NELLCO NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository

Harvard Law School Faculty Scholarship Series

Harvard Law School

12-17-2007

BEYOND USURY: A STUDY OF CREDIT CARD USE AND PREFERENCE AMONG LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS

Angela K. Littwin Harvard Faculty Account, alittwin@law.harvard.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard faculty



Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation

Littwin, Angela K., "BEYOND USURY: A STUDY OF CREDIT CARD USE AND PREFERENCE AMONG LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS " (2007). Harvard Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 8. http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard faculty/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Harvard Law School at NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Harvard Law School Faculty Scholarship Series by an authorized administrator of NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact tracy.thompson@nellco.org.

BEYOND USURY: A STUDY OF CREDIT CARD USE AND PREFERENCE AMONG LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS

Angela Littwin[†]

ABSTRACT

The question of whether to re-impose usury restrictions lies at the heart of the debates over consumer credit regulation. Advocates of interest rate regulations argue that creditors are exploiting low-income borrowers, making huge profits while they lure these families into financial traps from which they can never emerge. Opponents of regulation note the benefits of expanding credit to low-income consumers. This debate has continued for more than two decades, but until now no one has asked the affected families their views about access to credit or what safety features they would welcome. This paper presents original data from a study of low-income women. The findings suggest that usury regulation may be an unnecessarily blunt instrument to provide protection for low-income families, as low-income families themselves can identify credit protection devices that would be more nuanced and more useful.

[†] Climenko Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Harvard Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School. A.B., Brown University. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Oren Bar-Gill, Michael Barr, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Jack Goldsmith, Melissa Jacoby, Jody Madira, Ronald Mann, Katherine Porter, Katharine Silbaugh, Daniel Schwarcz, Matthew Stephenson, Cass Sunstein, and Elizabeth Warren. Thanks also to the participants in the Climenko Fellowship scholarship workshop and to Matthew Cipolla, Elizabeth Lewis, and Karen Suber for excellent data coding and research assistance. I am grateful to the fifty women who shared their stories and opinions about credit cards with me. I extend a special thanks to Joy Walker and Miguelina Santiago, who were instrumental in recruiting these participants.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
I. ADVANTAGES OF INCREASED ACCESS TO CREDIT CARDS	5
A. Usefulness in Emergencies	5
(1) Ease of Obtaining Funds	7
(2) Lack of Stigma at Time of Borrowing	8
(3) Versatility	
(4) Comparison to Credit Cards	
B. A PAYMENT CARD FOR THE UNBANKED	
C. ACCESS TO A FINANCIAL TOOL OF THE MIDDLE CLASS	11
II. TEMPTATION AND ADVANCE COMMITMENT	13
A. Hyperbolic Discounting	14
B. ADVANCE COMMITMENT	
C. PARTICIPANT ATTEMPTS AT ADVANCE COMMITMENT IN CREDIT-CARD USAGE	20
III. SELF-DIRECTED CREDIT CARDS	26
A. OPTING IN AND OPTING OUT	28
B. CONSUMER-CONTROLLED CREDIT LIMITS AND OTHER GENERAL PRE-COMMIT	MENT
DEVICES	
C. BORROWING CAPS, FIXED-FEE CREDIT CARDS, AND INSTALLMENT PAY	
PLANS	
D. IMPLEMENTATION	
(1) Disclosure and Debiasing	
(2) Profitability	
(3) Legal Mandate	
(4) Market Implementation	
(5) Implementation Through Opting In or Out	48
IV. CONCLUSION	49

Introduction

Over the past two decades, credit cards have become increasingly available to low-income families as credit card issuers have extended credit to riskier customers.¹ Families that would not have been able to obtain credit cards as recently as a decade ago now receive a deluge of pre-approved offers in the mail. Although the credit industry hails this trend as the "democratization of credit," the effects on low-income families may not merit celebration. Despite the substantial risks to lenders that they will be unable to pay their bills on time, low-income families often pay such extraordinary rates of interest that they are among the industry's most profitable customers.³ High interest rates and penalties can quickly multiply the original debt, so that a modest number of purchases can leave consumers deeply mired in debt.

Assuming the credit-card debt burden of low-income families warrants intervention, a return to the historic system of usury caps is a possible solution. As such, many commentators have proposed imposing legislative limits on credit-card interest and fees.⁴ The desirability of this legal change is largely evaluated by examining the policy implications of such legislation. While there is broad agreement that a return to usury restrictions on credit cards would make it more difficult for low-income families to obtain credit cards,⁵ there is substantial disagreement about

avid A. Lander. It 'is' the

¹ David A. Lander, It 'is' the Best of Times, It 'is' the Worst of Times: A Short Essay on Consumer Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 205 (2004); David A. Moss and Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 336 (1999); Joseph B. Cahill, Where It's Due: Credit Companies Find Tough Rival at Bottom Of Consumer Market --- Fingerhut's Experience Shows 'Subprime' Lending Takes Gimmicks, a Lot of Grit --- A Toll on Customers, Too, WALL St. J., Dec. 29, 1998, at A1.

² See, e.g., Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion: Debtor Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 37 (1998).

³ RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 201-02 (2006) [hereinafter *Charging Ahead*].

⁴ See, e.g., Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal Controls on Credit Card Interest Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1996); Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 38 (2004); JAVIER SILVA & REBECCA EPSTEIN, DEMOS, COSTLY CREDIT: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND LATINOS IN DEBT 11 (2005), http://www.demos.org/pubs/Costly%20Credit%20final.pdf. ⁵ See, e.g., David A. Steel, Jr., Bankruptcy's Home Economics, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 43, 52 (2004) ("If the usury ceiling is set too low--or becomes too low due to inflation--many marginally risky consumers will simply be cut off from standard forms of credit.").

how those restrictions would play out. Would a reduction in credit card availability mean freedom from debt, or would it mean the loss of a valuable tool for improving one's economic circumstances and access to a private safety net for emergencies? Commentators on both sides of the usury debate claim to represent the interests of low-income borrowers. Their arguments, however, are based on untested empirical assumptions about the needs of low-income families.⁶ Both sides proceed as if low-income families have little to add directly to the debate.

In order to obtain a new perspective, I conducted in-depth interviews, supplemented by documental materials, with fifty low-income women. The women interviewed for this study made it clear that they were not the rational economic actors of economic lore, but they also demonstrated considerable sophistication about the relative risks associated with various credit products and remarkable perception about their own cognitive biases. The findings suggest a more nuanced understanding of the risks and rewards of consumer credit for low-income families.

The participants articulated a profound ambivalence towards the relationship between access and usury caps. Most expressed anger toward credit card companies, but at the same time, there was a strong sense that the recent increase in access to credit cards was a step forward. Nearly 60 percent of participants originally stated that it should be easier for low-income people to obtain credit cards or that the current level of accessibility was appropriate. But when I explained that maintaining or increasing access would preclude imposing usury caps – which many of these same participants had suggested – half of them modified their access preferences. Conversely, 44 percent of the women proposed lowering credit card interest and fees as legal changes they would like to see, but

_

⁶ Several empirical studies have documented the effects of usury ceilings. Christopher G. DeMuth, *The Case Against Credit Card Interest Regulation*, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201 (1985-1986); Glenn B. Canner & James T. Fergus, *The Economic Effects of Proposed Ceilings on Credit Card Interest Rates*, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (1987); RICHARD L. PETERSON & GREGORY A. FALLS, CREDIT RES. CTR., IMPACT OF A TEN PERCENT USURY CEILING: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 15 (1981), http://www.business.gwu.edu/research/centers/fsrp/pdf/WP40.pdf (cited in Todd Zywicki, *The Economics of Credit Cards*, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 96 (2000)). These studies have demonstrated thoroughly that usury caps are associated with restricted access to credit cards, but that is the starting premise of this Article. This study addresses the follow-up question of whether restricted access is positive or negative from the perspective of low-income consumers. An additional fascinating study examines the factors influencing state interest rates in 1950 in order to demonstrate the social insurance function of usury regulation. Edward L. Glaeser & José Scheinkman, *Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws*, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1998).

support for these measures waned when I explained that this would likely lead to a reduction in access to credit cards.

Instead of accepting this dichotomous framework, the women put forth a number of ideas for how credit products could be better designed to meet their specific needs. I expand on their suggestions to develop recommendations for modifying credit cards to enhance low-income consumers' ability to repay their debts without acquiring unaffordable penalty fees and interest. I call these alternative products "self-directed credit cards." They fall into two broad categories.

The first set of self-directed cards would equip consumers to resist more effectively the temptation of credit cards, a problem nearly twothirds of participants identified. These proposals involve enabling credit card users to place binding restrictions on their own spending and borrowing in advance of the moment they faced tempting purchases. The second group of self-directed credit cards restructure credit limits or payment plans so that credit cards present fewer risks to low-income borrowers. These ideas include: low-limit credit cards aimed at lowincome consumers; fixed-fee credit cards, where issuers would present upfront all the interest and fees to be charged in exchange for a specific sum of credit; and installment-payment credit cards, in which each purchase would create an installment plan that required principal and interest to be paid over a specified period of time. I also suggest a novel method of implementation modeled on the "opt out" system, which enables consumers to "opt out" of receiving pre-screened credit card offers. The current system could be modified to further enhance consumer choice by allowing people to select "safe credit card plans," wherein they would receive only those solicitations meeting their criteria for reduced creditcard risk.

These recommendations go far beyond the stale usury debates. From a new perspective based on the views of low-income families themselves, the debates over credit regulation can find fresh ideas. The ideas presented here are specifically targeted to help the acute problems of low-income consumers, but they would also benefit all credit card users by allowing them more choice and control.

The next Part of the Article explains the study's methodology. Part I discusses the reasons that access to credit cards is important for low-income families. Study participants valued them for their usefulness in emergencies, and many thought that the recent increase in access to credit cards was an advance for low-income communities. Part II examines the risks credit cards present for this same population. Credit cards present a

tempting opportunity to spend beyond one's means, and the sudden influx of spending ability is especially enticing for people who cannot usually afford consumer goods. In addition, low-income borrowers are particularly vulnerable to accumulating balance by paying only the minimum due, because the financial skills low-income people develop under scarcity conditions are not well-adapted to making payments that are not immediately required. Part III explores self-directed credit cards as a means of maintaining the advantages of credit cards for low-income borrowers while limiting their harm.

METHODOLOGY

The goal of the study was to explore the perspective of low-income consumers regarding the advantages and disadvantages of increased access to credit cards in the wake of deregulation. Low-income consumers face the most difficult decisions because their primary borrowing alternatives are in the fringe-banking sector. The study consists of detailed interviews with fifty low-income women. I used residence in a public housing project or related government-subsidized housing program as a proxy for low income. I restricted the sample to women primarily because families raising children are under the greatest financial pressure, and the choices they face regarding borrowing are often even more urgent than those facing their child-free counterparts. At this income level, women are significantly more likely than men to be the head of household.

Instead of a random sample, I developed what the sociological literature terms a snowball sample – a standard technique for sampling populations that are difficult to reach through randomized methods. A snowball sample is established by beginning work with one person or a

 $^{^7}$ See Moss & Johnson, supra note 1, at 333-37 (describing the expansion of credit card availability for low- and moderate-income borrowers over the past two and half decades). 8 ELIZABETH WARREN AND AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP 6-7

⁹ See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 152 n.531 (2002); Sandra J. Newman, The Implications of Current Welfare Reform Proposals for the Housing Assistance System, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1231, 1235 (1995).

¹⁰ See, e.g., Jean Faugier and Mary Sargeant, Sampling Hard to Reach Populations, 26 J. ADVANCED NURSING 790 (1997). The difficulty and expense of reaching low-income populations for empirical work is well-documented. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Principal Investigator, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Detroit Area Household Financial Services Study (2006), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~msbarr/ and click on "Detroit Area Study."

small group of people who are members of the target population.¹¹ Those initial participants then invite other people who meet the study criteria to participate. When the researcher meets the next cohort of participants, she asks them for further referrals. Participants were paid twenty dollars for their time. I recorded the interviews with a digital voice recorder and had them transcribed by a professional service.

The interviews began with closed-end questions on demographic data and financial information such as bank account status and bill paying habits. I then took detailed credit histories and asked participants to evaluate each form of borrowing to which they had access. The final section of the interviews consisted of open-ended policy questions. I analyzed the transcripts using content analysis, a methodology frequently applied to interview transcripts. For a detailed discussion of the study methods and a description of the sample, please see the Appendix on Methodology following the Article.

I. ADVANTAGES OF INCREASED ACCESS TO CREDIT CARDS

A. Usefulness in Emergencies

The primary reason usury caps did not have broad support among study participant is that credit cards do provide distinct advantages for low-income borrowers. The most common reason study participants gave for wanting to maintain access to credit cards was their usefulness in emergencies. Credit cards provide a fast, easy, stigma-free way of obtaining funds which can be applied to almost any financial emergency.

Chronic poverty dramatically increases a family's chances of acute material crisis, and very low-income families are subject to frequent, unpredictable financial catastrophes. Relatively common events such as interruptions in food stamps, quasi-routine threats of eviction from public

¹¹ I knew twelve population members from previous work in the community.

¹² *Id. See also*, Robert Philip Weber, Basic Content Analysis 9 (1990).

¹³ Forty percent of participants mentioned emergency usage as an advantage of credit cards. The next most cited advantage of having credit cards was their purchasing power, at 34 percent. Twenty percent of participants said that credit cards were a good way to improve one's credit history, and another 10 percent obtained a credit card to see if they could get one.

¹⁴ Credit cards are stigma-free at the moment of borrowing.

¹⁵ Deborah Belle & Joanne Doucet, *Poverty, Inequality and Discrimination as Sources of Inequality Among U.S. Women*, 27 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 101, 102 (2003); Deborah Belle & Lisa Dodson, *Poor Women and Girls in a Wealthy Nation*, in HANDBOOK OF WOMEN'S AND GIRLS' PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH 122, 123 (Judith Worell & Carol D. Goodheart eds., 2005).

housing authorities, ¹⁶ or administrative issues with state-funded health insurance can escalate to threaten a family's health or even survival. Occurrences that a middle-class family can easily weather, such as a car breakdown, can send a low-income family into crisis. especially crucial for low-income families. A family may eventually be reimbursed for a medical expense or receive back payment of food stamps. but by that point, it may be too late to avert disaster. One of these delays could force a family to deprive itself of basic necessities, for example, by not seeking treatment for a medical emergency.

The inability to control for these events poses serious health consequences. Depression and other stress-related illnesses have reached epidemic proportions among low-income women, and a major contributing factor is living in the shadow of threatening financial events.¹⁷ Mental-health issues can prevent women from breaking the cycle of poverty, degrading their physical health¹⁸ and interfering with their ability to keep a job. 19 In addition, depression can have a significant impact on parenting, negatively affecting the cognitive development of the next generation.²⁰

The credit card's function as a form of private insurance, then, can play an essential role in a family's short-term and long-term well-being. A low-income mother's knowledge that she has a tool which will enable her to survive, for example, a food-stamp interruption can go a long way

¹⁶ In public housing, being late with rent generates an automatic eviction notice, which if not immediately addressed, can quickly lead to administrative action against a resident. While these notices do not usually result in eviction, they still require immediate action. Accordingly, when asked how they handle months where they do not have enough money to pay their bills, 70 percent of study participants said they paid some bills late or negotiated a later payment date. However, most emphasized that they did not use this process with their rent.

Belle & Doucet, supra note 15. See also Melissa Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560-571 (2002).

¹⁸ Belle & Dodson, *supra* note 15, at 124.

¹⁹ Angela Browne, Amy Salomon, & Shari S. Bassuk, *The Impact of Recent Partner* Violence on Poor Women's Capacity to Maintain Work, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 393 (1999); LADONNA PAVETTI ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, DESIGNING WELFARE-TO-WORK PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIES FACING PERSONAL OR FAMILY CHALLENGES: LESSONS FROM THE FIELD (1997), http://www.urban.org/publications/407338.html (surveying the literature addressing barriers that women on welfare would face when seeking employment and identifying mental health issues as one of eight major barriers). ²⁰ S. Petterson & A.B. Albers, *Effects of Poverty and Maternal Depression on Early*

Childhood Development, 76 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1794 (2001).

towards ameliorating the mental-health consequences of financial instability.²¹

(1) Ease of Obtaining Funds

Credit cards have three major features which make them a valuable source of emergency funds. First is the ease of obtaining money immediately. In an emergency, the principal alternatives to borrowing²² are seeking aid from government programs, 23 private charities, 24 and friends or family. Credit cards have an ease-of-use advantage over these Government programs and many charities have strict options. requirements for proof of need. Families must provide extensive documentation to demonstrate an emergency, and there is a large chance of denial even for qualified families.²⁵

While not all private charities have strict documentation requirements, they have related limitations. A family is still required to demonstrate need according to the agency's criteria rather than its own, and it may need assistance for an emergency that falls outside the scope of any government or private agency's criteria. In addition, agency aid can take so long to receive that its usefulness is limited.

²¹ In their current form, however, the association of credit cards with the stress of accumulating debt may eclipse the stress-relieving benefits discussed here. One participant described the stress-related effects of mounting interest and finance charges on her mother, who accumulated credit-card debt before becoming disabled and now cannot pay it: "And she has high-blood pressure, and if she's worried about something, that puts up her blood pressure. That puts up her diabetes, and now she's getting glaucoma because of the pressure on her eyes. And she can't control diabetes because she can't control the high-blood pressure because she can't control the problems. So it's all a ripple effect." Interview with Respondent G88.

²² In this Article, I compare credit cards only to non-borrowing alternatives for raising funds. For a comparison of credit cards with other forms of borrowing, see Angela Littwin, Credit Cards, Pawn Shops and Rent-to-Own Stores: An Empirical Examination of Subjective Desirability Among Low-Income Consumers (forthcoming 2007).

For example, emergency food stamps or rent assistance.

²⁴ Eight of participants described receiving emergency rent or utility assistance from the Salvation Army.

²⁵ Many agencies engage in "bureaucratic disentitlement" by using procedural hurdles to delay or deny benefits to eligible low-income clients. Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 Soc. SERV. REV. 3, 20 (1984). This practice has intensified since the welfare reform of 1996 put pressure on agencies to reduce their services. See, e.g., Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement after Welfare Reform: Are Fair Hearings the Cure?, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 13, 50 (2005); Randal S. Jeffrey, The Importance of Due Process Protections After Welfare Reform: Client Stories from New York City, 66 ALB. L. REV. 123, 167 (2002).

Seeking help from friends and family suffers from a different kind of transaction difficulty, unreliability. Low-income people are more likely to have low-income friends and families, so the network of people from whom they could borrow is often resource-deprived.²⁶ In addition to limiting a low-income person's borrowing options, these networks can actually exact a toll. The mutual-aid networks that many low-income women develop usually require reciprocity and also can make it difficult for a woman to extricate herself from a difficult or abusive relationship.²⁷ Participants in the current study discussed lending money to friends and relatives nearly as frequently as they discussed borrowing it. Despite these complexities, approximately 93 percent of participants had borrowed from friends and family. Some participants had friends and family who were relatively financially secure, while others knew people who were willing to lend even when it strained their own finances. Both of these situations create new stresses, mainly in the form of stigma.

(2) Lack of Stigma at Time of Borrowing

The second advantage credit cards have over other sources of emergency funds is a lack of stigma at the moment of borrowing. Government benefit programs are highly stigmatized. Using private charity can be similarly shaming. Seeking help from friends and family carries its own stigma. While several of the participants described comfortable relationships with friends and relatives to whom they could turn in emergencies, others discussed asking for money in terms of shame.

²⁶ Belle & Dodson, *supra* note 15, at 124; Deborah Belle, *Social Ties and Support, in* LIVES IN STRESS 142, 142-43 (Deborah Belle ed., 1982).

²⁷ Belle & Dodson, *supra* note 15, at 124.

²⁸ There is, of course, stigma associated with other aspects of credit card use. One of the major bankruptcy debates concerns the operation of stigma in consumer filings. *Compare* Theresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, *Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings*, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213 (2006) *with* Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, *It's Time for Means Testing*, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177 (1999). This stigma, however, attaches to a later stage in the cycle of credit-card use. Here, I am concerned only with the stigma at the moment of loan origination.

²⁹ See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the Means?, 75 Am. BANKR. L.J. 243 (2001); Pearson Liddell, Jr., Stevie Watson & William D. Eshee, Jr., Welfare Reform in Mississippi: TANF Policy and Its Implications, 11 Am. U. J. GENDER Soc. Pol'y & L. 1107, 1109 (2003).

³⁰ See, e.g., M. H. Hoeflich & John E. Thies, *Rethinking American Housing Policy: Defederalizing Subsidized Housing*, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (1987) (arguing that private charity can be more stigmatizing than public assistance because the former is charity whereas the latter is an entitlement).

Seeking to borrow money either meant admitting that one was doing less well than a friend or relative, which was embarrassing, or it meant that the loan might cause the creditor hardship, which was a source of guilt. In both cases, seeing the person could be awkward, and participants felt obligated to end the debtor-creditor relationship as quickly as possible.

(3) Versatility

The third advantage of credit cards as a form of private insurance is also closely related to ease of use. Emergency funds from government programs or charities can generally be used only for a specified purpose. A family has to prove, for example, a housing emergency or a food emergency. Often, the form of the aid limits its use, as with the receipt of food from a food pantry or utility assistance paid directly to the utility company. Some needs which may seem urgent to the family – such as car repairs – can fall outside the scope of all agency services. Moreover, it is a rare program that disperses funds which allow families to address crises before they reach emergency level. Many study participants described imposing similar constraints upon themselves when borrowing from friends and family. They were often so worried about social pressures and the other person's financial constraints that they would seek help only when a situation had escalated to an emergency.

(4) Comparison to Credit Cards

Obtaining emergency funds from a credit card, on the other hand, is often as simple as making a purchase. Accessing the credit and paying for the emergency expense occur simultaneously. The borrowing function is anonymous at the point of dispersal in the sense that nobody else knows whether the user can pay for this bill at the end of the month.³¹ There is no stigma associated with credit cards at the point of purchase – quite the opposite. Many participants reacted positively when asked whether there was status associated with credit cards, describing the way people treated them better in stores.³² Credit cards can be used for emergencies not covered by available services. They can be used to prevent a situation from becoming a crisis. In short, credit cards put the decision about what

³¹ This is not an inherent feature of credit cards. In Japan, consumers declare at the time of purchase whether or not they will revolve a balance. Ronald J. Mann, *Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan*, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1073 (2002).

³² See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. In comparison, when asked about the status associated with pawn shops or rent-to-own stores, the most frequent response was laughter.

constitutes an emergency and how to address it squarely in the family's own hands.³³

B. A Payment Card for the Unbanked

Another benefit of increased access to credit cards is that they are the only general-usage payment card to which many low-income people have This is crucial because cards are becoming an increasingly dominant payment mechanism. Currently, the United States has a card usage rate of 115 transactions per person per year.³⁴ As Ronald Mann points out in his new book *Charging Ahead*, 35 this trend is only likely to grow more pronounced. Mann cites the convenience and safety of carrying cards instead of cash.³⁶ The latter may be of even greater importance for low-income people than the population as a whole due to higher crime rates in low-income neighborhoods.³⁷ He also notes that payment-card transactions are now processed more quickly than checks and may soon be processed even faster than cash.³⁸ The advent of Internet processing offers even more benefits for card users, especially as a way of paying bills. It is far more cost-effective than the one-dollar-pertransaction charged by the check-cashing and money-order outlets that 52 percent of participants used to pay their bills.

Cutting credit-card access for low-income families may cause them to fall further out of the financial mainstream. Approximately 22 percent of households with incomes below \$25,000 do not have bank accounts, ³⁹ and that figure grows higher further down the income distribution. ⁴⁰ Families

³³ Of course, their ease of use, lack of stigma and versatility make credit cards attractive in non-emergency situations as well, but the study participants tended to view these characteristics in a negative light outside the emergency context.

³⁴ Charging Ahead, supra note 3, at 75-76.

³⁵ Charging Ahead, supra note 3.

³⁶ *Id.* at 10. *See also* Todd Zywicki, *The Economics of Credit Cards*, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 85 (2000).

³⁷ See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, *Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go From Here?* 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 497, 519-23 (1993) (describing high rates of violence crime in public housing projects).

³⁸ Charging Ahead, supra note 3, at 12. Already a television commercial for Visa Check Card shows an embarrassed man bringing lunch service at a fast-paced sandwich shop to a grinding halt by paying with cash instead of a card. Visa Advertising, http://www.usa.visa.com/personal/visa brings you/advertising/

index.html?it=bll/lView%20Our%20New%20Advertising (last visited Dec. 9, 2006).

³⁹ Michael S. Barr, *Banking the Poor*, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 123 (2004).

⁴⁰ See, e.g., id. at 189 (citing a study which found that only 24 percent of households receiving government benefits through EBT programs had bank accounts). About half of current study participants had bank accounts.

with low enough incomes to qualify for this study usually receive government benefits, which in the vast majority of states⁴¹ are distributed through EBT (Electronic Benefit Transfer) cards. These cards, however, are poor substitutes for general-use payment cards.⁴² EBT card holders often are not able to make essential purchases due to missing or broken point-of-service machines, and they encounter fees when seeking to withdraw EBT funds from ATMs.⁴³

A specific application of credit cards as payment cards arose in the context of car rentals. In a population where car ownership rates are low, car rentals are important for special occasions such as weddings and funerals. Several participants mentioned the ability to rent cars as an advantage of access to credit cards. One participant even obtained a credit card for the purpose of renting a car to transport her children to her brother's wedding.⁴⁴ A debit card with a MasterCard or Visa logo would also serve this purpose,⁴⁵ but until more low-income people have bank accounts and debit cards, many see credit cards as their main payment-card option.

C. Access to a Financial Tool of the Middle Class

For many women in the study, credit cards have become symbols of access to mainstream American society. This symbolism expressed itself partly on a practical level, with several participants detailing the goods and services they could finally buy, especially for their children. Fourteen percent of the women mentioned credit cards as allowing them to purchase Christmas presents for family members. As one participant explained, "you can't just take credit away from poor people. Sometimes it's the

⁴¹ See id. at 237 n.315 (citing Barbara Leyser, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Selected Characteristics of State EBT Systems (2001),

http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/electronic<uscore>benefits/content/ebt<uscore>summary<uscore>table.pdf & NACHA, *EBT in the States: Survey Results*, 2002 Electronic Payments Review and Buyer's Guide 43-44 (2002)). ⁴² See id. at 189.

⁴³ See BARBARA LEYSER, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST MULTI-STATE SURVEY OF EBT RECIPIENTS (2001), http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/electronic_benefits/.

⁴⁴ Interview with Respondent G88.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Avis Policies and Procedures for Credit and Debit Cards, http://www.avis.com/AvisWeb/JSP/global/en/rentersguide/policies/us/US_Credit_and_D ebit_Card.jsp (last visited Nov. 20, 2006); Hertz Qualifications & Requirements, https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/byr/index.jsp?targetPage =rentalQualificationsView.jsp?KEYWORD=LEGAL (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).

⁴⁶ This salience of this issue may have been due to the fact that the study conducted the interviews from late November through mid-January.

only way they can get Christmas for their kids."⁴⁷ Another participant described the pervasiveness of the need for credit cards throughout several sectors of the economy: "I mean, when you rent a car, that's the first thing they ask you, do you have a credit card? . . . When you reserve a motel, they want a credit card. And when you go to the video store, for God's sake, they want a credit card."⁴⁸

Credit cards have taken on a more abstract symbolism as well. As one participant described her reason for wanting a credit card, "I think it was like just to have a credit card, I mean just to walk around with it." The women described the first time they got a credit card in terms of strong emotion. Many of them expressed shock that they had received a credit card at all. As one participant said, "So I sent it in, and they actually sent it to me, and I was in shock. I was like, 'Who the hell would give me a credit card?" Twelve percent said that they applied for a credit card in part to see if they could get one. The act of applying for a credit card has become a test, a way of assessing one's status.

These factors may explain why some participants viewed access to credit cards as a civil rights issue. Nearly one-third of the women interviewed mentioned the theme of discrimination in access to credit cards. This theme usually emerged when the study asked whether credit cards should be easier or harder for low-income people to obtain. Those who thought it should be easier to get a credit card expressed concern that credit cards were discriminating on the basis of race and class. As one participant put it, "They're forgetting about our people." 51

Surprisingly, many women who thought that credit cards should be harder to obtain were also concerned about credit card companies discriminating against their community. Moreover, an additional group who thought that access to credit cards should be restricted was concerned about sounding discriminatory for saying so.

At some point the reasoning for this concern about discrimination becomes circular. The participants give the companies' decisions about creditworthiness this weight because credit cards have become symbolic of the American economic mainstream, but at the same time participants implied that one reason credit cards have this symbolism is their exclusivity, i.e., that until very recently, low-income people had difficulty

⁴⁷ Interview with Respondent 283.

⁴⁸ Interview with Respondent 9JK.

⁴⁹ Interview with Respondent 22B.

⁵⁰ Interview with Respondent 2AU.

⁵¹ Interview with Respondent 657.

accessing them. Untangling this knot is beyond the scope of this paper, but for now, two important points emerge. First, regardless of the reason, credit cards do carry this symbolism, and any initiative that reduces their availability to low-income people must account for the perception of discrimination. Second, the illusion of exclusivity confers power. At this moment in economic history, access to credit cards has increased dramatically, but the perception of access has not caught up to the reality. Some consumers still obtain credit cards in the belief that their access is limited and they should seize the opportunity while they can, even though this understanding is no longer accurate. Thus, for those seeking to reduce credit-card debt levels, changing the perception that credit cards are still difficult to obtain may be an important goal in and of itself.

On the other hand, external indicators of the credit card's status are still alive and well.⁵² A small number of participants found credit cards to be a tool for trumping other forms of discrimination. One woman described how using a credit card countered the racial discrimination she might otherwise experience: "No matter where you go, if you black...only when they saw a credit card, then they smile at you."⁵³ Another participant described the other side of the phenomenon, explaining that people sometimes looked down on her when she paid with cash: "When you go into certain stores and places where people look at you, and it made me think you're not as good. Like 'I should be before you, and I've got the money."⁵⁴

II. TEMPTATION AND ADVANCE COMMITMENT


Most academics, particularly economists, seem to think that all credit card features are a matter of nothing more than interest rates and fees. In some macro sense that may be true, but for card users themselves, the central issues are less about those specific cost items and more about the way credit cards influence their spending and borrowing patterns. The credit card problem participants cited most frequently was temptation. Nearly two-thirds described credit cards as tempting or enticing, whereas only 44 percent argued for a reduction in interest rates. (See Figure 1.) Participants felt enticed to apply for credit cards against their better judgment, and once they had them, they found it undesirably easy to spend money they did not have. This characterization of credit cards aligns

⁵² Issuers also attempt to create status for middle- and upper-income consumers by offering gold and platinum credit cards.

⁵³ Interview with Respondent CX4.

⁵⁴ Interview with Respondent 657.

perfectly with emerging theories of psychology and behavioral economics. These theories provide a framework that validates the women's concerns about temptation and helps to pinpoint the precise features of credit cards that are problematic in this respect.



Legal writers such as Oren Bar-Gill have applied a behavioral framework to credit-card borrowing by discussing mechanisms that dispose consumers to borrow more on their credit cards than they may prefer. I take that analysis one step further to explore how credit cards interfere with the attempts of even sophisticated consumers – which includes the majority of study participants under the definition of "sophisticated" I explain below – to limit their borrowing to their preferred levels.

A. Hyperbolic Discounting

An explanation for high credit-card spending that has significant support in the empirical literature is hyperbolic discounting or, more generally, present-biased preferences. These terms refer to the finding that people tend to be poor predictors of their own future preferences. Specifically, we habitually underestimate the intensity of our reactions to

⁵⁵ Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1374 n.2 (2004).

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 THE AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 THE Q. J. OF ECON. 443 (1997); Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002).

future costs and benefits.⁵⁷ In economic terms, a hyperbolic discounter applies larger discount rate to events that will take place in the near future and a smaller discount rate to events that seem further off.⁵⁸ The empirical literature has found hyperbolic discounting to be a more accurate model of human behavior than the neo-classical discounted utility model, which assumes that humans apply an equal discount rate to future costs and benefits, no matter when they will occur.⁵⁹

An important implication of hyperbolic discounting is that, in a delayed-consequences situation, a person may experience a "preference reversal"⁶⁰ during the time between her decision and her experience of the consequences. For example, when offered the choice between \$100 today and \$110 tomorrow, a hyperbolic discounter will choose the \$100 today because she discounts tomorrow's reward heavily compared to today's. Because her discount rate is much smaller when comparing two rewards that take place further in the future, she will also prefer \$110 in 31 days to \$100 in 30 days. But as time passes, and she arrives at day 30, her preference will reverse, and she will again prefer the \$100 to be distributed on the new "today." In other words, "people's preferences have a bias for the 'present' over the 'future' (where the 'present' is constantly changing)."⁶¹

Oren Bar-Gill has elegantly demonstrated how this framework applies in the credit card setting.⁶² A consumer may underestimate her future borrowing when she applies for a credit card, because at that time, both borrowing money on the credit card and repaying that money appear close together in the relatively distant future – much like the \$100 and the \$110 offered 30 and 31 days from the present. She is able to compare the benefit of borrowing to the cost of repaying with minimal cognitive distortion. Thus, the option of borrowing on the credit card does not look unduly appealing. But as the consumer advances to the moment when she has a credit card and is considering borrowing, the immediate benefits of spending appear larger than the still-distant costs of repaying the borrowed amount. In short, her borrowing preference reverses.⁶³

⁵⁷ Id

⁵⁸ See, e.g, Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 56.

⁵⁹ Id

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 361

⁶¹ O'Donoghue & Rabin, *supra* note 56, at 106 n.7.

⁶² Bar-Gill, *supra* note 55, at 1396-97.

⁶³ *Id*.

Many of the women in the current study described experiences that fit neatly within this framework. A common story was that a participant obtained a credit card with no intention of borrowing on it. She wanted it to have in case of emergency or to build her credit,⁶⁴ but she would quickly find herself charging on it with regularity. As one participant explained when asked why she wanted a credit card, "I thought this would be good for emergencies. Well, you know emergencies. I mean, you think that's the goal. . . . Then you get carried away, 'OK, well this is kind of an emergency,' you know what I mean, and then it's like, 'oh, OK, I want that.'"

Another participant described her experience after obtaining a store credit card for the ten-percent discount: "So what do I do? I charge, and I charge because I needed – you know, you go, 'Oh, I need clothing. Oh, I need a birthday present.' And I've been 'needing' a lot. As you can see, I 'needed' too much."

B. Advance Commitment

Hyperbolic discounters differ in the degree to which they recognize their own tendencies towards preference change, but awareness is not enough to change behavior. As economists Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin explain, a hyperbolic discounter "could be *sophisticated* and know exactly what her future selves' preferences will be. Or a person could be *naïve* and believe her future selves' preferences will be identical to her current self's. . . ."⁶⁷ The 66 percent of study participants who reported temptation qualify as sophisticated consumers under this framework. They understood that credit cards could "tempt" them in the short term to borrow more than they preferred in the long term. ⁶⁸ Of course, temptation applies to consumers of all income levels, ⁶⁹ but the more financially constrained the borrower, the more severe the consequences. A low-income borrower can accumulate unmanageable debt by succumbing to seemingly minor temptations. The speaker who

⁶⁴ An additional common, non-borrowing reason for applying for a credit card to see if one qualified. *See supra* note 60 and accompanying text.

⁶⁵ Interview with Respondent B63.

⁶⁶ Interview with Respondent 76C.

⁶⁷ O'Donoghue & Rabin, *supra* note 56, at 106 (emphasis in original).

⁶⁸ Of course, analyzing the preferences of people whose preferences vary over time can be problematic. Which "self's" preference is the correct one? I adopt what O'Donoghue and Rabin call the "long-run perspective – what you would wish now (if you were fully informed) about your profile of future behavior." O'Donoghue & Rabin, *supra* note 56, at 105 n.5.

⁶⁹ See generally Bar-Gill, supra note 55.

chastised herself for "need[ing] too much" in the previous sub-section was referring to purchasing items for a three-year-old niece she was temporarily supporting and cleaning supplies.⁷⁰

This framework highlights two major problems with the current credit-card system. First is the process by which a consumer moves from being naïve to becoming sophisticated. Fourteen percent of participants developed a sophisticated perspective about their likely consumption habits with a credit card without obtaining one, 71 but the majority of the sophisticated participants acquired this knowledge the hard way, as described Part III.D.1, *infra*. As one respondent stated, "I think that young people, they all make the mistake of borrowing money, and they don't know better. But now I have experience because I went through freaking hell."

The second major problem is that even sophisticated consumers do not have adequate means of protecting themselves from temptation. The major way of preventing short-term behavior that undermines long-term preferences is to commit to another course of action ahead of time, usually through what psychologists and behavioral economists call "commitment devices." The prototypical commitment device derives from Greek mythology, where Odysseus ordered his crew to tie him to the mast of his ship when passing the island of the Sirens. He knew that otherwise he would be unable to resist the Sirens' Song and wreck his ship by steering it onto nearby rocks. Modern-day life abounds with examples – from magazine articles advising dieters to request that half their restaurant meal be served in a doggie bag to alcoholism recovery brochures which advise avoiding situations where alcohol may be present.

Financial institutions offer an array of commitment devices as well. Two employed participants used Christmas and vacation clubs; their credit union garnished each paycheck and deposited a sum in an account that

⁷⁰ Interview with Respondent 76C.

⁷¹ For a discussion of this finding, see infra note 161 and accompanying text.

⁷² Interview with Respondent 76C.

⁷³ See, e.g., O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 56, at 105.

⁷⁴ HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 198-204 (Doubleday 1963).

⁷⁵ See, e.g., Yale-New Haven Hospital, Nutrition Advisor: Delicious Meals for Half the Fat, http://www.ynhh.org/online/nutrition/advisor/dining_out.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2006); Dr. Gourmet, Ten Quick Tips for Healthy Eating: July 17, 2006,

http://www.drgourmet.com/column/dr/071706.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).

⁷⁶ See, e.g., National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, How to Cut Down on Your Drinking, http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/handout.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).

could be accessed only for Christmas or vacation purposes. Another participant consolidated her credit-card debt through a credit union and repaid her loans at a lower interest rate by having the funds withdrawn from her paycheck. Middle- and upper-class consumers have access to a greater number of financial commitment devices, ranging from participating in 401(k) plans to investing in illiquid assets such as homes. Indeed, the vast majority of assets held by United States households can be characterized as commitment devices, even if they were not purchased for that reason.

There is strong evidence for a preference for pre-commitment devices in humans. In one powerful experiment, students in an MIT executive education class were assigned three short papers. The experimenters gave students in one section of the class three evenly-spaced deadlines. They allowed students in the other section to select their own deadlines, requiring them to submit binding deadline schedules during the second week of class. There was no advantage, such as feedback, to turning in papers earlier than the last day of class, and there was a grade penalty for late papers in both conditions. Only one-third of the students chose to take advantage of the full time available to them. The rest chose to bind themselves in advance even though they risked a penalty and gained no reward other than the external commitment to avoid procrastinating. 81

In other words, two-thirds of the students demonstrated a preference for a system that provided an external punishment (in the form of grade penalties) for procrastination, when they could have set the same deadlines for themselves without risking their grades. They recognized in advance, whether consciously or not, that at the moment they faced the short-term

⁷⁷ Interview with Respondent D11. She reported satisfaction with this arrangement.

⁷⁸ Laibson, *supra* note 56.

⁷⁹ *Id.* at 445.

⁸⁰ The early, ground-breaking work demonstrated such preferences in pigeons. In the first phase of the studies, pigeons were given a choice of pecking two buttons, one which dispensed a smaller reward sooner and another which gave a larger reward later. They invariably chose the former. In the second phase, they were given a third option ahead of time. By pecking this third button in advance, they could prevent the smaller reward sooner button from activating when the time came, thus limiting themselves to the larger-later reward. After learning the new system, several pigeons chose this route, committing themselves to withstanding the temptation and receiving the larger reward. G. W. Ainslie, *Impulse Control in Pigeons*, 21 J. OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAV. 485, 485-89 (1974); H. Rachlin & L. Green, *Commitment, Choice, and Self-control*, 17 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAV. 15, 15-22 (1972).

⁸¹ Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, *Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment*, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219, 219-224 (2002).

costs of writing the papers, their own long-term preferences for spacing the papers evenly throughout the semester would not provide enough incentive to complete the papers earlier than the external deadline required. They chose the procrastination-prevention device, even though the only concrete "benefit" it offered was the possibility of a lower grade.

This study also demonstrated an advantage of advance commitment devices. Students whose paper deadlines were evenly spaced throughout the semester – whether by choice or by assignment – received significantly better grades on the papers than the students who chose a more concentrated deadline distribution. Indeed, commitment devices are generally seen as positive choices. Anecdotally, they appear to enable people to eat more healthily and manage addiction. And both the popular and academic literature about savings laud commitment devices as essential for boosting savings rates.

Credit cards, on the other hand, are the antithesis of a commitment device. They exacerbate the effects of hyperbolic discounting by allowing consumers to receive benefits long before they internalize the costs. With a traditional loan, a consumer typically begins making installment payments soon after the loan originates. If the loan is unaffordable, it will quickly become apparent to a low-income borrower. With credit cards, the size of the minimum payment does not reflect the ultimate affordability of the loan. It is easy for a consumer to continue purchasing on credit without a reality check from her pocketbook. Many of the study participant accumulated large balances before understanding the effect of minimum-payment system on the amount that appeared to be due each month.

Compounding this problem is the ability to borrow in extremely small increments. The amount of the loan increases with each purchase a consumer makes. Some commentators have criticized credit cards as enabling increasingly large levels of consumer debt through incremental borrowing, ⁸⁶ but the mechanism behind the connection has not been

⁸² *Id*.

⁸³ See supra notes 77-78.

⁸⁴ In fact, economist David Laibson argues that the increasing ability to borrow against illiquid assets – and therefore the decreasing effectiveness of these assets as commitment decreases – is responsible for the declining savings rates. Laibson, *supra* note 56.

⁸⁵ For low-income borrowers, the traditional loans are rent-to-own stores and pawn shops. Rent-to-own stores typically require weekly payments, and pawn shops force the borrower to internalize the costs of the loan up-front through the surrender of collateral. ⁸⁶ *See* THERESA SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 111-12 (2000).

explored. Hyperbolic discounting provides one answer. Research has shown that humans discount small outcomes more heavily than large ones, 87 so the incremental nature of credit card loans compounds consumers' hyperbolic discounting tendencies.

Not only have credit cards removed the pre-commitment element of other lending products, the device makes it difficult for consumers to develop their own personal systems of advance commitment in their credit-card usage. One troubling finding from this study is that even a consumer who is fully aware of her propensity to accumulate debt and wants to bind herself to a specific borrowing level lacks good options.

C. Participant Attempts at Advance Commitment in Credit-Card Usage

The participants in this study developed creative strategies for limiting their future borrowing, ⁸⁸ but most were sub-optimal and required the consumer to forgo benefits of credit cards. As described in Figure 2, 52 percent of all participants, or 79 percent of those who reported temptation, attempted to implement at least one strategy. In the remainder of this subsection, I analyze the three major points at which consumers make decisions about credit-card borrowing. At each point, I describe the attempts of the study participants to impose advance limits on their borrowing and discuss the limits of these strategies. These decision points are: (1) the time when a consumer decides to obtain a credit card, (2) the time she purchases with the credit card, and (3) the time she borrows on it. ⁸⁹ The participants' strategies are summarized in Figure 3.

⁸⁷ Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, *supra* note 56, at 363.

⁸⁸ Over eighty percent of the participants who mentioned temptation developed at least one strategy for resisting it.

⁸⁹ My decision points are similar to those used by Bar-Gill in "Seduction by Plastic," but with one important difference. He defines t=0 as the moment when a consumer decides whether to obtain a credit card, t=1 as the time when she decides to purchase or borrow on her credit card, and t=2 as the time when the bill is due. Bar-Gill, *supra* note 55, at 1396. Because his focus is on application and purchasing decisions, his third time period, t=2, represents the time when a consumer experiences the consequences of her prior decisions, rather than a time for additional decision-making. *Id.* In his model, the decision to purchase and the decision to borrow occur simultaneously, at t=1. In contrast, I separate the purchasing and borrowing moments, to better reflect the reality that a consumer may purchase on her credit card without deciding whether to borrow. Instead, the borrowing decision comes later when she receives the bill and decides whether to pay it in full. Thus, I use the same three time points as Bar-Gill, but modify the second and third ones, so that the second reflects only purchasing decisions and the third reflects only borrowing decisions. Of course, for consumers with limited means, the decision to purchase with a credit card often is in effect a decision to borrow. On the other hand, at

Figure 2





Figure 3



A consumer's most effective opportunity for advance commitment is the moment of applying, or not applying, for a credit card. Ten percent of the women in the current study chose not to apply for credit cards because

the moment of purchase, credit card users are often unaware that they are spending beyond their monthly budget.

they suspected that they would spend more than they wanted. As one explained, "Because I know how I am. There's always something I want more than I need. So I already know, if I start putting things on there, I'm going to like add...I can just add another like...another 100 bucks won't matter." This strategy is not without consequences. These women were unable to take advantage of the benefits of credit cards discussed, *supra*, in Part II.

The moment of applying for a credit card is not just an opportunity to constrain future behavior; it presents a temptation itself. Under the current system, there is no way to pre-commit to living without a credit card (or with a limited number) for a specified period of time. Moreover, consumers are constantly faced with temptation in the form of pre-approved mail and telephone offers. Over ninety percent of participants said they received credit card offers on a regular basis, with several claiming to receive more than one a day. It should be remembered that 52 percent of the study participants lived in public housing, and the rest lived in Section 8 housing, which tends to be available largely in low-income neighborhoods. These mailings suggest that credit card issuers see low-income people as a targeted portion of their customer base. 92

In response, 24 percent of the participants described tearing up all credit card offers without opening them in order to avoid the temptation they presented. (One participant also threw hers away without looking at them.) As one woman said when asked why she tore up her credit card offers, "[that way], I won't fill it out. I know it's done." This strategy has two major drawbacks. First, it is highly imperfect as a precommitment device. The consumer must make the commitment decision

⁹⁰ Interview with Respondent 12R.

⁹¹ The data on the number of offers participants receive is imprecise because it requires detailed recall and most likely varies over time. The original study design asked participants to save the offers they received to provide exact data on this point, but after hearing a few participants describe the temptation these offers presented, I realized that this would violate my university's human subjects protections. Several participants also described receiving telephone solicitations. Anecdotally, it appeared that women who were heavy credit card borrower received constant telephone offers while other women received almost none. Complete data on this point was unavailable because many participants screened out unknown telephone calls using caller identification.

⁹² Of course is it also possible that public housing residents in particular receive a large

⁹² Of course is it also possible that public housing residents in particular receive a large number of offers simply because they tend to maintain a single address over long periods of time

⁹³ An additional sixteen percent of the women described destroying these offers because of identity-theft concerns.

⁹⁴ Interview with Respondent G88.

repeatedly each time a new offer arrives. Further, she must expose herself to the temptation more closely in order to remove it – holding the offer in her hands and refraining from opening it as she tears it up. Second, it is a lot of work to avoid applying for a credit card. As one participant described her time-consuming experience destroying these offers for identity-theft reasons:

We have the mailing address and the residential address. So I get one from CapitalOne, they would send out both to me. They know it's the same person, come on. . . . But I said to myself, that they can't lure me in again. . . . I would go through each envelope before I would trash it. And I'd tear off my name, wherever my name and address is on it whatever. Just rip it up because I'm most skeptical about that when I throw away the mail. . . . So that was time-consuming because you're getting these things several times a week. Virtually it's five times a week, weekdays out of the week, five days out of a seven-day week.

This participant later learned of her ability to opt out of receiving credit-card solicitations and did so.

The second time a consumer makes a decision about credit card use is at the moment of purchase. For low-income consumers, this time has particular significance because they have fewer options at the time of repayment. Many study participants described themselves as purchasing more than they intended when they applied for a credit card. Thus, women in the study developed creative ways of binding themselves in advance of these decisions. One described intentionally "losing" her credit card somewhere in her apartment, so that she would not be able to charge on it. Honother stated that she kept her credit cards in a lock box, explaining: "... I didn't want to have an impulse item say 'buy me.' And I'd be like, 'I've got my card. Why can't I?' If it's put away, and it's locked, I'd have to go all the way home, and I'd realize this is a sign from God, you don't really need it." A third kept hers at home instead of in her wallet. The main disadvantage of this strategy – in addition to the possibility of actually losing one's credit card in the process of

⁹⁵ Interview with Respondent 64F.

⁹⁶ Interview with Respondent 99Z.

⁹⁷ Interview with Respondent 557.

⁹⁸ Interview with Respondent 76C.

intentionally losing it – is that it is counter-productive. It requires a consumer to not have her credit card with her at the times she might need it, particularly in times of emergency.

Other participants attempted to limit their spending through strategic use of their credit limit, which theoretically provides a mechanism for committing oneself to a limited amount of credit-card spending. One participant used only low-limit credit cards for this reason. Two additional participants tried to take advantage of this by asking their issuers to lower their credit limit. One decided to cancel the card altogether partway through the telephone call. The other was unsuccessful. She earned approximately \$25,000 per year and had a credit card which raised her limit to \$10,000. She called the company several times, asking it to lower her credit limit. Company representatives said they would decrease the limit, but never did. 99

Moreover, even when a consumer has a lower credit limit, that credit limit does not cap her spending, but only imposes penalties for exceeding it. This system caught several participants by surprise. They thought that if they could make a purchase, they were still within their credit limit. They often learned otherwise only when they received their bill and saw that they had exceeded their credit limit and acquired several over-limit fees in the process. This distinction between commitment devices that provide real limits and those that only increase the penalties for choosing the tempting option is crucial for designing credit cards that allow consumers to better effectuate their long-term preferences.

The final decision point comes when a consumer chooses whether or not to borrow, that is, whether to pay her credit-card bill in full upon receipt or whether to carry a balance into the future. Obviously, a consumer may make this determination at the point of purchase by making a purchase she does not intend to fully cover at the end of the billing cycle. And in the case of a consumer whose financial resources will not accommodate a given purchase, she makes that decision by default. She is not required, however, to face the decision about whether to borrow, or to commit herself to the consequences, until the moment she decides whether to pay her balance in full. The women did not describe any advance commitment mechanisms that they had developed with respect to this decision because, for them, there are none. The most likely way to commit to paying the balance in full each month is to establish an

⁹⁹ Interview with Respondent 777.

¹⁰⁰ This contrasts with the Japanese system, where credit-card users must make this decision at the time of purchase. *See supra* note 37.

automatic withdrawal from a bank account. For a population that is largely unbanked and has limited Internet access, this is not an option.

Moreover, low-income credit card users are at a further disadvantage at this decision point. Avoiding difficulties with credit cards requires payment habits that are in direct contradiction with the strategies many low-income families have developed to survive. Low-income women, by necessity, are experts at managing financial resources under scarcity Sixty percent of participants characterized themselves as having trouble paying their bills currently or all the time, and an additional 16 percent mentioned specific times during the past year when they struggled to make ends meet. 101 They described a variety of strategies for coping with a chronic lack of resources – ranging from finding furniture on the street to searching for scholarships for their children's activities – but by far the most prevalent strategy was juggling bills every month. Seventy percent of the women said that when they were unable to pay their bills, they paid bills late or negotiated smaller payments for the They detailed elaborate systems for deciding which bills to prioritize and how delinquent a bill must be before a non-priority bill was elevated to the "must pay now" category. They have become skilled at identifying which bills can be paid how late in order to avoid immediate catastrophe. 102

Credit cards wreck havoc with this strategy. The financial skills low-income women have developed are maladaptive to the situation of sudden access to relatively large sums of money. Under the participants' usual strategy, credit cards make ideal bills on which to delay payment because lateness will not result in an immediate eviction notice or shutting off of the electricity. Delaying payment, however, is the precise behavior that can cause a family to become mired in debt over time. As one participant explained, "I really, really don't like credit cards. I think they set people up, especially poor lower-income people. When they get them in, and they are not used to having something, I think it's one big set up. . . ,104

¹⁰¹ Nationally, one in four workers are suffering from financial distress. E. Thomas Garman et al., Final Report: 30 Million Workers in America—One in Four—Are Seriously Financially Distressed and Dissatisfied Causing Negative Impacts on Individuals, Families, and Employers 3 (Mar. 23, 2005).

¹⁰² For example, the immediate consequences of paying rent late in a public housing project, *see supra* note 16, caused every participant who discussed this matter to say she was careful always to make rent payment her top priority.


¹⁰³ See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 86.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Respondent 777.

III. SELF-DIRECTED CREDIT CARDS

It would be possible to develop a second generation of credit cards that enable customers to handle their cognitive shortcomings more effectively. I term these products "self-directed" credit cards, but they could be marketed to consumers under more colloquial labels, such as "You're in Charge" credit cards or "Safe" credit cards. This Article offers several variations on self-directed credit cards, many of which were suggested in rough form by participants. Participants also contributed insight on topics such as consumer education that affect the implementation of self-directed cards. Figure 3 presents the percentage of participants who suggested each proposal discussed in this paper. ¹⁰⁵

Figure 4



All self-directed credit cards have three underlying themes. First, they permit consumers to exercise more control over their credit-card usage by pre-committing to certain levels and types of credit-card spending and borrowing. The first group of self-directed cards, discussed in Subpart B, modify existing credit cards by allowing all customers to self-impose these constraints. The second group, discussed in Subpart C, are new credit-

¹⁰⁵ Participants offered a tremendous variety of policy suggestions. By a conservative estimate, their ideas fell into nearly thirty broad categories. Figure 3 includes all ideas proposed by at least 20 percent of respondents as well as the ideas that are particularly relevant for this paper.

card products specifically designed to meet the pre-commitment needs of low-income borrowers.

The second unifying feature of self-directed credit cards is that they all allow for flexible implementation. Each product is well-suited to implementation through the private market, traditional government regulation, or a hybrid system proposed in Subpart E, *infra*. The first two implementation schemes are self-explanatory. Private-market implementation would mean encouraging competitors to offer the self-directed products, while government regulation would mean requiring issuers to offer their customers self-directed credit cards.

The third option would consist of a regulatory system that consumers could enter on an individual basis, allowing them to select their preferred regulatory regime at the time they decide whether to obtain a credit card at all. Current law enables consumers to "opt out" of receiving pre-screened credit card solicitations in the mail. 106 There is no reason, however, why the opt-out system need be limited to an "on/off" switch where consumers simply choose to receive or not to receive credit-card offers. This system could be expanded so that consumers could not only choose whether they would like to obtain credit cards, but also what kind of credit cards they would like. Consumers could then sign up for a "safe credit card plan" that would permit issuers to send them solicitations only for self-directed cards. The regulatory menu system also has enormous potential to restructure the credit card market to allow for vastly more consumer choice. It would enable consumers to channel demand for specific credit cards term and force issuers to decide whether to accommodate that demand or abandon soliciting that group of consumers.

The third central feature of self-directed credit cards is that they would all move credit cards from a model where the typical low-income borrower accumulates an unaffordable balance and makes the bulk of her payments as fees and interest to one where the low-income borrower has a reasonable chance of repaying the credit that was initially extended. Ronald Mann has identified the former model as the "sweat box" of credit card debt. He explains that, while most traditional lenders profit from customers who repay their loans, most credit-card issuers profit from borrowers who accumulate a balance. Credit-card companies charge these borrowers higher interest rates and more fees, which enable them to receive larger total payments than if the customers had paid their balances regularly. Mann asserts that "[t]he successful credit card lender profits

¹⁰⁶ This system is discussed in detail in Part III.A, *infra*.

from the borrowers who become financially distressed." One participant eloquently explained the model in personal terms:

[T]hey're taking advantage of poor people, and they know what the outcome is going to be. They know that if you miss two or three payments, you're going to owe them ten times more than you originally did. When I originally took out that card, I didn't know how quickly the amount could skyrocket, till you owe them an arm and a leg. But they knew, and that's why they did it. 108

An important goal of self-directed credit cards is to move low-income credit-card users out of the "sweat box" and into the realm of traditional loans.

A. Opting In and Opting Out

The one regulatory pre-commitment device already available is the opt-out system, which allows consumers to "opt out" of receiving prescreened credit card offers in the mail. 109 The opt-out system is incomplete and ineffective, but it is suggestive of a framework that could allow for a significant expansion of consumer choice and control. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act to allow consumers to "opt out" of receiving pre-screened credit-card and insurance offers in the mail. 110 This tool would seem to allow consumers to pre-commit to not obtaining a credit card through this channel and alleviate the temptation the offers present. Data from the current study, however, suggest that the current system is not effective. Of the fifty study participants, only one mentioned the ability to opt out of credit card She did opt out, but it took her two attempts to do so successfully. In addition, six percent of participants suggested the creation of an opt-out system as a change they would like to see. A 2004 Federal Reserve study found that only approximately twenty percent of consumers are aware of the opt-out list's existence. 111

¹⁰⁷ Ronald J. Mann, *The "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt*, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 376, 385 (2007) [hereinafter *Sweat Box*].

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Respondent A26.

¹⁰⁹ 15 U.S.C. 1681m(d)(1)(D), (E) (2006).

¹¹⁰ 15 U.S.C. 1681m(d)(1)(D), (E) (2006).

¹¹¹ BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON UNSOLICITED WRITTEN OFFERS OF CREDIT

The major reasons for this lack of knowledge seem clear. Telecommunications Act did specify that companies sending pre-approved offers must notify consumers of the right to opt out of receiving future solicitations, 112 but it was only with the passage of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)¹¹³ in 2003 that Congress directed the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to impose visibility requirements on these notifications. 114 By 2004, fewer than ten percent of people who knew of the opt-out system, or two percent of the total population, had learned of it through the notices included in their pre-screened credit offers. 115 While the FTC issued comprehensive regulations regarding visibility in 2005, 116 they are unlikely to have a large effect. Under the new regulations, a consumer still must open and read the credit card offer to find the opt-out notice, and yet approximately ninety percent of consumers either do not open the solicitation envelopes or only glance at the materials inside. 117 To alert this ninety percent of their opt-out rights, it would be necessary to post the notice prominently on the outside of the envelope.

In addition to being unfamiliar to the vast majority of consumers, several features of the opt-out system itself limit its effectiveness. Both the telephone and Internet procedures for opting out are potentially confusing and contain information seemingly designed to persuade consumers not to opt out. And once a consumer does opt out

AND INSURANCE 4 (Dec. 2004), https://www.optoutprescreen.com/

UnsolicitedCreditOffers2004.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE 2004]. Approximately six percent of all consumers have exercised the opt-out right. *Id*.

¹¹² Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).

¹¹³ 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.

¹¹⁴ 15 U.S.C. 1681m(d)(1).

¹¹⁵ FEDERAL RESERVE 2004, *supra* note 111, at 32.

¹¹⁶ 16 C.F.R. §§ 642, 698.

¹¹⁷ FEDERAL RESERVE 2004, *supra* note 111, at 33 tbl.5.

Upon calling the toll-free opt-out telephone number maintained by the credit agencies, one is greeted with the message: "You've reached the consumer credit reporting industry opt-in and opt-out number." 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e)(5)(A)(i) (1997). After selecting whether to continue in English or Spanish, the message continues, "on this call you can add or remove your name from receiving firm offers of credit or insurance based on your credit report with Experian, Equifax, Innovus and TransUnion." Copied by author from telephone calls to 888-5-OPT-OUT placed on Aug. 21, 2006. The message does not mention stopping credit card offers. The closest it comes is with the word "opt-out," but calling it the "opt-in and opt-out number" obfuscates its purpose as an "opt-out" line. The telephone system is entirely automated – there is no option to speak to an agent – and requires consumers to divulge personal information such as social security numbers, a prospect that may be unsettling to someone calling due to concern about identity theft.

successfully, she still may receive credit card offers. The system allows consumers only to opt out from receiving pre-screened credit card offers and only a subset of those. It technically allows a consumer to prohibit issuers from using the data in the consumer's credit report for pre-screened solicitations. A consumer has no ability to opt out of offers generated without the use of personal data (i.e., not pre-screened) or generated with data from the issuer's corporate affiliates. 120

Regulating data usage instead of mailings enabled lawmakers to avoid the constitutional issues associated with statutes, such as the Do-not-call list, that allow consumers to directly opt out of direct-marketing advertising, ¹²¹ but gives consumers less control over the direct advertising they receive. In addition, the effectiveness of the current opt-out system relies on the underutilization. If opt-outs were better known, companies might resort to more non-prescreened mail. In its 2004 study, the Federal Reserve Board argued that further "restrictions on sending prescreened solicitations are likely to cause creditors and insurers to use less-efficient techniques to market their services, including additional mailings to prospective customers and to those unqualified for the product or service."122 This argument applies equally to a situation where a large portion of consumers take advantage of the current opt-out system. Approximately thirty percent of consumers who know of the opt-out option, or six percent of the total population, use it. 123 If opting out of credit card offers were to obtain the mass familiarity of programs such as

For a further critique of the telephone system, see Anuradha Raghunathan, No Easy Escape 'Opting out' - Taking Action to Cut off Credit Card Solicitations, Spam and the Like - Is Easier Said than Done, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 26, 2004, at A1.

While the opt-out web site provides more information, it dedicates approximately one-third of its front web page to a section entitled "What are the benefits of receiving firm offers?" There is no corresponding section explaining the benefits of opting out. The site does, however, suggest benefits for opting in: "In doing so, you will soon be among the many consumers who can significantly benefit from having ready access to product information on credit and insurance products that may not be available to the general public." OptOutPrescreen.com, https://www.optoutprescreen.com/?rf=t (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).

¹¹⁹ See generally 15 U.S.C. 1681m. The opt-out system is maintained jointly by the major credit-reporting agencies.

¹²⁰ See 16 C.F.R. 313.4(b)(1) (2006).

¹²¹ See Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 812 (2004).

¹²² FEDERAL RESERVE 2004, *supra* note 111, at 48.

¹²³ *Id.* at 4.

the do-not-call list, that could, in fact, mean an increase in other types of direct marketing from credit cards.

On the other hand, an improved opt-out system could be a very effective tool for credit-card users struggling with rising debt. The 2004 Federal Reserve Board study found that consumers with higher total credit card balances were more likely to opt out than those with lower ones. Similarly, the more credit accounts a consumer has, the more likely she is to opt out.¹²⁴ The Federal Reserve attributes these findings to the possibility that consumers with more credit: "(1) are not looking for further credit or (2) are more familiar with the opt-out process or both."¹²⁵ Another explanation, suggested by the current study, is that consumers with more credit accounts and higher total balances are more likely to be concerned about mounting debt and seeking ways to prevent incurring more. ¹²⁶

Allowing consumers to opt out of all credit card solicitations would be a small step in the right direction. Such a system would likely pass constitutional muster, as the do-not-call list did before it.¹²⁷ It would give consumers more control over their credit-card usage by allowing them to fully pre-commit to not obtaining a credit card based on offers that arrive by mail.

A more comprehensive response to the underutilization difficulties that plague the opt-out system is an opt-in system. Although many legal observers are cognizant of the power of default rules, label almost no

¹²⁴ FEDERAL RESERVE 2004, *supra* note 111, at 4-5.

¹²⁵ Id.

¹²⁶ Two contradictory findings from the Federal Reserve study have the potential to weaken or strengthen this hypothesis. On one hand, the Federal Reserve Board found that consumers with higher credit ratings were more likely to opt out than those with lower credit ratings. *Id.* at 26. This would suggest that individuals who have more trouble paying their current credit bills are less likely to opt out. On the other hand, the study found that both individuals with collection items and those with public-records actions in their credit files were more likely to opt out than the general population. *Id.* This finding supports my hypothesis that consumers with negative debt experience are more likely to seek a means of eliminating credit-card offers. The Federal Reserve study notes that having collection items or public-records actions in one's file is likely to lower one's credit score, but does not attempt to reconcile the collection items and public-records actions findings with the credit-score finding. Because this portion of the study examined only credit reports, from which all personal identifiers had been redacted, the researchers could not control for consumers' education or income. These and other related variables might explain the discrepancy.

¹²⁷ Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d at 1236.

¹²⁸ See, e.g., Sunstein, infra note 156, at 258-59.

commentators, in either the legal literature or the popular press, have considered the possibility of an opt-in system. The 2004 study by the Federal Reserve Board appears to be the only large-scale record of public preferences on opt-out issues, but it asked consumers exclusively about an opt-out system and a complete ban on credit card solicitations. It did not ask about the intermediate option of an opt-in system.

Substituting an opt-in system for the current opt-out regime would be a major step. The credit card industry is heavily dependent on access to consumer data for pre-screened offers. As Ronald Mann argues in *Charging Ahead*, it is America's liberal use-of-data policies that have enabled the success of the credit card industry in the United States. He compares the degree to which other countries allow credit card companies to use consumer data for pre-screened offers and finds a strong correlation between a country's data-privacy regime and its consumer credit-card penetration. In the United States, more than two-thirds of new credit card accounts are generated through pre-screened offers. Thus, changing the system could have a large positive impact on consumers who struggle with the temptation of credit cards, but would also devastate the credit card industry. Detailed study of these benefits and costs would be needed before an opt-in system could be seriously considered.

B. Consumer-Controlled Credit Limits and Other General Precommitment Devices

Allowing consumers to opt-out of or opt-in to receiving credit-card solicitations only decreases temptation at the point of obtaining one. As explained in Part II.C, *supra*, however, many study participants sought ways to maintain credit cards while limiting the temptation to spend and borrow on them. An opting system can support that goal by allowing consumers who already have one credit card to avoid receiving future offers, but it is a blunt instrument in this respect. The self-directed credit cards proposed in this Article can facilitate this balance more precisely.

¹²⁹ One exception is Raghunathan, *supra* note 118.

¹³⁰ FEDERAL RESERVE 2004, *supra* note 111.

¹³¹ *Id.* at 38.

¹³² *Id.* at 28.

¹³³ Charging Ahead, supra note 3, at 113-18.

 $^{^{134}}$ Id.

¹³⁵ FEDERAL RESERVE 2004, *supra* note 111, at 8-9. The study does not differentiate between offers that were based on information obtained through credit reporting agencies and those based on data obtained through corporate affiliates.

Several of the self-directed credit cards modify the product to address spending temptation directly. One option, suggested by eight percent of participants, is consumer-controlled credit limits. Credit card companies could be required to give consumers the option of capping their own credit limits, or – to take this idea one step further – could be prohibited from raising a consumer's credit limit without express consent. Eight percent of participant suggested this modification. As one participant stated, "What they shouldn't do is tempt people by saying every three or four months, oh, your credit limit has been increased."

Currently, issuers can increase a customer's limit at any time, even when the customer has a significant unpaid balance. Several study participants reported receiving unwanted credit-limit raises, and as discussed in Part II.C, *supra*, two participants attempted, with mixed results, to persuade their companies to return their limits to previous levels. The converse of this practice is that companies are not always willing to raise a credit limit when the consumer desires an increase. One participant described asking her credit card company for an increased credit limit, being turned down, and then shortly afterwards receiving an automated letter informing her that her credit limit was being raised. What this anecdote illustrates, besides the lack of internal coordination of this particular credit card company, is that credit limits are under the exclusive discretion of credit card issuers. The current study suggests consumers would benefit if credit limits were mutually determined.

There is a range of ways such a system could be implemented, with each alternative representing a point on the spectrum of mutuality. On one end, credit card companies could be prohibited from issuing credit-limit raises unless consumers requested them. Companies could include a form with their monthly bills, which consumers could fill out and return when they wanted a credit-limit raise. A milder variant of this option would allow consumers to opt-in or opt-out of such a regime on an individual basis by checking a box in the initial credit card contracts. On the other end of the spectrum, credit card companies could issue credit-limit raises as they currently do, but would be required to allow consumers to reject the raise within a specified period of time. A compromise option would allow credit card companies to send notifications of potential credit limit raises, but require consumers to return an acceptance form before it became effective. Further study of the trade-offs between ease-of-

¹³⁶ Interview with Respondent 9JK.

¹³⁷ Interview with Respondent 2AU.

implementation and an acceptable degree of consumer consent is needed, but any of these alternatives would be a step in the right direction.

Similarly, there are a number of ways to implement the step where a consumer reactivates a credit increase she had previously declined. It could be as simple as the consumer calling her issuer and asking for the increase. At the other end of the spectrum, she could be required to mail in a form. An intermediate option would allow the transaction to take place over the telephone, but require information (such as account number or exact amount of her previous purchase) that consumers would likely keep at home. That way, the consumer would need to go home to ask for the credit increase, rather than calling on her cell phone from the store. The key to this step is that it would allow the consumer to pre-commit to a time delay before spending beyond her credit limit, much like the theory behind a "cooling off" period before purchasing a gun. For the participant described, supra, who kept her credit card in a lock box, the time delay of needing to go home would be enough. As she explained, having to "go all the way home" gave her the time for reflection to realize "this is a sign from God, you don't really need it." Other consumers might need a lesser or greater delay for the credit limit to serve as an effective precommitment device.

Of course, for any of these options to be effective, the function of the credit limit would have to change. Currently, the "limit" in the term "credit limit" is illusory. Rather than actually restricting the amount a consumer can charge on a credit card, the limit simply subjects the user to additional fees and interest when it is exceeded. In the language of psychology literature, the current limits provide punishments after the fact rather than actual restraints. Several study participants were surprised by this system when they began using credit cards. They reported having used their credit limits to keep track of how much they were spending and were unpleasantly surprised to find, upon receiving their bills, that they had exceeded their credit limits. A system in which a credit limit prevented a user from charging beyond the specified amount would turn credit limits into effective pre-commitment devices and enable consumers

¹³⁸ See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

¹³⁹ See, e.g., credit card statement of participant 283, CapitalOne, Platinum Mastercard Account, Mar. 6, 2006 (on file with author). Here, the participant was charged a \$29.00 overlimit fee for charging \$64.00 when her previous balance was \$641.30 and her credit limit was \$500.00.

¹⁴⁰ H. Rachlin, *Self-control: Beyond Commitment*, 18 BEHAV. AND BRAIN SCI. 109 (1995).

to maintain better control of their spending. Under this system, credit card companies would be required to decline a credit card purchase when it would exceed a user's credit limit, much like a debit-card issuer does when a consumer has insufficient funds. Alternatively, the company could inform the consumer that the purchase would put her over the limit, so the consumer has the option at the moment of purchase not to complete the transaction. This option would have the additional advantage of transferring the impact of not being able to pay one's credit card bill to the time of purchase, when the consumer has more ability to change course. Again, there are a variety of options for allowing consumers to opt out of or opt into such a system, but any of the alternatives would give consumers a path toward pre-committing to a preferred level of credit card spending.

Consumer-driven credit limits are just one way of enabling credit-card users to manage their spending before they are faced with the temptation of an immediate purchase. Credit limits are an obvious first step because they already exist and would only need to be modified. But a number of new mechanisms would allow credit-card users even greater control. Consumers could request to be "blacked out" of charging at certain stores they find particularly tempting, or conversely, they could allow themselves to charge only at stores such as supermarkets and pharmacies. With their self-imposed credit limits in hand, they could budget that credit on a monthly basis, allowing themselves to spend only a certain portion of their credit each month. Or more simply, they could "freeze" their creditcard usage altogether when their balance exceeded their comfort level. These options are particularly important for low-income consumers, whose financial security can be threatened by relatively low debt levels, but they would benefit middle- and upper-class credit-card users as well. For consumers with Internet access, all of these choices could be managed online with a time delay that would impose a "cooling off" period when a consumer sought to alter a previously-established forbearance mechanism.

The options to spend and borrow less are choices consumers already have, but currently they must make these decisions repeatedly and at the moment they are faced with a tempting purchasing decision. Self-directed credit cards would allow them to pre-commit to their longer-term preferences and minimize the chances that their short-term preferences would cause them to make spending decisions they would later regret.

¹⁴¹ Ronald Mann proposes the disclosure alternative and points out that it is already technologically feasible. *Charging Ahead*, *supra* note 3, at 162.

C. Borrowing Caps, Fixed-fee Credit Cards, and Installment Payment Plans

The above proposals are ways for consumers to control their usage of existing credit cards more effectively. There are also at least three forms of self-directed credit cards that would alter the basic structure so as to make the device less risky, particularly for low-income borrowers. One intriguing idea to which the study participants returned repeatedly is that of significantly lower lending caps. Of course private lending caps do exist in the form of determinations of credit-worthiness. But when asked what *changes* they would like to see to the credit-card system, 38 percent of participants answered that the credit they receive should be more realistically calibrated to their incomes. They emphasized that credit limits should be tied to one's ability to pay, even if the limits had to be enforced by law. A popular incarnation of this idea was to have "starter" or "trial" credit cards with limits of no more than \$250 or \$300. Once a consumer spent the initial funds, she would have to repay the entire amount before being issued additional credit. The credit limit would then increase gradually in direct response to the consumer's repayment of previously-borrowed amounts.

This approach has several advantages. Most obviously, credit limits that were more tightly bound to a family's actual ability to pay would enable low-income consumers to use credit cards without incurring unmanageable debt. Low-income families could still use credit cards as payment cards so long as they paid enough of their balance regularly to maintain some room in their credit limit. And they would know in advance that they faced a specific, finite credit limit, which would enable them to plan more successfully and better preserve that resource for true emergencies.

Further accessibility to a smaller credit card would have two additional advantages. First, it would address the discrimination concern voiced by so many of the participants. It would be a way to make credit cards available to the entire community while still preserving the companies' obvious need to make credit determinations on the basis of income. Such a credit card might even be realistic for families who cannot obtain credit cards under the current system. Second, on a practical level, the issuance of small credit cards as a matter of course would weaken the impetus to apply for a credit card as a test of one's personal or financial status. As mentioned above, twelve percent of participants said that they applied for

a card to see if they could obtain one.¹⁴² Once they received a credit card, several of these women went on to borrow amounts they came to regret. Thus, lessening this motivation for credit-card applications would have a positive effect.

Another possibility for a self-directed credit card is a fixed-fee card, in which all interest and fees would be included up-front with the credit limit. The credit card company would determine the ratio of interest and fees to principle ahead of time and convey this information to the consumer when it issued the card. For example, for a \$1,000 credit card, the credit card company would specify that, say, \$600 of this \$1,000 was interest and fees and \$400 of it was the actual limit on the amount the consumer could spend. The \$600 would represent the entire amount of interest and fees to be charged over the life of the loan. The consumer would not be able to spend more than \$400 on her credit card and would know in advance that this \$400 would cost her \$600 in interest and fees. Companies could set whatever interest and fees to principle ratio they calculated would compensate for the risks of the transaction, but they would be competing directly on the total amount charged, so they would need to keep this amount within the range that consumers would be willing to pay.

This would make a significant difference from the perspective of consumers. It would allow them to grasp the real cost of the loan at the time of borrowing and therefore to make more informed borrowing decisions. Giving consumers concrete information about the total costs of the loan ahead of time would make the financial terms of credit cards much less complicated and lessen the misunderstandings associated with how credit cards work. It would also force consumers to confront the total costs at the time they apply for and use them.

Issuers currently compete on the basis of interest rates, ¹⁴³ but because this competition focuses on initial interest rates, not on the total amount that consumers will pay, it fails to give sufficient decision-making information either to consumers who literally do not understand the events that trigger higher interest rates and fees or to those who underestimate the likelihood that they will be faced with these rates and fees. The focus on initial interest rates can be seen in the recent success of the zero-interest credit card. ¹⁴⁴ These cards offer interest rates of zero percent on either

¹⁴² See supra note 60 and accompanying text.

¹⁴³ See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 36.

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., Bruce Mohl, Enough Already: Pay Attention to Your Credit Cards, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 2003, at E1.

balance transfers or for a specified period of time. Consumers find these credit cards attractive at the time of application and purchase for the obvious reason that zero interest is a very low rate, but consumers who make borrowing decisions on the basis of a zero percent interest rate are, for the most part, inaccurately calculating the potential interest and fees they will pay. Setting the ratio of interest and fees to principle ahead of time, on the other hand, would force issuers to compete on the basis of total costs, and it would force consumers to internalize psychologically these costs earlier in the decision-making process.

Fixed-fee credit cards would also address the problems of consumers who have stopped charging on their credit cards and are struggling to pay down the already-accumulated debt that rises with mounting interest and Three study participants described this scenario with deep late fees. frustration. One participant told how she had accumulated \$700 of debt on a Sears credit card when she was working, but then suffered an aneurysm and could no longer make payments. Sears discontinued her line of credit, preventing her from making further charges. She has been trying to pay down the credit card since then, but approximately three years later, the balance is now \$1,200. She had a similar experience with a Filenes's card, where she managed to reduce her debt to \$100 only to see it rise to \$250 even though she has not used the card since. Her major suggestion for credit-card reform was to prohibit issuers from charging interest and fees once a borrower has stopped charging on the credit card and is working to pay down her debt. As she explained, "I think that if a credit card company cuts you off from . . . using that card anymore, give that person a chance to pay the bill off, as in not charging those late fees or the interest fees. At least the bill will get paid off." Other participants echoed this sentiment, including one who said, "when we're all charged up, and we can't pay anymore, you need to stop charging us interest, fees and all that stuff. Let us pay our credit card down." ¹⁴⁷

From an economic perspective, it would be difficult to mandate that credit-card issuers stop the interest clock when a borrower stops charging and enters the phase of paying down her debt. Even though the borrower may not feel that she is getting a benefit during this time, the lender is still losing the time value of the funds it has already extended. A fixed-fee credit card could solve this dilemma. By definition, a consumer using a fixed-fee credit card would not incur additional interest and fees when she

¹⁴⁵ *Id*.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Respondent 399.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Respondent K72.

is not making purchases, but the lender would have taken the risk into account when determining the price of the card.

An intermediate alternative to the fixed-fee credit card is one which offers installment payment plans. As one participant explained, credit cards could "make an arrangement like you can pay . . . like if it's 1,000, they should let you pay maybe in ten months or fifteen months. . . . Otherwise how are you going to clear that up?" Every purchase the consumer made would establish an installment payment plan requiring payment over a specified period of months. The issuer would immediately add the installment-plan interest to the price of the consumer's purchases, but if the borrower made the installment payments promptly, she would not be charged any additional interest or fees. If she missed a payment or paid late, then the issuer would charge her a late fee and additional interest on the missing payment.

In some ways, increasing the minimum payment is a step in the direction of installment-plan credit cards. In 2003, the inter-agency Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)¹⁴⁹ issued a "guidance" requiring credit-card issuers to increase the size of the minimum payment from approximately 2 percent to 4 percent.¹⁵⁰ A series of such initiatives would eventually increase the size of the minimum payment until it reached that of an installment payment – with one key difference. The installment idea presented here would require issuers to include the interest of the installment payments up-front so that a borrower who made all the payments on time would not incur any additional interest. Increasing the minimum payment under the current fee structure would not change the timing or the charging of interest on the unpaid balance.

Ten percent of participants suggested that issuers should increase their minimum payments or offer installment plans. But many had an important criticism of the way the minimum-payment change was implemented: the fact that it was applied to current balances.¹⁵¹ Thus, every participant who

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Respondent 34H.

¹⁴⁹ The FFIEC is an interagency group consisting of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.

¹⁵⁰ Joint Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FFIEC Agencies Issue Guidance on Credit Card Account Management and Loss Allowance Practices, NR 2003-01 (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2003-01.htm.; Mara Der Hovanesian, *Tough Love for Debtors*, Bus. Week, Apr. 25, 2005, at 98.

¹⁵¹ See, e.g., Charging Ahead, supra note 3, at 133; Julia Lane, Will Credit Cardholders Default over Minimum Payment Hikes?, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 331, 348 (2006).

mentioned the change described it negatively, maintaining that it increased her minimum payment without warning, often to a level she could not afford. Legal changes designed to help consumers manage credit cards must keep this pitfall in mind. Initiatives that require consumers to pay more up front in order to protect them from paying even larger amounts later must either apply only to debt acquired in the future or be implemented in a gradual manner.

D. Implementation

(1) Disclosure and Debiasing

The three primary ways to implement self-directed credit cards are through legal mandate, market solutions, and the hybrid opt-in system. The success of all three implementation schemes would hinge on consumer education. Of the 76 percent of study participants who had used credit cards, 87 percent described themselves as not understanding how their credit cards worked before using them. As discussed in Part II, *supra*, most credit-card users who participated in the study were "sophisticated" about credit cards by the time of the interview, but they acquired this sophistication largely through negative experiences with credit-card debt. Thus, consumers who had already experienced the negative consequences of credit cards would recognize the advantages of the alternatives presented here, but consumers who had not used credit cards would not. Without public education, these proposals would be ineffective in preventing the vast majority of low-income credit-card users from experiencing the "sweat box" at least once.

As uncontroversial as the idea of better information sounds, ¹⁵³ it would actually be a complex task to give consumers information in a manner they could use effectively. The central difficulty is that study participants wanted something beyond a literal knowledge of the workings of credit cards. They needed this literal knowledge, but they also wanted consumers like themselves to grasp on a psychological level the difficulties in using credit cards in a controlled manner.

With respect to literal understanding, almost all participants understood from the beginning that they would need to repay what they borrowed with interest. But many did not understand how high the interest would be, some because they generally did not understand how

¹⁵² See Part II.C, supra.

¹⁵³ Even this idea contrasts sharply with the current state of the law, which mandates financial counseling as a requirement for filing for bankruptcy, long after a family is in financial trouble. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2006).

interest was applied, others because they did not realize how quickly debt would accumulate when they paid only the minimum due. A few participants did not know about late fees and financing charges ahead of time; others did not realize that their interest rate could change. None of the participants evidenced an understanding of the more complex features of credit-card billing such as double-cycle billing and minimum-finance charges. The following quote is illustrative of the confusion many participants discussed: "Well, I knew...it said 26, but I didn't realize what that meant.... I didn't understand what 26 was and what was it causing or how was it going to be applied to my bill."

And yet, while 26 percent of participants suggested that issuers should provide better disclosures, many did not think they were an adequate solution. They said the information they needed could not be communicated on a form, even in larger print. Many were concerned that they would not understand the standardized language available on a form contract, no matter how it was written.

Others worried that new credit card users would have difficulty applying the disclosures to their own lives. They recalled their own early experiences with credit cards and remembered that they had to experience the consequences of credit-card borrowing first-hand before understanding the self-control challenges credit cards presented. Their point is echoed by Cass Sunstein in a recent paper about cognitive biases and credit-card borrowing: "the strategy of 'provide more information,' favored on standard economic grounds, should be helpful when people merely lack knowledge; but as a response to biases and self-control problems, it is most likely to be inadequate."

Many participants favored a more thorough form of information-provision. Twenty-two percent suggested classes for new credit-card users. What the women seemed to want was a way for people to more fully understand the consequences of credit-card usage before experiencing them. This is what psychologists call "debiasing." Debiasing is a form of psychological education designed to address the

¹⁵⁴ One participant had a thorough understanding of the complex universal-default system and argued for its abolition.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Respondent 803.

¹⁵⁶ Cass R. Sunstein, *Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, and the Law and Economics of Consumer Choice: Boundedly Rational Borrowing*, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 261 (2006).

learner's cognitive biases and distortions. ¹⁵⁷ In a situation like this, where some consumers begin with little information about the consequences of credit cards and have difficulty applying any information they do have to their own lives, debiasing might, as Sunstein suggests, "involve vivid accounts, by real people, of problems created by excessive borrowing."158 Such debiasing efforts could take place through classes, as some participants advocated; public-awareness campaigns, for which Sunstein argues; 159 or through the advertising of competitor banks offering selfdirected credit cards.

One counter-argument to the need for debiasing stems from the finding that a small number of participants did gain an understanding of the potential negative consequences of credit cards without using them. Fourteen percent of study participants never obtained credit cards because they believed they would lead to financial problems. 160 Many of these participants acquired their sophisticated understanding by witnessing the negatives experiences of friends and families. One woman learned from handling her grandfather's bills. 161 Moreover, this person-to-person education could increase as the longevity of credit card saturation in lowincome communities continues to increase. It is only in the last twentyfive years that credit cards have become easily accessible to low-income people, and that transition has occurred gradually. 162 The current study reveals evidence of this changing credit card market. The older a participant was, the older she was when she first obtained a credit card, ¹⁶³ meaning that younger women and older women were essentially obtaining their first credit cards at the same time. As credit cards become even more established in low-income communities, this will change, and people considering their first credit card will have the benefit of observing the experiences of their older friends and relatives.

¹⁵⁷ Id.; Baruch Fischhoff, Heuristics and Biases in Application, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 730, 747 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Grifin & Daniel Kahneman eds., Cambridge U. Press 2002).

 $^{^{158}}$ Sunstein, *supra* note 156, at 263. 159 *Id*.

¹⁶⁰ This percentage is higher than the percentage of participants who avoided obtaining a credit card for temptation reasons, as discussed in Part II.C, supra. Four percent of participants did not obtain credit cards because they foresaw financial difficulties, but did not consider credit cards a temptation.

¹⁶¹ Interview with Respondent DM1.

¹⁶² Moss & Johnson, *supra* note 1.

¹⁶³ This finding was significant at the p=.01 level.

These changes will not reach everyone, however, so public education with de-biasing will still be an important supplement. And in the meantime, it is an essential component of implementing self-directed credit cards.

(2) Profitability

The second threshold question for implementation is that of profitability. Low-income borrowers with self-directed credit cards would not be as profitable for credit-card companies as they are under the "sweat box" model, but if they would be at all profitable, then all three implementation structures are possible. The degree to which self-directed cards would decrease credit-card profitability depends in large part on the extent to which they interfere with issuers' current business model. Some of the self-directed alternatives, such as consumer-driven credit limits, would probably have a minimal impact, whereas the impact of a product like small credit cards would be much greater. Whether a given impact on profitability would deter issuers from offering self-directed cards depends, in turn, on the profit margins they are generating now. If issuers are making supra-normal profits, then the introduction of self-directed credit cards should not cause a decrease in access to credit. If, on the other hand, current profit margins are low, then current issuers would likely decrease access to credit were self-directed cards imposed by regulation, and new issuers would have little incentive to enter the market to offer these cards.

The question of current credit-card profitability is the subject of much debate. Federal Reserve data suggests that credit card profits are sufficiently higher than those of other forms of lending that a reduction in profit margins should not prevent issuers from offering self-directed credit cards. The 2005 Federal Reserve figures state that the industry average for large, monoline credit-card issuers is a return on assets (ROA) of 2.85 percent. The ROA for these banks ranged from 3.14 to 3.66 percent for the previous five years. In comparison, the pre-tax ROA for all commercial banks – including both credit-card banks and multi-product lenders – was 1.94 percent in 2005. These data suggest that banks are

¹⁶⁴ BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 3 (Jun. 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/2006/default.htm [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE 2006]. The Federal Reserve includes banks that have at least \$200 million in assets and specialize in consumer lending, at least 90 percent of which involves credit cards.

¹⁶⁵ Id. at 3.

¹⁶⁶ *Id.* at 4.

willing to offer other loans for lower profit margins than they currently offer credit cards, so self-directed cards could reduce credit-card profitability substantially before lenders would leave the market.

However, even though the Federal Reserve reports are the most reliable source of data on this point, ¹⁶⁷ they cannot definitively answer the question. They are not representative because they only include data from large banks which exclusively issue credit cards, and these banks are likely to have larger profit margins than smaller issuers. ¹⁶⁸ The banks covered by the Federal Reserve report account for 65.5 percent of the industry market share. ¹⁶⁹ And the alternative might result in even less accurate data. The Federal Reserve claims that collecting information on credit card profitability from banks that offer multiple lending products would not be reliable because of difficulties with cost allocation to lines of business. ¹⁷⁰ The agency discontinued collecting ROA information for smaller banks in 2000 because its sample became too small to provide reliable data by 1997. ¹⁷¹ Thus, the significance of the available data remains highly controversial. ¹⁷²

In light of this unclear evidence, one advantage of self-directed credit cards is that they are more of a financial product than a legal reform, so they are amenable to being tested in pilot programs that could assess their profitability. If the result is that self-directed credit cards cannot provide enough profit for implementation in the private marketplace, the implementation options would be narrowed considerably. One major option would remain: they could be offered by government entities or non-profits seeking to alleviate the distress of low-income borrowers. There is historical and international precedent for the idea of belowmarket lending sponsored by government and non-profit entities. It is believed that pawn shops were first created with the goal of combating usury by the Franciscans of the Catholic Church. Low-interest pawn

¹⁶⁷ The Federal Reserve data cited is based on reports commercial banks file with their supervisory agencies. *Id.* at 2.

 $^{^{168}}$ *Id.* at 4 n.3.

¹⁶⁹ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁷⁰ Id. at 4 n.3.

 $^{^{171}}$ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Profitability of Credit Card Operations of Depository Institutions n.4 (1999),

http://www.federalreserve.gov/ boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/1999/default.htm.

¹⁷² Compare Elizabeth Warren, Clean Cards (forthcoming 2007) with Zywicki, supra note 36, at 128-37.

¹⁷³ JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWN SHOPS, AND THE POOR 14 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1994).

shops spread across continental Europe, where they were maintained by the Church, private charities, and municipal governments. Several of the municipal pawn shops are still in operation. This form of lending is also prevalent in Mexico. Philanthropic pawn shops began in the United States in the mid-1800s. They were maintained as charitable non-profits, and by 1910, had reached such density that they established a national trade organization. Only one survived the general decline in pawn-broking that began in the 1930s and exists today as a non-profit. Municipalities and non-profits could emulate this model and might particularly benefit from studying its current success in Continental Europe and Mexico.

(3) Legal Mandate

Government regulation as discussed in this subsection refers to requiring private actors to offer self-directed credit cards, rather than the government offering them itself. Self-directed credit cards that build precommitment devices into the current model, as discussed in Subpart B, are ideal candidates for legal mandate because they would not actually regulate consumers, but rather require issuers to offer consumers more choice. This avoids any paternalism concerns, while allowing consumers more alternatives for imposing self-regulation on their credit-card spending. For such an initiative to be successful, however, the regulatory agencies would need to have a cognitive shift in their public education efforts. Current governmental initiatives follow the model of providing information rather than debiasing consumers. With the passage of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA), ¹⁸¹ Congress unified the federal government's financial information initiatives under the Financial Literacy and Education Commission (FLEC). 182 As its name suggests, FLEC's focus is financial literacy. Its strategy regarding credit appears to be the launching of a public-awareness campaign centered on the resources provided by its web site. 183 FLEC's web site does provide

¹⁷⁴ *Id.* at 13-14.

¹⁷⁵ *Id.* at 14 n.3.

¹⁷⁶ *Id*.

¹⁷⁷ *Id.* at 23.

¹⁷⁸ *Id.* at 24.

¹⁷⁹ This trend has since reversed, beginning in the late 1970s. *Id.* at 84.

¹⁸⁰ Id. at 24-25

¹⁸¹ 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2003).

¹⁸² 20 U.S.C. § 9702 (2006).

¹⁸³ Financial Literacy and Education Commission, Taking Ownership of the Future: the National Strategy for Financial Literacy 38 (2006),

useful financial information and issue warnings about financial scams, ¹⁸⁴ but its resources on credit are dedicated to providing consumers with more information, not helping them understand the interaction of credit cards and their own cognitive biases.

Regulation mandating that issuers offer small-scale, fixed-fee and installment-plan credit cards would have similar effects. It would be less desirable, however, to require that issuers offered only these products to their low-income customers. Mandating that credit card companies significantly reduce the credit limits they offer their low-income customers is unappealing. The main difficulty lies in determining the customer base to which any such law would apply. Requiring more income-appropriate credit limits for all credit card users would be an obviously over-inclusive solution, but defining an income point at which such limits became mandatory would be problematic on both a practical and a theoretical level. Practically speaking, such a law would necessitate complex regulatory work to determine the threshold income level and the appropriate credit limits for consumers with incomes below it. The more theoretical concern is that a law mandating different credit card terms for low-income people would not address, and indeed would arguably exacerbate, the fears about credit-card discrimination which study participants voiced. It could create a mandatory ghettoized credit card used only by low-income people. Mandating fixed-fee or installmentpayment credit cards seems no more possible. These credit cards raise similar concerns about whether such devices would be required for the whole population or only for lower-income populations, and if for lowerincome users, where to draw the line.

Examining the political infeasibility of mandating fixed-fee credit cards, and to a lesser extent, installment-payment credit cards, does provide an interesting thought experiment. Most commentators would probably agree that forcing credit card companies to switch to fixed-fee credit cards would have a devastating effect on the industry, but the basis for these arguments is telling. Of course there would be major transaction costs associated with making such a shift, and it would no doubt make issuers' fees "less accurate" in the sense that companies would have to predict which customers were likely to incur late fees and interest-rate increases in order to determine how much to charge each borrower. Issuers do have extremely sophisticated risk-analysis techniques, however,

http://www.mymoney.gov/pdfs/ownership.pdf. I have not found any evidence of a public awareness campaign.

¹⁸⁴ *Id*.

which would allow them to make these predictions with a high degree of accuracy. 185

The larger reason why a switch to fixed-fee credit cards would devastate the industry is the degree to which its current business model depends on deception. The effective interest rate – the ratio of interest and fees to principle over the entire course of the loan – of credit cards is much higher than the advertised initial interest rate. It is extremely difficult to calculate the prevailing rates of credit card interest and fees to principle. But it is fair to say that the 87 percent of credit-card users in the study who did not understand how their credit cards worked believed that their effective interest rate would be more favorable than it was. As discussed in Subpart A, *supra*, consumers both did not understand the terms of their contracts and underestimated the amount they would eventually owe. If credit-card issuers were to disclose up-front the total amount of interest payments and fees they expected each customer to accrue, credit cards would be a much less appealing product.

(4) Market Implementation

Even if they were profitable, the credit card companies that currently lend to low-income consumers would likely resist adopting self-directed credit cards voluntarily because they would less profitable than the current "sweat box" model. That does not mean, however, that other private actors could not be persuaded to offer them. One likely candidate is credit unions, whose mission is to serve low- and moderate-income consumers. Another possibility is "transactional" credit card companies who focus on providing services to middle- and upper-income convenience users and generate their major profits through annual fees and interchange fees. Self-directed credit cards would present an option for expanding their reach to low-income consumers without changing the foundation of their business model. Consumer-oriented non-profits seeking to address the problems associated with credit cards could experiment with opening affiliates to offer these cards.

¹⁸⁵ See, e.g., Charging Ahead, supra note 3, at 40; TIM WESTRICH & MALCOLM BUSH, BLINDFOLDED INTO DEBT: A COMPARISON OF CREDIT CARD COSTS AND CONDITIONS AT BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 1 (Woodstock Inst. 2005).

¹⁸⁶ The current study was unable to obtain anywhere near the amount of detailed documentation needed to perform these calculations for the sample.

¹⁸⁷ See Sweat Box, supra note 107.

¹⁸⁸ 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (2006).

¹⁸⁹ Sweat Box, supra note 107, at 384.

¹⁹⁰ See CASKEY, supra notes 173-93.

Private entities offering the alternatives presented in this article would need to address the public-education function as well. It would be a complicated task to achieve with advertising, because a company would need to educate consumers about the back-end disadvantages of its competitors' products, and back-end features tend to be less salient than those consumers will immediately use. This type of campaign has succeeded, however. As Ronald Mann points out, the subscription movierental company Netflix became a major industry player by highlighting that consumers were paying large late fees under the traditional movierental model. This advertising was so successful that Blockbuster, the dominant movie-rental chain, had to announce its own "end of late fees" package to stay competitive. 191

(5) Implementation Through Opting In or Out

The contractual nature of credit cards allows for a different kind of regulatory regime altogether, one where individual consumers could choose from a menu of legal tools to help them control their credit-card borrowing. Unlike fields such as environmental law, where everyone breathes the same air, or election law, where treating voters equally is a normative goal, with credit cards, one consumer could be subject to Regulatory System A, while her neighbor could choose Regulatory System B.

This could be achieved by expanding the opt-out system so that consumers opt in to receiving only solicitations that contained certain features. The regulatory agency could offer options such as the "safe credit card plan" that would enable consumers to exclude all offers that failed to include the anti-temptation features discussed in Part B. A "small credit card plan" could allow consumers to receive solicitations which not only offered low initial credit limits, but which guaranteed that credit raises would only occur in specific circumstances. To help consumers avoid the trap of multiple credit cards with low limits, the "small credit card plan" could enable them to select in advance how many credit cards they wanted. Companies who obtained these consumers as customers would report this to the regulating agency, which would then transfer these consumers to "opt out" status when they reached their self-selected limit.

Some additional public education would be necessary, but much of it would be inherent in the system. In order to receive credit card offers, consumers would view short descriptions of the different credit card plans. Once a consumer selected a plan, she could be assured that she would

¹⁹¹ Charging Ahead, supra note 3, at 180.

receive only offers that met her criteria and would not need to study the fine print to be sure she understood the terms. Issuers, would in turn, be able to use these selections as borrower data in their risk calculations.

This educational screening function would benefit users of traditional credit cards as well. They could select to receive solicitations exclusively from cards with certain interest rates guaranteed for specified periods of time. They could even exclude all offers that included controversial terms such as mandatory arbitration clauses or universal default provisions. They would receive no offers at all unless an issuer decided that obtaining the accounts of those customers was worth deleting that clause from some of its contracts. This, in turn, would increase the effectiveness of government, non-profit, or private consumer-education efforts. These groups could publicize, for example, the disadvantages of mandatory arbitration clauses in the context of a specific action consumers could take to eliminate that term from their future credit card contracts. In effect, this system would allow consumers to express their demand for different contract terms and put issuers in the position in which many consumers find themselves now: that of taking or leaving their offers.

IV. CONCLUSION

Much of the controversy over credit cards has focused on the hypothesized wants and needs of low-income borrowers, but low-income borrowers themselves have been routinely excluded from the debate. In the dozens of hearing Congress held while it considered the various iterations of the bills that eventually became the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 192 the legislature invited testimony from credit-card issuers, judges, lawyers, academics and all manner of professionals, but almost never from individual debtors. Similarly, legal academics have been debating the merits of credit-card usury caps for decades, with one of the major premises underlying the argument being that imposing usury caps would reduce credit-card availability in low-income communities. But none of the empirical work to date has attempted to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of such regulation from the viewpoint of low-income credit-card users. This absence, both in the literature and the policy-making arena, has left commentators in favor of regulation vulnerable to charges of paternalism¹⁹³ and resulted in bankruptcy legislation that punishes

¹⁹² S. 256, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).

¹⁹³ See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 36, at 83. ("[I]ll-advised legislative reform proposals and confused judicial decision-making...will have little negative impact on the upper-

distressed debtors rather than addressing the structural features of credit cards that contribute to financial failure. ¹⁹⁴ It has allowed commentators on both sides of the spectrum to overlook subtler policy changes that could improve low-income people's ability to manage credit cards while having a less dramatic impact on access than usury regulation would.

This study is a modest step in the opposite direction. The participants generated a wealth of insights. These findings have the potential to move the debate into productive new territory. Legal scholars have not considered the possibility that some borrowers might want less credit available on their credit cards. The concept of "consumer-driven credit limits" is foreign in academic circles. The initial response is often, "Credit card companies have to be able to set limits on the amount they lend. They cannot just extend as much credit as the borrower wants."

But the reality is more subtle. Consumer-driven credit limits would allow borrowers to limit the amount of credit they receive, not to increase It is difficult to picture borrowers seeking ways to restrict their spending when policy rhetoric about the "immoral debtor," 196 intentionally spends beyond her means and then seeks to avoid the consequences, dominates the debate. Not surprisingly, the legislation that followed from this rhetoric addressed the perceived problem of overconsumption only after-the-fact, in bankruptcy, long after the debt is already incurred. But by listening instead to people who are directly affected by the threat of bankruptcy and other credit policies under consideration, academics and policy-makers can develop alternatives that would give consumers the tools to curb their borrowing ahead of time. This study suggests that there is indeed a problem of over-consumption, one of borrowers whose short-term spending exceeds that which they themselves would prefer in the long-run. Careful consideration of the perspectives of low-income consumers can better inform credit policies that are neither punitive nor paternalistic, but instead would enable borrowers to better resist the "temptation" many associate with credit cards and thereby better effectuate their own long-term borrowing preferences.

APPENDIX ON METHODOLOGY

middle class academics, judges, and lawyers who propound them but who also can easily escape their reach.")

¹⁹⁴ S. 256, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).

¹⁹⁵ See supra Part III.B.

¹⁹⁶ WARREN & TYAGI, *supra* note 8, at 71-95.

The study consists of detailed interviews with fifty low-income women. To qualify as "low income," participants had to reside either in public housing projects or housing subsidized through the Section 8 voucher program. There were two primary reasons for this decision. First, the population needed stable addresses over time to have access to telephone and direct-mail solicitations from credit card companies. Traditional locations of studies of low-income populations, such as welfare offices, risked including many individuals who live in shelters or other forms of unstable housing. Because of the high demand for subsidized housing, residents of housing projects and, to a lesser extent, holders of Section 8 vouchers tend to keep a single address over several years. Study participants had resided at their current addresses for a mean of six years.

Focusing on public housing and Section 8 residents had the additional advantage of providing a sample with relatively fixed incomes in addition to low incomes. For most of the participants, government benefits, usually Social Security Income (SSI), were their main source of income. Even families whose main source of income derived from work rather than benefits, had relatively fixed net incomes, because any increase or decrease in their earnings triggers a corresponding increase or decrease in rent. The issue of fixed income has interesting implications for people's ability to repay loans. Their expenses may vary over time, but their income will rarely increase. This would allow the study to explore how those who do repay their credit card debt manage to so.

I further restricted the same to women primarily because of the financial pressures they face in raising families. ¹⁹⁷ This decision also had an important practical advantage as well. I did the interviewing myself, and I knew from previous experience with this community ¹⁹⁸ that potential respondents would be more likely to participate in the study if I could interview them in their homes. ¹⁹⁹ I felt substantially more comfortable entering the homes of women I did not know than those of men.

Interviewing was the ideal methodology because the goal was to obtain a rich account of people's experiences with and opinions about

¹⁹⁷ See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.

¹⁹⁸ I founded and directed a non-profit project aimed at the Cambridge low-income community.

¹⁹⁹ This is common practice. *See*, *e.g.*, Michael S. Barr, Principal Investigator, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, *Detroit Area Household Financial Services Study* (2006), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~msbarr/ and click on "Detroit Area Study."

credit cards. To gain a textured understanding of participants' opinions, the study needed to opportunity to push participants to make real choices about the trade-offs of increased access to credit cards and not to leave with pat, unrealistic answers, such as "credit card companies should lower interest rates and make them universally available." In addition, I obtained written records of participants' borrowing histories through documents such as credit card statements or credit reports. As it was, this was the request participants were most likely to refuse, so I needed to build trust during the interview to increase the chances that participants would agree to share their records.

The interview sample was not random. I knew from experience in the community that people would not respond to a mass mailing or phone calling,²⁰⁰ especially regarding a topic as sensitive as personal financial information. Instead, I capitalized on the connections I already had in the community and developed a snowball sample.²⁰¹ I began by interviewing the twelve women I knew who met the study criteria and then asked them to talk to their friends, neighbors and relatives about the study. When I interviewed the next cohort of participants, I asked them if they knew others who would be interested. Participants were paid twenty dollars for their time. By the end of the interview, most women were willing to recommend family and friends. Many participants stated that they would not have agreed to meet with me if I had not come with an endorsement from somebody they knew. In total, the sample consists of the twelve women I knew from my earlier work and the thirty-eight met through this referral system.²⁰² I interviewed the women in person, either at their homes or a relatively quiet location, such as my home, my office, or a Dunkin Donuts.²⁰³ I recorded the interviews with a digital voice recorder and had them transcribed by a professional service.

²⁰⁰ As part of the previous work referenced in footnote 198, *supra*, I managed the recruiting of people for workshops. Three local housing projects agreed to deliver our flier directly to each apartment in their complexes. We obtained a response rate of zero. We revised our strategy and instead successfully recruited for the workshops through word of mouth.

 ²⁰¹ See, e.g., Jean Faugier and Mary Sargeant, Sampling Hard to Reach Populations, 26 J.
 ADVANCED NURSING 790 (1997).
 ²⁰² I verified after the fact that there was no statistical difference in the demographics or

²⁰² I verified after the fact that there was no statistical difference in the demographics of the answers of the participants I had known beforehand and those I had not.

²⁰³ Six participants were native Spanish speakers who needed a translator. In four of these cases, I paid a participant with whom I had worked for several years \$10 per interview to act as a translator. In the other two cases, older teenaged children of the participants offered to serve as translators, again for \$10.

The interviews began with questions about demographic data. The next set of questions concerned general financial information, such as income, monthly bills, and bank-account status. I next asked participants to list the forms of borrowing they had used, specifically inquiring about each form of borrowing not mentioned. For each form she had not used, I asked why not. Participants then described their experiences with each borrowing method in detail. At the end of each description, I asked her to identify whether the experience had been positive, negative, or somewhere in between. Next, I asked participants to rank the forms of borrowing from best to worst.

The last section of the interviews focused on participants' policy ideas. I first asked whether they thought it should be easier, harder, or about the same level of difficulty for people in their community to obtain credit cards. I then asked how credit cards could be improved and what kinds of laws they would like to see regarding them. For participants who answered both that credits should be easier to obtain and that they should be required to charge lower interest, I explained that many people thought that if credit cards had to charge less, they would become harder to access. I then asked them to choose whether they would rather have credit cards be harder to obtain and charge less interest or easier to obtain and charge more. This often took much explaining, and many participants were displeased with this choice, but all except one eventually made a decision. Next, I repeated the policy questions with respect to other forms of borrowing. I concluded the interviews by asking for documentation and giving participants who had expressed concern about debt a list of nonprofit resources.

I analyzed the transcripts using content analysis, a form of qualitative analysis developed for analyzing texts, such as political speeches, advertisements, or judicial opinions, that were not generated by researchers as data. The methodology has frequently been applied to interview transcripts as well. I began by reading the transcripts myself with a colleague trained in content analysis, and she helped me develop a codebook with which to analyze them. I then trained three law-student research assistants to code the data according to this written protocol.

²⁰⁴ I adapted all the questions to my best estimate of each participant's comprehension level. For some participants, a question like this would become, "So are [borrowing form] good, or bad, or in the middle?"

 $^{^{205}}$ See generally, Klaus Krippendorf, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (2004).

²⁰⁶ Id. See also, ROBERT PHILIP WEBER, BASIC CONTENT ANALYSIS 9 (1990).

After testing, I adjusted the initial codebook to the actual coding and then modified it as necessary during the process. ²⁰⁷

Most of the coded information consisted of answers to specific interview questions. For example, participants ranked the various forms of borrowing to which they had access. In addition, the study also coded for two themes that arose throughout the interviews: the perception of credit cards as a temptation and the concern about credit discrimination against low-income borrowers.

Description of Sample

The mean income of the participants was \$1194.57 per month, with a standard deviation of \$982.51. The median monthly income was \$770. Participants derived their income from a variety of sources, such as work (48 percent), Social Security Income (40 percent), child support (22 percent), and welfare (16 percent). Many households had more than one source of income, especially when they were receiving child support. Fewer than 10 percent of participants lived in households where there was more than one working earner. Sixty-four percent of participants received food stamps for themselves and/or their children, and the same percentage had Medicaid health insurance. Nearly 80 percent of families received one of these two benefits. Fifty-two percent of participants lived in public housing, while 48 percent held Section 8 vouchers. The racial and ethnic composition of the sample was 44 percent black, 40 percent Latina, 10 percent white, 2 percent Asian, and 4 percent biracial.

The mean, median and mode for education was some, but less than two years of, college, with a full half of the participants falling within the range of having graduated from high school or a GED program to having completed two years of college. Participants ranged in age from twenty-two to sixty-one, with a median of forty-five. They had a median of two children. That figure held constant for the number of children they were currently supporting and the number of total dependents. Fourteen percent of participants had filed for bankruptcy, 8 percent within the past two years. The study was able to obtain credit documentation, either credit-card statements or credit reports, from 68 percent of participants. An additional 14 percent volunteered documents, but had no credit-card records and no credit report on file with any of the three major reporting agencies. Only eighteen percent declined to provide documentation.

²⁰⁷ I also employed eight undergraduate psychology-student volunteers to enter the objective data obtained in the interviews.
²⁰⁸ Most of these participants had not used credit cards or any other form of bank-related

Most of these participants had not used credit cards or any other form of bank-related borrowing.