent before modification[31] and by

whether there were any *lis pendens* filed before modification. Loan products differ

somewhat along several dimensions, however these differences do not consistently

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[29] See above for specific requirements.

[30] The significantly larger payment reduction for HAMP is not surprising given the DTI-related requirements of HAMP described above.

[31] This measure was very similar between the two samples for the loans originated

suggest that one set of loans would be expected to perform better over time. For example, 56 percent of the non-HAMP loans are subprime whereas only 45 percent of the HAMP loans are subprime but, on the other hand, the share of FRMs is larger in the non-HAMP sample (60 percent) than in the HAMP sample (50 percent). Similarly, the relative interest rate at origination for FRMs is lower whereas that for ARMs is higher in the HAMP set. Moreover, and more importantly perhaps, the proportions of loans with very risky characteristics such as interest only and low or no documentation are very similar in the two samples. Finally, comparing the neighborhood characteristics for the two sets of loans, the only differences occur in terms of unemployment rate at modification and house price appreciation between origination and modification, with the HAMP loans faring somewhat worse along both dimensions.[32]

5. Results

Table 3 presents, in the first four columns, odds ratio estimates -- i.e., the impacts explanatory variables have on the conditional odds of redefault at a given point in time (conditional on the loan being current until that time) -- for the four logit regressions described in Section 3. The table also shows, in the last four columns, estimates of the impact of selected explanatory variables – those with statistically significant effects on the conditional odds of redefault – on the predicted probability that the average modified loan becomes seriously delinquent over the 12 months following the modification. Below, we review in detail the results for these regressions.

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[32] However, neighborhood differences, in general, should be of little concern with respect to endogeneity biases in the HAMP effect estimate given that neighborhood conditions turn out to have little influence on post-modification loan performance, as shown below.

5.1 Effects of Variables on the Conditional Odds of Redefault

Modification Features. The first set of rows in Table 3 show the impacts modification features have on loan performance. These effects are, in general, highly statistically significant and economically important. In all specifications, HAMP is associated with sizable reductions in the odds of redefault. The overall HAMP effect from the first regression is a 49 percent reduction in the odds of redefault. Controlling for changes in mortgage terms dampens that effect somewhat. This is not surprising given that HAMP is associated with more advantageous changes in loan terms (as Table 2 shows). Nonetheless, the improvement in loan performance remains significant (a 29 to 35 percent reduction in the redefault odds, depending on the specification), even after controlling for these changes. Thus, the program design may play a significant role in how the loan fares after modification.

Modifications that result in larger payment reductions make the loan less likely to redefault; a 1 percentage point increase in the payment reduction is associated with a 1.6 percent decline in the odds of redefault, as shown in model M2. Looking at the effects of the individual term changes in model M3, a larger balance decrease (or a smaller balance increase) makes redefault less likely; if the balance reduction grows by 1 percentage point, the odds of redefault decrease by 1.6 percent. The larger the interest rate reduction, the smaller the odds of redefault; a 1 percentage point increase in the rate reduction is associated with a10 percent decline in the redefault odds. If the modification includes a term extension, the odds of redefault are almost 18 percent lower than if a term extension is not granted. Interestingly, some of the effects of interest rate and balance reductions

still remain, while the effect of a term extension disappears after controlling for the size of the payment reduction (see model M4). While the persistence of the balance change effect is not very surprising given that this modification also reduces the principal burden (in addition to reducing the monthly payment), the reason the effect of a rate change persists is less clear and deserves further investigation.

Loan characteristics. Loans that the servicer defines as non-prime at origination were more likely to redefault than prime loans. Conventional mortgages with private mortgage insurance (PMI) were less likely to redefault than government and conventional mortgages without PMI, however the differences diminish after controlling for the payment reduction from modification. While previous research (Been, Weselcouch, Voicu, and Murff, 2011) found that securitized loans guaranteed by the GSEs were more likely than all other loans to be modified, we find that the modified GSE loans are more likely to redefault than all other loans.

We next focus on the pricing of loans after modification. Both for FRMs and ARMs, loans with interest rates after modification that are much higher than the market index (more than 3 points higher for FRMs and more than 4 points higher for ARMs) are significantly more likely to become seriously delinquent after modification. Consistent with other research (Chan, et al., 2010), if we interpret the loan pricing terms to reflect *ex ante* risk pricing by lenders, these effects could be picking up some borrower risk that is not reflected in the specific risk controls we include in our model.

We find that the loan performance post modification is affected by the performance prior to modification as measured by the percent of the months from the pre-modification period that the loan was seriously delinquent. Specifically, if that measure

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of pre-modification performance increases by 1 percentage point, the odds of redefault after modification increase by 0.6 to 1.8 percent, depending on year of origination and regression specification.

Similarly, early intervention matters. Most of our models indicate that modifying loan terms while the borrower is still current or 60DPD makes redefault less likely compared to modifications that are granted while the borrower is 90+DPD.

The post modification loan performance does not differ significantly by current LTV levels, however, the higher the dollar value of the current outstanding balance, the higher the likelihood of redefault. A 1 percent increase in loan balance is associated with a 1.2 percent increase in the odds of redefault. This effect suggests that the loan limit associated with HAMP is a desirable feature.

The impact of time elapsed since modification is associated with an increased likelihood of delinquency. The impact of time elapsed since modification can be thought of as baseline odds. All other variables are interpreted as proportional shifts up or down from the baseline odds.

Finally, we find differences in the performance of loans modified by different servicers. We do not have enough servicer-specific information, however, to further explore the reasons for these differences. Future research incorporating detailed servicer characteristics may be warranted to better understand these differences."

Borrower characteristics. FICO score is the only borrower characteristic that matters for loan performance. Specifically, borrowers with higher current FICO scores were less likely to redefault, and the differences in loan performance across the various credit score brackets are large. For example, a borrower in the highest bracket

(FICO>=720) has almost 83 percent lower odds of redefaulting, and one in the middle

bracket (650<=FICO<680) has almost 60 percent lower odds of redefaulting relative to a

borrower in the lowest bracket (FICO<560). The lack of a significant effect on the

owner-occupancy variable suggests that the HAMP's exclusive focus on owner-

occupants may not be warranted from an efficiency perspective. The insignificance of the

foreclosure counseling variable suggests that counseling is resulting in modifications that

are no more or less successful than average, even though prior work shows that

counseling increases the likelihood that a borrower will receive a modification (Been,

Weselcouch, Voicu and Murff, 2011). The borrower's race or ethnicity is not

significantly correlated with the odds of redefault.

       Neighborhood characteristics. Table 3 also explores whether socio-economic

characteristics of the neighborhood affect the post-modification loan performance.

Interestingly, we find little evidence of any neighborhood effects. The lack of any

significant effect of house price depreciation or lis pendens rate is puzzling, because

Chan et al. (2011) show that those factors are important for default, and one would reason

that they would be similarly likely to affect redefault. Our result might be an indicator

that once a family has received a modification, they are not being influenced by the

neighborhood property values because the payment reduction is good enough to allow

them to live in the house at the equivalent of market rents (so that it does not matter if the

house value falls).

**5.2 Effects of Variables on the Probability of Redefault over 12 Months
  since Modification**

Modification Features. HAMP has a strong effect on the predicted 12-month probability of redefault. The overall effect is a 14 percentage-point reduction in that probability, whereas the residual effect after controlling for changes in mortgage terms varies between a 7.3 and 9 percentage point reduction. The other modification features in our models have, with one exception, relatively small, albeit statistically significant, impacts. A 10 percentage-point increase in the monthly payment reduction reduces the predicted probability of redefault over the first year post modification by 0.3 - 0.4 percentage points. If the balance reduction grows by 10 percentage points, the predicted redefault probability decreases by 0.3 - 0.4 percentage points, whereas a 1 percentage point increase in the rate reduction is associated with a 0.12 – 0.28 percentage point decline in that probability (with the smaller effects occurring in the regression that controls for payment changes). The one exception is the relatively large impact of a term extension -- if the modification includes a term extension, the probability of redefault is 4.4 percentage points lower than in the absence of that feature. However, this effect disappears when we control for the monthly mortgage payment change.

Loan Characteristics. The 12-month probability of redefault for non-prime loans is 3.4 to 3.7 percentage points higher than that for prime loans. Probability of redefault for GSE loans is 6.7 to 6.9 percentage points higher than that for loans held by private investors. Loans with interest rates after modification that are much higher than the market index have a probability of redefault which is 10 to 14 percent higher than that for loans with below market rates.

If the percentage of the months that the loan was seriously delinquent in the pre-modification period increases by 10 percentage points, the redefault probability over the

first year post modification increases by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points. A 1 percent

increase in the outstanding loan balance is associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase

in the likelihood of redefault.

Borrower characteristics. The current FICO score has a strong effect on the

cumulative probability of redefault. For example, the 12-month redefault probability for a

borrower with FICO greater than 720 is almost 34 percentage points lower than that of a

borrower with FICO less than 560.

Figure 3 graphs the effects of the dummy variables described above on the

predicted survival probability as a function of time since modification. The graphs are

based on the estimates from the regression model M2. Since survival probability over a

given time period is 1 – probability of delinquency over that period, the graphed effects

are the negative of the effects on the cumulative probability of redefault. Notice that the

magnitudes of all effects increase with the time since modification.

5.3 Do HAMP Effects Vary over Time?

The results in Table 4 offer insights about the temporal dynamics of the

comparative performance of HAMP and non-HAMP modifications. Notice first that the

odds ratios for the pre- and post-HAMP time trend variables are statistically significant,

smaller than 1, and very similar in magnitude[33], whereas the odds ratio for the post-

HAMP indicator is not statistically significant. These results indicate that newer

proprietary modifications are associated with lower conditional odds of redefault, and this

improvement appears unrelated to the advent of HAMP. Second, we find that HAMP

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[33] In addition, the difference in odds ratios is not statistically significant.

modifications result in significantly lower odds of redefault relative to the proprietary modifications from the post-HAMP period.[34] The newer HAMP modifications result in performance improvements relative to older ones similar to those in the non-HAMP sector, which leaves the HAMP versus non-HAMP differential relatively constant over time.[35]

5.4 Do Effects of Modification Features Vary with FICO and LTV?

In alternative specifications, shown in Table 5, we took steps to test whether the effects of modification features such as payment change, balance change, rate change, and term extension vary with the FICO and LTV levels. We find that the balance change effects discussed in the previous section only occur for the borrowers with negative equity. This suggests that principal write-downs may be more effective in preventing redefault if targeted to underwater borrowers. We also find that a reduction in interest rate may be less effective in improving loan performance for the borrowers with the lowest credit scores than for the more creditworthy borrowers, controlling for changes in monthly payment. Finally, we find no evidence that the effects of payment changes and term extensions on the loan's post modification performance vary with FICO and LTV.

6. Conclusion and Policy Implications

Our results demonstrate that borrowers who receive HAMP modifications have been considerably more successful in staying current than those receiving non-HAMP

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[34] Almost 60 percent lower as indicated by the odds ratio for the HAMP indicator.
[35] As indicated by the statistically insignificant odds ratio for the Post-HAMP Time Trend X HAMP interaction term.

modifications. HAMP modifications have resulted, on average, in modifications that are on terms substantially more favorable to the borrower than other modifications, and not surprisingly, when mortgages are made more affordable to the borrower, the borrower performs better. But our results also show that successful modifications are not simply a matter of bringing the cost of the mortgage down to an affordable level. Overall, getting a HAMP modification improves the conditional odds that the borrower will not redefault by about 49 percent, but more than half of that effect remains after controlling for the terms of the modification, which suggests that the design or implementation of the HAMP program is promoting more successful modifications than the design or implementation of the proprietary modification programs. Proprietary modification programs accordingly would be well advised to experiment with adopting features of HAMP's design or implementation.

This research is unable to isolate precisely which HAMP features are reducing the likelihood of redefault. One possibility is that HAMP is so difficult to use that the borrowers who survive the process of application are different in determination, organizational effectiveness or other characteristics, which in turn affects their propensity to redefault. The HAMP eligibility criteria and daunting application process are weeding out the borrowers least likely to succeed, in other words.[36] While no program should adopt unnecessary application hurdles, both proprietary programs and HAMP policymakers may want to experiment with different forms of trial periods, training or assistance to help borrowers become better organized or more effective in financial

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[36] The Government Accountability Office surveyed counselors about their client's experience with the HAMP application process, and found that 76 percent of the counselors responding rated their client's experience in the HAMP application process as negative or very negative, largely because of lost documentation and the length of the decision-making process.

management, or other efforts to help borrowers develop skills, attitudes or habits that may improve their chances of successful homeownership.

Another (related) possibility is that proprietary modifications are misguided in offering greater flexibility. Servicers claim that their proprietary modifications have "fewer documentation requirements, fewer eligibility requirements, and more flexibility around the DTI threshold" (GAO, 2011a). It may be that those more flexible criteria result in inefficient modifications. Servicers and policymakers should be cautious about adopting stricter eligibility requirements or processes, however, because those requirements may improve success at the cost of denying many modifications that would be cost-effective.

It could also be that the specificity and order of the waterfall protocol, or other specific features of the modification process itself help to explain the relative success of HAMP modifications. Again, experimentation and further analysis of the success of modifications under programs with different features is required.

Our findings also may hold lessons for the design of the net present value model. Both HAMP and non-HAMP modifications may need to recalibrate their assessments of when modifications are likely to result in a higher return than foreclosure or denial of the modification, given the findings that relatively small changes in modification terms can have a small but significant effect on the probability of redefault. A 1 percentage point increase in the payment reduction is associated with a 1.6 percent decline in the conditional odds of redefault, for example. Accordingly, for the average borrower in our sample, whose monthly payment is $2,562 and who received a $723 monthly payment reduction, an additional 1 percentage point payment reduction of $26 would lower their

conditional odds of redefault by 1.6 percent. Similarly, although few modifications are resulting in principal reductions, increasing the balance reduction by 1 percentage point reduces the conditional odds of redefault by 1.6 percent. For the average borrower in our sample with an outstanding balance of $400,739 each reduction of $4,007 accordingly would lower the conditional odds of redefault by 1.6 percent. Of course, the benefit of a balance reduction should be weighed against the negative impact the reduction would have on the net present value of the modified loan, to evaluate the resulting net return to the investor.

Our analysis of the temporal dynamics of the performance of HAMP and non-HAMP modifications reveals some encouraging trends. While the performance differential between the HAMP and non-HAMP modifications seems relatively steady across modification vintages, the more recent vintages – both in the HAMP and the non-HAMP sector – are associated with improved loan performance relative to the earlier ones.

Our results also suggest the borrowers with whom servicers and counselors should be especially careful to review the costs and benefits of a modification over the long run: low credit score borrowers with high balance subprime loans, guaranteed by the GSEs, originated at rates substantially higher than market, and with many months of delinquency have particular difficulties carrying even modified loans. Our results also suggest that for borrowers with the lowest credit scores, interest rate reductions may be less effective than for other borrowers.

Interestingly, the determinants of which borrowers are getting modifications identified in Been, Weselcouch, Voicu and Murff (2011) – subprime, high LTV, ARM,

low FICO borrowers in less rapidly depreciating neighborhoods – do not turn out to be the determinants of which modifications succeed. The factors that are associated with a greater propensity to modify loans may reflect the servicer's attempt to prevent strategic default, or may reveal the servicer's belief that those homes will command so little on the market that they are not worth foreclosing on. More attention to the factors that predict the success of modified loans in the decision making process that determines who gets modifications, however, may help increase the efficiency of loan default resolutions.

While many observers are seriously disappointed with the failure of the HAMP program to modify more of the millions of mortgages in default, our results reveal that those modifications that have been made under the HAMP program have performed well, relative to other modifications. The real test of the success of modification programs, however, is whether the modifications helped borrowers achieve better outcomes than they would have achieved without the modification, at a reasonable cost. Little public information is available about what happens to borrowers who applied for, but were denied modifications, or who were denied permanent modifications after a trial period. However, the Department of Treasury has recently announced plans to make information about which borrowers applied for modifications available to some researchers, and that data should allow a broader assessment of the cost-effectiveness of both HAMP and proprietary modifications.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

A. Outcomes of Modified Loans

Outcome	% of all loans
Remains Current	70.7
Becomes 60+Days Delinquent	29.3

B. Modification Features

Variable	Mean	% of Loans with:[1] Reduction	Increase	No Change
HAMP	0.330			
Monthly Mortgage Payment Change (pre ─ post mod, as % of pre mod)	28.215	81.3	6.7	3.8
(missing payment change indicator)	0.083			
Principal Balance Change (pre ─ post mod, as % of pre mod)	-2.623	9.6	71.8	14.8
(missing balance change indicator)	0.038			
Interest Rate Change (pre ─ post mod, in percentage points)	2.807	75.1	2.8	11.2
(missing rate change indicator)	0.109			
Term Extension (Yes=1; No=0)	0.449			
(missing term extension indicator)	0.026			
Number of Loans	6,541			

C. Loan Characteristics

Variable	Mean
Credit Class	
Prime	0.449
Non-Prime	0.526
(missing credit class indicator)	0.025
Product Description	
FRM	0.568
ARM 2/28	0.020
ARM 3/27	0.015
ARM (other)	0.261
Other	0.135
Interest Only at Origination	0.142
(missing interest only indicator)	0.009
Full Documentation	0.409
(missing full documentation indicator)	0.001
Product Group	
Government (FHA, VA)	0.079
Conventional with PMI	0.115
Conventional	0.789
Other	0.017
Relative Interest Rate after Modification (FRMs):[3]	
<0	0.210
0-1	0.157
1-2	0.295
2-3	0.197
>3	0.111
(missing interest rate indicator)	0.030

Relative Interest Rate after Modification (ARMs):[2]		
	<0	0.345
	0-2	0.036
	2-4	0.077
	>4	0.517
	(missing interest rate indicator)	0.024
Investor Type		
	Private Investor	0.364
	GSE	0.433
	Held in Portfolio	0.173
	(missing investor type indicator)	0.030
% Months the Loan was 60+ DPD before Modification X Origination Year[5]		
	X 2004	45.352
	X 2005	39.107
	X 2006	39.929
	X 2007	39.956
	X 2008	36.912
Lis Pendens Filed before Modification		0.171
Number of Months Post-Adjustment (ARMs):[2]		
	before 1st adjust or no adjust	0.863
	0-3	0.016
	4-6	0.015
	>6	0.106
Current LTV[4]	Mean	1.077
	<80%	0.173
	80-100%	0.229
	100-120%	0.270
	>120%	0.319
	(missing LTV indicator)	0.010
log (Current Unpaid Balance)		12.855
Loan Age (months)		44.227
Time since Modification (months)		6.685
Number of Loans		6,541
Number of Loan-Months		42,380

D. Borrower and Property Characteristics

Variable		Mean
Owner Occupier		0.913
Borrower Race/Ethnicity		
	Non-Hispanic Black	0.281
	Non-Hispanic Asian	0.085
	Non-Hispanic Other	0.012
	Non-Hispanic White	0.152
	Hispanic	0.147
	(missing race/ethnicity indicator)	0.323
Received Foreclosure Counseling before Modification		0.035
FICO Score Decline between Origination and Modification[4]		87.760
	(missing FICO score decline indicator)	0.067

Current FICO Score[4]	Mean	597.009
	<560	0.364
	560-620	0.248
	620-650	0.112
	650-680	0.082
	680-720	0.085
	>=720	0.087
	(missing FICO score indicator)	0.022
Number of Loans		6,541
Number of Loan-Months		42,380

E. Neighborhood Characteristics

		Estimation Sample	NYC (4 boroughs)
Variable		Mean	Mean
Neighborhood Racial Composition			
% Non-Hispanic Black			
	<20%	0.377	0.584
	20-40%	0.092	0.117
	40-60%	0.083	0.085
	60-80%	0.143	0.089
	>80%	0.305	0.125
% Hispanic			
	<20%	0.631	0.551
	20-40%	0.201	0.203
	>40%	0.168	0.246
% Non-Hispanic Asian			
	<20%	0.884	0.840
	20-40%	0.102	0.124
	>40%	0.014	0.036
Other Neighborhood Characteristics			
% Foreign Born			
	<20%	0.132	0.181
	20-40%	0.459	0.414
	40-60%	0.339	0.307
	>60%	0.069	0.098
Median Household Income (1999)			
	<$20,000	0.049	0.121
	$20,000-40,000	0.360	0.435
	$40,000-60,000	0.495	0.312
	>$60,000	0.096	0.132
Origination Year			
	2004	0.077	
	2005	0.173	
	2006	0.324	
	2007	0.308	
	2008	0.118	
Borough			
	Manhattan	0.018	
	Bronx	0.153	

	Brooklyn	0.287
	Queens	0.542
Quarter of Loan Performance		
	2008 - 1	0.001
	2008 - 2	0.009
	2008 - 3	0.011
	2008 - 4	0.018
	2009 - 1	0.024
	2009 - 2	0.043
	2009 - 3	0.065
	2009 - 4	0.080
	2010 - 1	0.102
	2010 - 2	0.171
	2010 - 3	0.262
	2010 - 4	0.214
Unemployment Rate (%)		10.079
Recent Foreclosure Rate		
	<1%	0.266
	1-2%	0.315
	2-3%	0.242
	>3%	0.177
HP Appreciation (%)		-5.854
Number of Loans		6,541
Number of Loan-Months		42,380

F. Servicer Characteristics: Mean FICO and LTV at Origination[4]

Servicer	FICO	LTV
1	643.7	0.794
2	651.4	0.775
3	662.4	0.753
4	695.2	0.774
5	667.4	0.782
6	649.8	0.731
7	685.2	0.754
8	675.3	0.770
9	652.1	0.770

Notes

Statistics based on the loan-month-level sample are represented with gray shading. The other statistics are based on the loan-level sample.

1) The percentages in the rows of this panel do not add up to 100 due to the exclusion of missing values; the share of loans with missing values for the given feature is indicated by the mean of the corresponding missing value indicator in the Mean column.

2) The means are computed using only the ARMs.

3) The means are computed using only the FRMs.

4) The mean is computed using only non-missing values.

5) The mean is computed using only the loans originated in the relevant year.

Table 2. Characteristics of HAMP and Non-HAMP Loans

Variable	HAMP Mean	Non-HAMP Mean
Modification Features		
Monthly Mortgage Payment Change (pre ─ post mod, as % of pre mod)	42.587	20.177
Principal Balance Change (pre ─ post mod, as % of pre mod)	0.520	-4.262
Interest Rate Change (pre ─ post mod, in percentage points)	4.171	2.023
Term Extension (Yes=1; No=0)	0.558	0.395
Loan Characteristics		
Credit Class[1]		
Prime	0.543	0.402
Non-Prime	0.446	0.558
Product Description		
FRM	0.500	0.604
ARM 2/28	0.004	0.028
ARM 3/27	0.003	0.023
ARM (other)	0.318	0.229
Other	0.174	0.116
Interest Only at Origination	0.119	0.133
Full Documentation	0.435	0.392
Relative Interest Rate at Origination (%) (FRMs):[2]	-0.022	0.159
Relative Interest Rate at Origination (%) (ARMs):[3]	1.738	1.558
% months the loan was 60+ DPD before modification X origination year[4]		
X 2004	39.669	46.790
X 2005	44.695	37.495
X 2006	42.375	38.915
X 2007	40.159	39.803
X 2008	35.168	38.124
Lis Pendens Filed before Modification	0.160	0.176
LTV at Origination	0.766	0.769
LTV at Modification	1.075	1.029
Borrower Characteristics		
FICO Score at Origination	678.598	657.938
FICO Score at Modification	576.217	577.481
Neighborhood Characteristics		
Median Household Income (1999)		
<$20,000	0.035	0.057
$20,000-40,000	0.341	0.369
$40,000-60,000	0.524	0.481

	>$60,000	0.100	0.093
Borough			
	Manhattan	0.005	0.025
	Bronx	0.137	0.160
	Brooklyn	0.260	0.300
	Queens	0.598	0.514
Unemployment Rate at Modification (%)		10.574	9.239
Recent Foreclosure Rate before Modification (%)		1.917	1.906
HP Appreciation between Origination and Modification (%)		-28.645	-19.965
Number of Loans		2156	4385

Notes

Means are computed using only non-missing values.

1) Shares do not add up to 1 because of the exclusion of share of loans with missing credit class.

2) The means are computed using only the FRMs.

3) The means are computed using only the ARMs.

4) The mean is computed using only the loans originated in the relevant year.

Table 3. Baseline Models

Variable	Effects on hazard of re-default (odds ratios)				Effects on probability of re-default over 12 months since modification (%) (selected variables)			
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Modification Features								
HAMP	0.523***	0.664***	0.690***	0.728***	-13.57 ***	-8.64 ***	-7.97 ***	-6.77 ***
Monthly Mortgage Payment Change (pre— post mod, as % of pre mod)		0.984***		0.988***		-0.04 ***		-0.03 ***
(missing payment change indicator)		1.103		1.030				
Principal Balance Change (pre— post mod, as % of pre mod)			0.982***	0.987**			-0.05 ***	-0.03 **
(missing balance change indicator)			1.254*	1.218				
Interest Rate Change (pre— post mod, in percentage points)			0.901***	0.950***			-0.27 ***	-0.13 ***
(missing rate change indicator)			0.829**	0.896				
Term Extension (Yes=1, No=0)			0.822***	0.909			-4.41 ***	-2.13
(missing term extension indicator)			1.030	1.048				
Loan Characteristics								
Credit Class Non-Prime	1.177**	1.193**	1.164**	1.180**	3.67 **	3.85 **	3.36 **	3.60 **
(missing credit class indicator)	3.036***	3.140***	3.043***	3.095***				
Product Description [REF: FRM]								
ARM 2/28	0.988	1.038	1.040	1.052				
ARM 3/27	0.819	0.843	0.864	0.860				
ARM (other)	0.766*	0.862	0.859	0.891				
Other	0.876	0.908	0.924	0.924				
Interest Only at Origination	0.911	0.950	0.946	0.969				
(missing interest only indicator)	0.708	0.702	0.588*	0.644				
Full Documentation	1.096	1.092	1.092	1.090				
(missing full documentation indicator)	1.916	1.840	1.853	1.806				
Product Group [REF: Conventional]								
Government (FHA, VA)	1.132	1.094	1.132	1.105				
Conventional with PMI	0.798**	0.856*	0.830**	0.861	-4.91 **		-4.01 **	
Other	1.121	1.107	1.133	1.118				
Relative Interest Rate after Modification (FRMs) [REF: <0]								
0-1	1.370***	1.122	1.196	1.104	7.18 ***			
1-2	1.398***	1.143	1.206	1.111	7.71 ***			
2-3	1.379***	1.149	1.225*	1.124	7.35 ***			
>3	1.635***	1.562***	1.542***	1.524***	11.88 ***	10.84 ***	10.41 ***	10.16 ***
(missing interest rate indicator)	0.781*	0.795*	0.826	0.820				

Relative Interest Rate after Modification (ARMs) [REF: <0]								
0-2	0.797	0.736	0.723	0.716				
2-4	1.478**	1.228	1.306	1.207	8.55**			
>4	1.811***	1.569***	1.582***	1.512***	13.91***	10.54***	10.70***	9.63***
(missing interest rate indicator)	0.744	0.810	0.765	0.812				
Number of Months Post-Adjustment (ARMs) [REF: <0]								
0-3	0.883	0.861	0.891	0.867				
4-6	1.149	1.126	1.150	1.119				
>6	0.879	0.877	0.887	0.870				
Investor Type [REF: Private Investor]								
GSE	1.217**	1.230***	1.239**	1.229**	4.58**	4.72***	4.90**	4.67**
Held in Portfolio	1.113	1.074	1.155	1.100	4.67**			
(missing investor type indicator)	1.031	1.051	1.004	1.034				
% Months the Loan was 60+ DPD before Modification X Origination Year								
X 2004	1.011***	1.011***	1.011***	1.011***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
X 2005	1.011***	1.010***	1.010***	1.010***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
X 2006	1.008***	1.008***	1.008***	1.007***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
X 2007	1.011***	1.011***	1.010***	1.011***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
X 2008	1.018***	1.017***	1.018***	1.017***	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***
Lis Pendens Filed before Modification	1.057	1.039	1.053	1.034				
Current LTV [REF: <80%]								
80-100%	1.053	1.045	1.040	1.041				
100-120%	1.035	1.022	0.992	1.002				
>120%	1.114	1.108	1.056	1.071				
(missing LTV indicator)	4.678***	4.507***	4.507***	4.442***				
log (Current Unpaid Balance)	1.213**	1.223**	1.213**	1.214**	0.54**	0.51**	0.51**	0.49**
Loan Age	0.994	0.991	0.990	0.990				
Time since Modification	1.053***	1.038***	1.046***	1.039***				
Borrower and Property Characteristics								
Owner Occupier	0.910	0.913	0.905	0.909				
Current FICO Score [REF: <560]								
560-620	0.620***	0.613***	0.620***	0.616***	-13.49***	-13.57***	-13.35***	-13.40***
620-650	0.429***	0.423***	0.429***	0.425***	-21.59***	-21.51***	-21.31***	-21.30***
650-680	0.421***	0.408***	0.420***	0.411***	-21.94***	-22.20***	-21.74***	-21.91***
680-720	0.212***	0.204***	0.212***	0.207***	-32.06***	-31.87***	-31.60***	-31.53***
>=720	0.172***	0.164***	0.166***	0.165***	-34.15***	-33.94***	-33.99***	-33.63***
(missing FICO score)	0.555***	0.566***	0.553***	0.562***				
FICO Score Decline between Origination and Modification	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000				
(missing FICO score decline indicator)	0.929	0.924	0.935	0.929				

Borrower Race/Ethnicity [REF: Non-Hispanic White]				
Non-Hispanic Black	1.107	1.097	1.107	1.100
Non-Hispanic Asian	0.885	0.919	0.906	0.924
Non-Hispanic Other	0.732	0.718	0.720	0.716
Hispanic	1.030	1.019	1.034	1.027
(missing race/ethnicity)	1.110	1.101	1.111	1.108
Received Foreclosure Counseling before Modification	0.981	0.983	0.989	0.985
Neighborhood Characteristics				
House Price Appreciation (%)	1.266	1.310	1.274	1.293
Recent Foreclosure Rate [REF:<1]				
1-2%	1.062	1.057	1.069	1.064
2-3%	1.073	1.074	1.087	1.081
>3%	0.986	0.995	1.003	1.002
Neighborhood Racial Composition [REF: 0-20%]				
% Non-Hispanic Black				
20-40%	1.035	1.039	1.038	1.035
40-60%	1.186	1.189	1.191*	1.188
60-80%	0.980	0.968	0.981	0.971
>80%	1.071	1.077	1.087	1.084
% Hispanic				
20-40%	0.957	0.976	0.958	0.970
>40%	0.978	0.996	0.985	0.994
% Non-Hispanic Asian				
20-40%	0.987	0.971	0.985	0.978
>40%	0.639	0.631	0.593	0.600
% Foreign Born [REF: 0-20%]				
20-40%	1.011	1.026	0.997	1.015
40-60%	0.930	0.940	0.921	0.934
>60%	0.984	1.012	1.008	1.018
Median Household Income (1999) [REF: $40,000-60,000]				
$0-20,000	0.795*	0.787*	0.792*	0.789*
$20,000-40,000	0.980	0.979	0.986	0.985
>$60,000	0.947	0.926	0.923	0.915
Unemployment Rate (%)	1.021*	1.019	1.018	1.018
Origination year [REF: 2004]				
2005	1.207	1.188	1.217	1.201
2006	1.224	1.182	1.211	1.191
2007	1.160	1.105	1.152	1.121
2008	1.135	1.047	1.043	1.026
Borough [REF: Queens]				
Manhattan	1.144	1.090	1.116	1.089
Bronx	0.932	0.914	0.919	0.912

	Brooklyn			
	1.090	1.076	1.077	1.074
Quarter of Loan Performance [REF: 2010 - 4]				
2008 - 1	1.891	1.159	1.230	1.009
2008 - 2	1.711	1.071	1.215	1.001
2008 - 3	2.658***	1.647*	1.939**	1.580
2008 - 4	3.485***	2.162***	2.634***	2.131***
2009 - 1	3.814***	2.466***	3.048***	2.473***
2009 - 2	2.408***	1.698***	1.969***	1.678***
2009 - 3	2.991***	2.286***	2.552***	2.254***
2009 - 4	2.501***	2.049***	2.228***	2.026***
2010 - 1	1.657***	1.439***	1.542***	1.431***
2010 - 2	1.273**	1.161	1.231**	1.163
2010 - 3	1.277***	1.219**	1.252**	1.216**
Servicer fixed effects included				
Pseudo-R2	0.1146	0.1162	0.1146	0.1146
N	42,380	42,380	42,380	42,380

Notes:

*** denotes results that are statistically significant at the 1 percent level

** denotes results that are statistically significant at the 5 percentlevel

* denotes results that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level

Table 4. Model with Temporal Variation of HAMP effect

Variable		Effects on hazard of re-default (odds ratios)
		M1b
Modification Features		
Pre-HAMP Time Trend		0.928***
Post-HAMP		1.038
Post-HAMP Time Trend		0.901***
HAMP		0.425***
Post-HAMP Time Trend X HAMP		1.041
Loan Characteristics		
Credit Class Non-Prime		1.132*
	(missing credit class indicator)	2.923***
Product Description [REF: FRM]		
	ARM 2/28	1.007
	ARM 3/27	0.869
	ARM (other)	0.771*
	Other	0.891
Interest Only at Origination		0.914
	(missing interest only indicator)	0.706
Full Documentation		1.080
	(missing full documentation indicator)	1.584
Product Group [REF: Conventional]		
	Government (FHA, VA)	1.146
	Conventional with PMI	0.821**
	Other	1.143
Relative Interest Rate after Modification (FRMs) [REF: <0]		
	0-1	1.411***
	1-2	1.394***
	2-3	1.415***
	>3	1.687***
	(missing interest rate indicator)	0.897
Relative Interest Rate after Modification (ARMs) [REF: <0]		
	0-2	0.759
	2-4	1.461**
	>4	1.750***

(missing interest rate indicator)	0.732
Number of Months Post-Adjustment (ARMs) [REF: <0]	
0-3	0.920
4-6	1.222
>6	0.956
Investor Type [REF: Private Investor]	
GSE	1.239***
Held in Portfolio	1.140
(missing investor type indicator)	1.066
% Months the Loan was 60+ DPD before Modification X Origination Year	
X 2004	1.012***
X 2005	1.012***
X 2006	1.010***
X 2007	1.011***
X 2008	1.019***
Lis Pendens Filed before Modification	1.047
Current LTV [REF: <80%]	
80-100%	1.064
100-120%	1.050
>120%	1.147
(missing LTV indicator)	4.616***
log (Current Unpaid Balance)	1.237**
Loan Age	0.996
Time since Modification	0.970**
Borrower and Property Characteristics	
Owner Occupier	0.914
Current FICO Score [REF: <560]	
560-620	0.623***
620-650	0.430***
650-680	0.415***
680-720	0.212***
>=720	0.172***
(missing FICO score)	0.533***
FICO Score Decline between Origination and Modification	1.000
(missing FICO score decline indicator)	0.966
Borrower Race/Ethnicity [REF: Non-Hispanic White]	
Non-Hispanic Black	1.090
Non-Hispanic Asian	0.889
Non-Hispanic Other	0.642

Hispanic		1.019
(missing race/ethnicity)		1.098
Received Foreclosure Counseling before Modification		0.996
Neighborhood Characteristics		
House Price Appreciation (%)		1.614*
Recent Foreclosure Rate [REF:<1]		
	1-2%	1.073
	2-3%	1.092
	>3%	0.999
Neighborhood Racial Composition [REF: 0-20%]		
% Non-Hispanic Black	20-40%	1.023
	40-60%	1.192*
	60-80%	0.984
	>80%	1.077
% Hispanic	20-40%	0.969
	>40%	0.975
% Non-Hispanic Asian	20-40%	0.990
	>40%	0.654
% Foreign Born [REF: 0-20%]		
	20-40%	1.020
	40-60%	0.933
	>60%	0.979
Median Household Income (1999) [REF: $40,000-60,000]		
	$0-20,000	0.793*
	$20,000-40,000	0.975
	>$60,000	0.947
Unemployment Rate (%)		1.021*
Origination year [REF: 2004]		
	2005	1.140
	2006	1.216
	2007	1.293
	2008	1.259
Borough [REF: Queens]		
	Manhattan	1.123
	Bronx	0.924
	Brooklyn	1.077
Quarter of Loan Performance [REF: 2010 - 4]		
	2008 - 1	0.182
	2008 - 2	0.199***

2008 - 3	0.331**
2008 - 4	0.528
2009 - 1	0.728
2009 - 2	0.568*
2009 - 3	0.818
2009 - 4	0.870
2010 - 1	0.754
2010 - 2	0.757**
2010 - 3	0.994

Servicer fixed effects included

Pseudo-R2	0.1125
N	42,380

Notes:

*** denotes results that are statistically significant at the 1 percent level

** denotes results that are statistically significant at the 5 percentlevel

* denotes results that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level

Table 5. Models with Interactions between Modification Features and FICO and LTV

Variable	M2b	M3b	M4b
	Effects on hazard of re-default (odds ratios)		
Modification Features			
HAMP	0.665***	0.684***	0.713***
Monthly Mortgage Payment Change (pre─ post mod, as % of pre mod)	0.984***		0.988***
(missing payment change indicator)	1.104		1.045
Monthly Mortgage Payment Change X FICO<560	0.999		0.995
Monthly Mortgage Payment Change X LTV>100%	1.002		1.002
Principal Balance Change (pre─ post mod, as % of pre mod)		0.992	0.998
(missing balance change indicator)		1.231*	1.185
Principal Balance Change X FICO<560		0.999	1.001
Principal Balance Change X LTV>100%		0.982**	0.979**
Interest Rate Change (pre─ post mod, in percentage points)		0.870***	0.934*
(missing rate change indicator)		0.829**	0.910
Interest Rate Change X FICO<560		1.038	1.077**
Interest Rate Change X LTV>100%		1.017	0.981
Term Extension (Yes=1, No=0)		0.772**	0.846
(missing term extension indicator)		1.017	1.050
Term Extension X FICO<560		0.919	0.954
Term Extension X LTV>100%		1.160	1.147
Loan Characteristics			
Credit Class Non-Prime	1.193**	1.145*	1.164**
(missing credit class indicator)	3.137***	2.936***	2.985***
Product Description [REF: FRM]			
ARM 2/28	1.043	1.056	1.057
ARM 3/27	0.846	0.875	0.857
ARM (other)	0.863	0.858	0.885
Other	0.910	0.928	0.927
Interest Only at Origination	0.950	0.947	0.968
(missing interest only indicator)	0.700	0.593*	0.659
Full Documentation	1.093	1.093	1.092
(missing full documentation indicator)	1.832	2.058*	2.015*
Product Group [REF: Conventional]			
Government (FHA, VA)	1.097	1.136	1.112
Conventional with PMI	0.856*	0.837*	0.869
Other	1.109	1.148	1.134
Relative Interest Rate after Modification (FRMs) [REF: <0]			
0-1	1.119	1.191	1.106
1-2	1.142	1.209	1.119
2-3	1.150	1.222*	1.126
>3	1.561***	1.541***	1.519***
(missing interest rate indicator)	0.796*	0.832	0.824
Relative Interest Rate after Modification (ARMs) [REF: <0]			
0-2	0.739	0.716	0.709
2-4	1.229	1.301	1.208
>4	1.574***	1.573***	1.521***
(missing interest rate indicator)	0.812	0.768	0.818
Number of Months Post-Adjustment (ARMs) [REF: <0]			
0-3	0.857	0.879	0.860
4-6	1.120	1.129	1.103

	>6	0.870	0.872	0.855
Investor Type [REF: Private Investor]				
	GSE	1.231***	1.243**	1.240***
	Held in Portfolio	1.075	1.146	1.091
	(missing investor type indicator)	1.051	1.003	1.032
% Months the Loan was 60+ DPD before Modification X Origination Year				
	X 2004	1.011***	1.011***	1.011***
	X 2005	1.010***	1.010***	1.010***
	X 2006	1.008***	1.007***	1.007***
	X 2007	1.011***	1.010***	1.010***
	X 2008	1.017***	1.017***	1.017***
Lis Pendens Filed before Modification		1.040	1.042	1.021
Current LTV [REF: <80%]				
	80-100%	1.045	1.048	1.050
	100-120%	1.002	0.877	0.899
	>120%	1.082	0.912	0.941
	(missing LTV indicator)	4.479***	4.501***	4.452***
log (Current Unpaid Balance)		1.222**	1.211**	1.208**
Loan Age		0.991	0.989	0.989
Time since Modification		1.038***	1.047***	1.040***
Borrower and Property Characteristics				
Owner Occupier		0.914	0.914	0.914
Current FICO Score [REF: <560]				
	560-620	0.609***	0.639***	0.633***
	620-650	0.420***	0.441***	0.435***
	650-680	0.405***	0.432***	0.421***
	680-720	0.203***	0.219***	0.213***
	>=720	0.163***	0.169***	0.166***
	(missing FICO score)	0.564***	0.567***	0.575***
FICO Score Decline between Origination and Modification		1.000	1.000	1.000
	(missing FICO score decline indicator)	0.923	0.942	0.934
Borrower Race/Ethnicity [REF: Non-Hispanic White]				
	Non-Hispanic Black	1.097	1.106	1.095
	Non-Hispanic Asian	0.918	0.902	0.921
	Non-Hispanic Other	0.718	0.719	0.727
	Hispanic	1.021	1.036	1.025
	(missing race/ethnicity)	1.102	1.108	1.102
Received Foreclosure Counseling before Modification		0.982	0.989	0.983
Neighborhood Characteristics				
House Price Appreciation (%)		1.305	1.253	1.277
Recent Foreclosure Rate [REF:<1]				
	1-2%	1.056	1.074	1.067
	2-3%	1.073	1.090	1.085
	>3%	0.995	1.006	1.005
Neighborhood Racial Composition [REF: 0-20%]				
% Non-Hispanic Black	20-40%	1.039	1.038	1.033
	40-60%	1.188	1.175	1.168
	60-80%	0.968	0.973	0.960
	>80%	1.076	1.079	1.072
% Hispanic	20-40%	0.976	0.952	0.961
	>40%	0.996	0.975	0.977
% Non-Hispanic Asian	20-40%	0.970	0.987	0.972
	>40%	0.632	0.598	0.605

% Foreign Born [REF: 0-20%]				
	20-40%	1.026	0.997	1.017
	40-60%	0.939	0.919	0.935
	>60%	1.014	1.006	1.016
Median Household Income (1999) [REF: $40,000-60,000]				
	$0-20,000	0.786*	0.795*	0.795*
	$20,000-40,000	0.980	0.988	0.987
	>$60,000	0.926	0.916	0.911
Unemployment Rate (%)		1.019	1.019	1.019
Origination year [REF: 2004]				
	2005	1.188	1.227	1.208
	2006	1.181	1.219	1.189
	2007	1.100	1.153	1.114
	2008	1.041	1.031	1.008
Borough [REF: Queens]				
	Manhattan	1.090	1.101	1.063
	Bronx	0.914	0.921	0.915
	Brooklyn	1.076	1.081	1.080
Quarter of Loan Performance [REF: 2010 - 4]				
	2008 - 1	1.154	1.147	0.944
	2008 - 2	1.063	1.150	0.955
	2008 - 3	1.633*	1.867**	1.533
	2008 - 4	2.147***	2.565***	2.091***
	2009 - 1	2.457***	2.987***	2.427***
	2009 - 2	1.696***	1.943***	1.664***
	2009 - 3	2.284***	2.516***	2.229***
	2009 - 4	2.049***	2.213***	2.022***
	2010 - 1	1.440***	1.533***	1.424***
	2010 - 2	1.162	1.226*	1.158
	2010 - 3	1.220**	1.248**	1.212**
Servicer fixed effects included				
Pseudo-R2		0.1163	0.1149	0.1149
N		42,380	42,380	42,380

Notes:

*** denotes results that are statistically significant at the 1 percent level

** denotes results that are statistically significant at the 5 percentlevel

* denotes results that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level

Figure 1: Map of Census Tract Boundaries, Community District Boundaries, and 2009 Foreclosure Filings in New York City

Legend

· Foreclosure Filings

☐ Census Tracts

☐ Community Districts

Figure 2A. Kaplan-Meyer Survival Graph

Figure 2B. Kaplan-Meyer Survival Graph: HAMP vs. Non-HAMP

Figure 3. Effects of Selected Variables on the Survival Function

Survival Function - HAMP vs. Non-HAMP

Survival Function - Credit Class

Survival Function - Investor Type

Survival Function - Relative Interest Rate, FRM

probability

months at risk

Relative Rate FRM <0
Relative Rate FRM >3%

Survival Function - Relative Interest Rate, ARM

probability

months at risk

Relative Rate ARM <0
Relative Rate ARM >4%

Survival Function - FICO Score

probability

months at risk

FICO<560
FICO 620-650
FICO 680-720
FICO 560-620
FICO 650-680
FICO >=720